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**Recent Migration  
in Poland.  
Trends and Causes**

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**Maj 1997**

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# **RECENT MIGRATION IN POLAND.**

## **Trends and causes**

**Marek Okólski**

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Badanie przeprowadzono w ramach projektu badawczego zamawianego Komitetu Badań Naukowych: “Imigranci: przyczyny napływu, cechy demograficzno-społeczne, funkcjonowanie w społeczeństwie polskim” (PBZ-042-05), na zamówienie Biura ds. Migracji i Uchodźstwa MSW.

## 1. Purpose and contents

In this paper I focus on the basic characteristics of international population movements observed in Poland since 1989 and principal determinants of those movements. The paper goal is to expose the distinctiveness of recent migration relative to the past trends. In order to achieve that, the proper analysis is preceded by a brief and highly selective description of what was the essence of those past movements.

## 2. Introducing basic concepts and sources of evidence

Bearing in mind well-known substantial differences in the definitions of basic categories applied in migration studies, as well as factual discrepancies in the body of evidence concerning migratory flows and stocks, widely observed not only when comparative international perspective is adopted but also, when - in individual country perspective - time is allowed to change, it seems useful to begin the following considerations with a concise presentation of major concepts and data sources referred to.

For the exclusive purpose of this paper, and for reasons that will be explained later<sup>1</sup>, I will conceive an international migration as a movement from one country to another which is primarily related to earning/acquiring the means of subsistence for the migrant or her/his family and not necessarily to the length of stay<sup>2</sup>. Such a wide approach will enable me to deal in a flexible manner with various concepts and data sources on migration which are in use or available in Poland and principal countries with which Poland is linked through current population flows.

To be more specific, in assessing general trends and regularities I will have to resort to the evidence based on administrative records/registers or population censuses. Those sources adopt rather rigid defining criteria and tend to ignore a majority of short-term migrants or migrants in irregular situations in the country of destination. In particular, due to complex circumstances, official Polish statistics on migration are limited to a relatively small part of the migrants whose explicit intention is to settle in the country of destination. Therefore my estimates and judgements concerning such general matters as the size of migratory flows from and to Poland, its changes over time, the composition of those flows with regard to nationality,

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<sup>1</sup>See a description (to follow) of new and specific to political and economic transition movements, such as incomplete migration.

<sup>2</sup>The definition of an international migrant underlying my analysis generally departs from the traditional one. Voluntary spatial mobility, both on internal and international scale, was always undertaken with the improvement of migrant's living predicament in mind. It might well be assumed that human being is a highly mobile creature who in pursuing her/his objectives may venture a number of migrations. In doing so one rarely predetermines the duration of stay in the new place of residence nor the fact that any particular movement would be the ultimate one. In spite of this a majority of policy makers and many researchers, at least until the end of the interwar period, seemed to believe that the virtue of international migration was a move from one country to another with an intention of making an ultimate movement, i.e. changing the country of settlement. In a post-war climate of belief that labour markets in individual countries could be better balanced (if not satisfactorily controlled) by means of channelled or stimulated transfers of temporary workers from the countries with excess supply of labour to the countries with excess demand, in the 1970s a definition was developed within the United Nations, and subsequently recommended to the member countries, which made a distinction between long-term and short-term migration. The former meant a duration of stay abroad in excess of one year (and could be identified with settlement migration) whereas the later between three months and one year. Notwithstanding controversies surrounding that definition, and despite considerable differences across the member countries regarding the extent to which it is actually followed, in none of them is a move abroad for shorter than three months recognised as migration.

type of movement, etc. will only be vague and tentative. However, wherever possible, in dealing with structural characteristics of migrants as well as the causes of migratory movements I will refer to a variety of data sources, ranging from media reports through working papers of various specialized government organizations to scattered surveys devoted specifically to the subject<sup>3</sup>.

### **3. Is Poland in any respect an unusual or distinct case for migration study?**

The question appears trivial but nevertheless needs to be asked and answered. I shall address it in an indirect way by describing major developments in Polish migration over recent several decades.

In doing so it would perhaps be useful to look as far back as at the second half of the 19th century when Poland, still partitioned between three neighbouring states: Austria, Prussia and Russia, experienced rapid albeit belated relative to western Europe modernisation that followed social reforms (including the final abolition of serfdom and limited enfranchisement of peasants) and industrialisation. A huge overmanning in agriculture was quickly revealed which could hardly be coped with by demand for labour generated by - being still in its infancy - local industrial sector. To make things more difficult, this period also saw unprecedented acceleration in the population growth. In response to aggravating labour prospects, between 1860 and 1890 a massive outflow of people, mostly inhabitants of overpopulated regions of central eastern and south eastern Poland began. It is estimated that within around 50 years more than 3.5 million persons emigrated (from the territory encircled by the 1938 state boundaries), the majority of them to overseas destinations. They were followed by over 2 million migrants or displaced persons who left Polish lands during the First World War and nearly 2 million who emigrated in the period 1918-1939 [Pilch, 1984].

A predominant share of people who emigrated from Poland prior to the outbreak of the Second World War headed for the United States, Germany and Latin America. They were mostly impoverished or landless peasants. Those people of whom around 75 per cent settled abroad and never returned, set up one of the largest and strongest diaspora of that time<sup>4</sup>.

The drama of the Polish state and Polish nation which began with the joint German and Soviet invasion in September 1939 and was finalised with the agreement of Yalta in February 1945, brought about a new wave of migrations which was fundamentally different from the earlier one. First, initially most of these migrations were of involuntary nature (deportations, army movements, other displacements). Secondly, although the migrations involved practically all strata of the Polish society, it is highly probable that groups of people situated higher on the social ladder, city dwellers and highly educated persons were overrepresented. Thirdly, a large majority of the migrants found a stable post-war settlement in the western countries for whom Poland happened to be an ally in the Second World War, i.e. mainly in the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Canada and Australia, which shifted the geographical composition of Polish migrants by destination to the disadvantage of formerly most preferred countries: Germany, Brazil, Argentina and (for a while) even the USA.

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<sup>3</sup>Many of those sources are hardly widely available but some of them were already quoted in my earlier publications on the subject. Wherever this is the case, I have chosen to refer to a relevant publication of myself rather than to an original source.

<sup>4</sup>It should be mentioned that a non-negligible proportion of that diaspora became an outcome of involuntary migrations, enforced principally by Tsar's Russia or the former Soviet Union.

According to the estimates made by Polish historians, between 1 September 1939 and 8 May 1945, i.e. over less than six years, more than 5 million Polish citizens or, in other words, every sixth inhabitant of Poland's territory (as of 1938) left the state frontiers [e.g. Kersten, 1974, Pilch, 1984, Piesowicz, 1988].

Migrations related to the Second World War contributed to the perpetuation of the Polish diaspora until present day. The diaspora is now believed to include as many as 12 million persons who admit to Polish nationality or maintain regular contacts with relatives in Poland [Stpiczynski, 1992].<sup>5</sup>

The Polish diaspora whose foundations were laid in the 19th century proved very stable and deeply concerned with the old country destiny. Among other things it continued to seriously influence Poland's political, economic and cultural reality, and in particular helped the people in Poland to resist or survive drawbacks that resulted from the communist rule. It is due to the involvement and assistance of the diaspora that the outflow of Poles was never effectively stopped even though the policy of the communist administration repeatedly attempted to achieve such task.

In discussing the relevance of Polish case for a scholarly analysis of recent migration trends, one should not overlook that due to the geopolitical location of Poland and dramatic political developments in Central Eastern Europe, a large part of the current population was born to migrants or is composed of migrants themselves. In order to illustrate this point it is sufficient to remember that among around 24 million inhabitants of Poland recorded at the end of 1946<sup>6</sup> as many as 4 million immigrated<sup>7</sup> in 1944-1946, a majority of them to localities distant from previous homes [Kosinski, 1969]. Moreover, more than 15 million internal movements took place between 1946 and 1959, and by the year 1970 statistically everybody in Poland became a migrant. Bearing in mind such extraordinary spatial mobility and provided that migratory experience in one's family belongs to the factors conducive to international migration, it might therefore be argued that there were good reasons to expect in the beginning of the post-war period a high propensity to future emigration among the Polish population. Contrary to this prediction, however, the years 1950-1979 happened to witness a very low level of international movements of Poles, probably the lowest in the entire modern history of Poland.

A more recent period, namely the 1980s, provides another conspicuous evidence of how distinct contemporary Polish migrations are. It was then, after three decades of very low outflow (practically limited to settlement emigration based on family reunion principle, and with a peak in 1959 when 37 thousand persons emigrated<sup>8</sup>), that mass migration was restored.

Political upheavals of 1980-1981 and 1988 produced two distinct peaks in the emigration trend of that decade. It goes without saying that Polish asylum seekers were treated in the West on preferential terms at the times of political tension in Poland. On the other hand, a gradual liberalisation of passport regulations (migration policy, in general) in Poland<sup>9</sup>, which resulted in grossly intensified travelling of Poles to western countries, coincided with a lenient (to say the least) policy of the FRG towards the applicants for *Aussiedler* status coming from Poland<sup>10</sup>. In effect, the

<sup>5</sup>An evergreen anecdote claims that the second largest Polish city is Chicago, Illinois as the number of Poles living in Chicago appears to be only slightly lower than in Warsaw but certainly higher than in Lodz.

<sup>6</sup>Persons who were repatriated to Germany in 1947-1950 and 1956-1957 are not included in this count.

<sup>7</sup>They were predominantly repatriated from the territory lost in 1945 (Yalta) to the ex-USSR.

<sup>8</sup>The period 1957-1958 when around 200 thousand ethnic Germans were allowed to be repatriated is ignored here.

<sup>9</sup>It has been initiated in the second half of 1980 but withdrawn/denied on 13 December 1981, then resumed in 1984 and culminated at the end of 1988.

<sup>10</sup>This policy seemed to be an aftermath of the failure of the temporary labour recruitment strategy pursued by the FRG from around mid-1960s to 1973. After bringing the recruitment of new guest-workers to an abrupt halt in 1973, the strategy was never resumed. Instead, a major source of foreign labour in the FRG economy turned out *Aussiedler* migrants from Central and Eastern Europe, notably from Poland.

transfer of the members of German minority, which in the past was subject to bilateral inter-government agreements and strictly controlled by the Polish administration, became spontaneous and (particularly in 1988-1990) vehement [Okolski, 1994a].

It might be argued that a large share of people who participated in those two types of flows: politically and ethnically motivated, were in fact economically motivated migrants, and that the two flows to a large degree concealed a major objective of migrants which in reality was a search for a better quality of life in the relatively little known but acclaimed "western paradise".

My own estimate of gross long-term emigration (i.e. related to at least one-year long stay in a foreign country) in 1980-1989 suggests the number between 1.1 and 1.3 million persons of whom only around 20 per cent returned to Poland by the end of 1989 [Okolski, 1994b]. In order to put that number in a comparative perspective, one might mention that in the 1980s Poland ranked as the top net emigration country in Europe, in both relative and absolute terms.

A distinct feature of emigration wave in that period was its purely voluntary character. Migrants were generally relatively young and well-off; those originating from large cities and more highly educated were over-represented. Most migrants headed for Germany (55 per cent), the USA (13 per cent), Austria (5 per cent), Italy (5 per cent), France (4 per cent) and Canada (3 per cent).

A special register of border crossings (being in the 1980s a strictly qualified source) revealed that only 15 per cent of long-term migrants emigrated legally whereas the rest constituted invisible migration not accounted for in the central population register. Invisible and at the same time, in the light of administrative regulations of that period, illegal migrants disguised themselves as tourists. In reality they were false tourists who failed to return to Poland within the time stated in their exit visa. A particular pattern could be observed as far as the age and sex compositions of legal and illegal emigrants were concerned, namely within individual families adult men who belonged to younger age brackets (25-44 years) constituted a primary illegal outflow, which was followed by a secondary and at the same time legal outflow consisting of women at about the same age and children. Significant over-representation of young males among illegal migrants and over-representation of young females and children among legal migrants seemed to clearly reflect that pattern [Okolski, 1996a].

In the light of recent evidence it seems justified to say that Poles who emigrated in the 1980s were very eager to leave Poland and settle somewhere abroad. They as a rule wished to exploit unusual opportunities offered by certain western countries, notably the FRG (which included fast-track legalisation procedure, preferential status and generously assisted adaptation period) for a radical improvement of their living conditions. However, taking into account that so many young and relatively well-off persons undertook a risk of becoming a foreigner in an alien country, and in particular that so many migrants from Poland (632 thousand between 1980 and 1989) identified themselves as ethnic Germans (many times more than any reasonable estimate of the size of German minority in Poland known around 1980), applied for *Aussiedler* status and, consequently, German nationality/citizenship, and - what fragmented evidence tends to prove - relatively easily and quickly integrated with the German society (rather than joined the traditional Polish diaspora in Germany or set up new Polish communities there), one might argue that the economic explanation of this process might not be comprehensive nor satisfactory [Okolski, 1993].

As pointed out in one of the most penetrating analyses of the collapse of state socialism in Poland, since the 1970s the Polish society gradually drifted into the status of dual organization [Kaminski, 1991]. Growing disobedience or inertia among largely disillusioned people as far as public life was concerned which met with a growing inability of the state to cope with its countless self-imposed duties produced the "syndrome of withdrawal". Step by step the state withdrew from its prerogatives concerning the people, and the people withdrew from the officialdom. Informal links, informal markets (including goods, labour or money markets), informal organizations (including political opposition and "free trade unions"), informal culture and education, etc. became widespread and visible, and finally some of them overshadowed their formal counterparts.

On the other hand, under state socialism in the course of time work ethos, social norms and values were widely eroding, while the lack of institutions of civil society and shrinking social cohesion were restricting the degree of self-realisation on the part of adult population. In effect, a large proportion of the Polish society underwent a gradual demoralisation, a process which was reinforced by the awareness of western improvements. As Kaminski argues, the ultimate form of people withdrawal was inner exile (or, in other words, spiritual emigration) which often involved as much as possible the rejection of social ties, participation in public affairs or cultural life, etc. As a matter of fact, many young and highly skilled people found themselves in such situations. This was short of looking for an opportunity to reject Poland as a country to live in.

Irrespective of the breakdown of the "socialist way" of development in Poland (and other communist countries of Europe), the modernisation imposed upon society by Marxist elites gave rise to the "social maladaptation syndrome" [Jozan, 1989]. In pursuit of socialist modernisation the elites undertook to disrupt traditional values and institutions, at the same time translocating large numbers of peasants from the most backward to newly developing, socially amorphous industrial centres. Within a lifespan of one generation this created masses of uprooted people with virtually no leadership, guidance and consistent values. This undermining of internal coherence and softening of spirit which became the case of many individuals might also have contributed to the high pace of outflow in the 1980s and the determination with which people were heading westwards.

If the above interpretation is plausible then indeed the hypothesis identifying economic factors as a major cause of the 1980s exodus from Poland requires re-statement. Namely, in the light of this reasoning, it is possible that Poland in the 1980s presented itself a case confirming an assertion that in the modern world international migrants are primarily attracted by more successful and efficient institutional set up [Olson, 1985].

Granting everyone the right to leave Poland at any time which was proclaimed by the last communist government in the middle of 1988 (when negotiations between the ruling communists and opposition on dismantling of the state socialism were already in progress) and quickly (within a half a year) implemented, was bound to introduce a discontinuity to migration trends in Poland. Until that time, in spite of subsequent liberalisations in migration/passport policy, the gate - so to speak - remained too narrow to cope with the demand and indeed a pressure on exit. The changes that actually took place, however, turned out to be much above rational expectations<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup>It should be added that it was not only the final lifting of exit restrictions but also a generous opening of the state boundaries to incoming foreigners which signalled new migration policy. Those measures quickly met with the reciprocal introduction of visa-free entry for Polish citizens in a number of European countries.

Before a more orderly description of those changes is attempted, let me at this point only list the most important of them.

First, what was unprecedented in Poland's modern history, she started to play host to masses of foreigners whose mobility took on several forms, like arrivals of petty traders, migration of temporary workers, inflow of refugees, settlement immigration or repatriation. In striking contrast to the past, the incoming foreign citizens by and large outnumbered the outgoing Poles.

Secondly, Poland became a strategic destination for large numbers of transit migrants denied access to or anticipating difficulties in entering western Europe.

Thirdly, settlement emigration was brought down to the level which is probably lower than typically under repressive communist rule, and - if this is accurate - the lowest in modern history of Poland.

Fourthly, a number of deep structural changes occurred, such as:

- incomplete migration became a predominant form of international movements of people, and replaced in that role the settlement migration;
- emigrants generally shifted to less remote destinations, and their average stay abroad was drastically shortened;
- illegal emigration faded away, and in a sense was replaced by illegal immigration;
- the inflow of highly educated foreigners started to preponderate over the outflow of highly educated Poles, at least in case of settlement migration.

The fact that these changes were not only very profound but, what is even more remarkable, happened in a very short time, some of them almost overnight, provides us with yet another reason for taking a closer look at contemporary Polish migration and attempting a more thorough causal analysis.

#### **4. Major traits of migratory movements since 1989**

In order to present a set of hypotheses on the factors that underlie newly emerged migratory trends, which I am going to achieve in the final part of this paper, it seems to me necessary first to take a close look at their scale and structure.

It goes without saying that a sudden multiplication of border crossings, both by Poles and foreigners, which began in 1989, constitutes a corner-stone for the relevant analysis. For a country like Poland until 1988, with strictly controlled frontiers, with an explicit policy of intimidating foreign travelling and direct contacts of her citizens with other nationals, it must have had far-reaching consequences.

Between 1988-1995 the number of entries by foreign citizens increased from 6 million to 82 million, and the number of exits by Poles from 10 million to 36 million [CSO, 1996a]. Three aspects of that change need to be accentuated:

- the numbers: by four-fold rise in case of the Poles and fourteen-fold rise in case of the foreigners, the transborder population movements have reached a qualitatively new dimension; especially, by this sheer fact in many regions of Poland foreign citizens have become a part of everyday life;

- the form of trips: in sharp contrast to the recent past, a vast majority of trips was undertaken individually and spontaneously<sup>12</sup>;
- the ratio of Poles-to-foreigners trips: while in 1988 almost two Poles per one foreigner were registered at border check-points, in 1995 this proportion was more than reversed (over two foreigners per one Pole).

As far as the incoming foreign citizens is concerned, in 1995 as many as 63 million visits (77 per cent of the total) ended on the day of entry. It might be presumed that nearly all these visits were related to shopping. In addition, 5.3 million trips that involved at least one night stay were related to shopping although in many instances this was combined with other business (e.g. selling goods or services). However, additional 5.5 million foreign visits lasting at least one night were mostly devoted to some other kind of business, of which 1.8 million to seeking any gainful occupation [IT, 1996].

Typically, those foreigners whose stay in Poland is longer than just one day spend only few days there before going back home. The average duration of visit within this group in 1995 was 4.7 nights<sup>13</sup>. Only 38 per cent of visitors who fell into this group spent at least five nights in Poland in 1995 [IT, 1996].

It should be stressed that foreigners visiting Poland are "addicted" travellers. In 1995 for more than 50 per cent of persons who did not go back home on the day of entry, it was already at least their fifth journey to Poland [IT, 1996]. This proportion is certainly higher among those who leave on the same day.

It might be estimated on the basis of official records and specialised surveys that in 1995 from 3 to 5 million foreign citizens who spent at least one night in Poland were involved in some kind of short-term (usually shorter than one week) economic activity there. They were predominantly the citizens of ex-Soviet republics, with Ukraine being by far the most important country.

As far as Poles are concerned, at present and contrary to the 1980s, the principal goal for a majority of international trips (69 % in 1995) is genuine tourism or business. This, however, does not seem the case with travelling to Germany, the principal target country, in case of which in 1995 most visits lasted only one day. On the other hand, it is estimated that in 1995 21 per cent of travellers from Poland were weekend shoppers, pedlars or petty traders and 5 per cent job seekers [IT, 1996]. This suggests that still for a large number of Polish citizens main purpose of travelling abroad is earning some money. The 1995 number of this kind foreign trips which involved at least one night spent abroad might be estimated at around 4 million which translate itself to as many as 1-2 million persons.

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<sup>12</sup>The number of tours organized by tourist/travel agencies and "sponsored" trips, such as artists or sportsmen travelling on official business, within the educational, academic, cultural, exchange scheme, etc. did not increase as much as the number of arranged individually arranged trips.

<sup>13</sup>The length of stay seems to be more related to the distance from the country of origin than to any other factor. For instance, in 1995 the average length of visit in case of the citizens of the United States was 21.8 nights, whereas in case of the citizens of the United Kingdom 6.4 nights, France 5.9 nights, Russia 5.5 nights, Germany 4.5 nights and Ukraine 3.4 nights.

A large majority of those 1-2 million Poles and 3-5 million foreigners making regularly their international trips with the primary intention to benefit economically would fall into a new category of migration, namely incomplete migration. The importance of incomplete migration to and from Poland, as follows from a number of recently conducted surveys, stems from that it rarely is an accidental event in one's life history but it is either a chronic state or a preliminary stage in the migration process which transform into a more conventional form of international migration. These movements are not only symptomatic to the present transitory period of Poland's modern history but their truly massive scale makes them probably the most distinct migratory phenomenon of the 1990s.

The essence of incomplete migration is its quasi-migratory character. This means that the people involved do not strictly or hardly at all fulfil preconditions which are generally set for a migrant, especially the minimum length of stay abroad. On the other hand, they realise to a high degree, probably higher than any other migrants, economic function of migration.

The following three features seem to aptly depict a migrant of this kind:

- "loose" social and economic status in the country of origin;
- irregularity of stay or work in the host country, and
- maintaining close and steady contacts with migrant's household in the home country (by means of regular phone communication, frequent home visits, remitting money, etc.).

Although the length of specific stays abroad and the distance from the countries of destination tend to be generally very short, no regularity can be observed as far as the duration of stay abroad or the location of the host country are concerned in case of incomplete migration<sup>14</sup>. Despite the flexible nature of incomplete migration, including the migrant's social role and economic status both in the country of origin and destination, it is usually well organized and supported by a professional infrastructure and extended networks. On the other hand, this type of migration, by its very nature and probably more than any other type of migration, inescapably limits people to a movement between peripheries of various national economies and cultures<sup>15</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup>Some movements are so short (from a few days to a few weeks), that they fail to meet criteria inhered in any popular definition of migration, and they tend to be recurrent according to a cycle typical for a particular (national/regional/local) labour market of the host country (or to any other opportunities to earn more money that it might have been possible by staying in home country) while some others might extend to over one year. In addition, Polish migrants of this kind hardly follow traditional routes marked by earlier migration waves from Poland and they rather carefully react to foreign demand for (seasonal, irregular) labour or to other foreign-travelling-related gainful opportunities.

<sup>15</sup>[For those migrants registration of their stay or business or work abroad is a matter of secondary importance. In fact, they are usually compelled to act under the tourist cover. Neither do they care about getting access to public health system, social security and education of host countries. Very rarely they intend to settle abroad. Instead, those persons split their lives between making money in foreign countries (or through purposeful operations in those countries), and using basic (public) social services and spending holiday time (vacations, national or religious holidays, certain weekends) in home country. This is greatly facilitated by an extensive use of fast and relatively inexpensive means of telecommunication and transportation. As they mostly travel alone, the family life of those migrants usually goes undisturbed in their home country. Many migrants falling into this type of movements are socially and economically loose individuals, at any time ready to move or go back.

Incomplete migration is by no means the only type of movement which brings considerable amount of foreign citizens to Poland. Another important and new (but relatively unstable) form of the respective inflow are the migrations which embrace foreigners who are on their way to some other (western) country, and come to Poland not because of transportation necessity but for some other reasons which on aggregate might be perceived as the difficulty with getting access to a desired country of destination. They constitute a large and formerly unknown type of transit migrants. The salient feature of their movements is criminality<sup>16</sup>.

For the last six years Poland has been attracting large numbers of those people because of the neighbourhood with Germany, by far the most preferred target country in Europe. The notion of "transit migration", however, seems a little confusing in the context of my analysis because for many migrants concerned Poland plays a role of a "vestibule" rather than a "direct passage". As a rule the migrants use well organized international networks of traffickers and rarely take unnecessary risks. The transit through Poland may well take weeks or months during which the migrant might be compelled to go into hiding, or to disguise the genuine purpose of the trip to Poland by pretending to be a refugee-applicant, a migrant worker, a student or a tourist. Moreover, while waiting for a proper moment to leave Poland, some transit migrants take occasional jobs in the grey sector.

The magnitude of transit migration in Poland, other than lawful travelling through the country because of technical reasons (e.g. international rail or road network), is unknown and for its very nature must remain obscured. It is, however, a common experience of a number of organisations in Poland (border guard, police) that it is by all means non-negligible phenomenon. A cautious "guestimate" (surely, informed one) would imply a number of 50-100 thousand of such migrants on an annual scale [IOM, 1995].

The geographical composition of migrants transiting through Poland can also only be guessed. Any estimate must be limited to two sources: prevented illegal border crossing and deportation records. The two records, however, might imply a biased picture as they reflect only failures, and the rate of failure might not be the same for all nationalities. As a matter of fact there exists a third source but its nature is even more preselective than that of the two former. It is the refugee application record which recently includes practically all transit migrants travelling in large groups (15-300 persons), and intercepted in the interior by the police<sup>17</sup>.

Contrary to incomplete migration, transit migration seems to involve large numbers of people from far away rather than from the neighbouring post-Soviet countries. Initially, in 1990-1992, a large majority of transit migrants originated from Romania and Bulgaria. Other more frequently recorded nationalities included Ethiopia, Somalia and Iraq. Recently, in 1994-1996, two geographical regions predominate: South Central and Western Asia and North Africa. The major countries of origin are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka. The year 1996, when a number of large groups of transiting people (over 100 persons each) were spotted inside Poland, saw a dramatic rise in the inflow of migrants from Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and India<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup>At least a part of such migration involves an illegal deed (border crossing, document forgery, etc.).

<sup>17</sup>It is a common practice that upon arrest all migrants claim to be asylum-seekers; however, immediately after submitting an application for refugee status they disperse and never again report to the authorities.

<sup>18</sup>Between 1 January and 30 September around 1,000 persons from these four countries were uncovered by the police.

Apart from newly emerged migratory flows of foreigners to or through Poland, also conventional emigration of Poles deserves a special attention in the description of major population movements observed since 1989. The main feature of the latter, however, appear to be not so much its scale but rather the structural transformations.

In the 1980s around 120 thousand Polish citizens became long-term emigrants (at least 12-month stay abroad) each year. The estimate based on a survey recently conducted in four regions of Poland<sup>19</sup> suggests for the period 1990-1994 a figure lower by one-half (around 60 thousand). Furthermore, it seems that within this group of migrants the proportion between those who settled abroad and those who returned to Poland changed considerably due to much stronger decline in the number of returning migrants than settlers. If nowadays people migrate with the intention of coming back to Poland, they more and more often stay abroad for shorter than one year, and do not qualify as long-term migrants<sup>20</sup>.

It might be mentioned at this point that a large number of Polish citizens who, according to the Polish law, retain their permanent residence in Poland, in reality live abroad. The 1995 microcensus revealed that as many as 900 thousand permanent residents of Poland were staying in a foreign country for at least two months [CSO, 1996b]. Confrontation of this figure with all other available Polish sources (among them with the results of the 1988 population census) and the data on foreign residents published in major countries receiving migrants from Poland suggests, however, that a large majority of those persons have actually settled abroad, in fact usually more than 7-8 years ago, but did not cancel their domicile in Poland.

One of the most spectacular structural changes concerning emigration from Poland was a shift from more to less educated migrants. The declining trend of the number and proportion of highly educated emigrants started in 1989, and was continued in the 1990s. The only category of educational attainment which displayed an increase as far as the number of emigrants is concerned was elementary education.

In effect, the predominance of emigrants having attained at most elementary education in all emigrants has greatly increased (from 38 to 73 % in 1988-1995), and by 1995 the official settlement emigration as registered by Polish statistics has become the almost exclusive domain of low educated people.

This trend contributed to one of the least expected migratory phenomena of the transition period in Poland, i.e. "inverse brain drain". In the early 1990s the decreasing number of highly educated emigrants met with increasing number of highly educated immigrants, and even though on the whole emigrants continued to outnumber immigrants, the net migration of people with university diploma became positive. For instance, in 1995 despite the fact that in general the number of emigrants exceeded the number of immigrants by the factor 3.2, the number of immigrants with a university diploma was by over 280 per cent higher than the respective number of emigrants, and even the number of immigrants with completed secondary education (including not completed post-secondary) was by more than 10 per cent in excess of the respective number of emigrants [Okolski, 1996b].

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<sup>19</sup>The survey on the causes and consequences of migration from Poland was carried out by the Centre for Migration Studies (Institute for Social Studies, Warsaw University) [e.g. Jazwinska, Iglicka and Okolski, 1996].

<sup>20</sup>For instance, the Labour Force Survey revealed that between May 1993 and May 1996 the number of short-term migrants (according to their status established at the time of the survey) rose by 5 % whereas the number of long-term migrants (according to the above principle) declined by 35 % [Okolski, 1996b].

Finally, a reference ought to be made to two distinct changes concerning the flows of migrant workers. One of these changes pertains to Poles working abroad and another to foreigners working in Poland.

As far as Polish workers employed in other countries are concerned, their number is at present probably higher than it was in the 1980s but no reliable estimate can be made at this time. What seems obvious instead is the shift in the legal status of workers and the geography of that migration. In the 1980s a large majority of Polish migrant workers abroad was in irregular situation, and in the peak year (1988) only around 120 thousand Poles staying abroad were officially recorded in employment statistics [Okolski, 1990]. In recent years that figure oscillates between 300 thousand and 350 thousand [Okolski, 1996b]. The conclusion which seems plausible here is that after 1988 the flows of Polish labour became at least partly channelled and regularised. Furthermore, in the 1990s an overwhelming majority of migrant workers heads for western labour markets, most notably for the German market while in the 1980s - at least insofar as regular employment was concerned - a predominant proportion of Poles worked in the ex-CMEA or Middle East countries.

On the other hand, the inflow of foreign workers to Poland presents itself even more remarkable case despite that in quantitative terms it appears to be much lower than the outflow of Polish workers. The uncommon aspect of that migratory flow is obvious: for the first time in many decades the Polish labour market attracts inhabitants of other countries. In 1995 around 12 thousand foreign residents were permitted to take a job in Poland. Of that number less than 3 thousand were highly qualified professionals, mostly from western countries, while a majority of the rest were manual workers or servicemen from Ukraine, Belarus, Vietnam and some other countries. In addition, it is estimated that annually between 50 thousand and 100 thousand foreign workers (predominantly from Ukraine) remain in an irregular situation. Preliminary results of recently launched studies indicate that some of them are brought to Poland with the wave of incomplete migration, but a significant part is made up of former petty traders who, in spite of the irregularity of their stay and employment, already transformed to settled or at least long-term migrants [Okolski, 1996b].

To sum up, in the period since 1989 the population of Poland retained its traditionally high mobility but no acceleration in the outflow took place. On the contrary, certain flows were significantly reduced (e.g. ethnically-motivated emigration and long-term emigration in general) or totally disappeared (e.g. the outflow of asylum-seekers). On the other hand, many structural characteristics of the Polish migrants flows were seriously modified or totally transformed. In addition, Poland became a country of immigration, and indeed underwent the most sizeable influx of foreigners in its modern history. Therefore once more, within a relatively short time, migratory trends changed dramatically for Poland.

## 5. The causes of recent migration

Let me start from the following truism which will not be discussed here: the causes of any sizeable and persistent migratory flow are very complex. It might also be mentioned that the determinants of various forms or types of migration differ, and consequently those forms or types require different explanations.

On the other hand, bearing in mind that in science a theory serves as the main means of causal reasoning, two more clarifications are needed in addition. First, not only that there is not even one widely accepted general migration theory, but also that no theory exists which would capture the whole complexity of migration. Rather most of migration theories are one-dimensional. Second, even with respect to the same form or type of migration, a researcher is confronted with many competing and to a degree mutually contradictory interpretations. All this makes the present task perplexing.

In the present author's opinion, neither theories at hand nor available empirical material make it possible to produce a rigorous and precise analysis of the causes of recent migratory trends in Poland. For the theories, as already suggested, are too universal and at the same time too narrow-oriented to grasp major traits of the transitory, by its very nature, reality<sup>21</sup>, whereas the empirical knowledge, at least at this moment, is too scanty and superficial.

However, if a temptation to pursue a clean-cut and model-like analysis is resisted, I would suggest step by step cause-oriented reflections on all major forms or types of migration that are currently observed in Poland, which would take into account the following arguments.

First, while the role of independent decision-making by individuals is generally growing since 1989, and the range of available choices increased, the principal criterion for making choices (including those concerning migration) became economic premises.

Second, it would be naive to believe that in the period under consideration the people in Poland and in other ex-socialist countries started to follow perfectly or at least coherently signals emitted by the market. Various inconsistencies in the reform packages in particular countries and diversified scope, depth and pace of reforms across the countries greatly delay the process of learning of how to react rationally to those signals but on the other hand give way to increased territorial mobility.

Third, although the people enjoy a much greater degree of freedom of making choices, they are bound to take greater risks, and more competence and responsibility is required from them. In Poland this brought about a tremendous (almost non-existent on wider scale in the past years) differentiation in wage levels and career opportunities to the advantage of young generation and university graduates and propositions.

Fourth, some factors which proved of crucial importance for the 1980s migrations in Poland either ceased to operate or were drastically limited in or shortly after 1989, or their effects seem adverse now. For instance, no longer is political (or any other kind) persecution a matter of the real life, no control of Polish citizens exists on exit, and no preferences are offered to immigrants from Poland in western countries. On the other hand, instant restoration of almost perfect balance in the consumer good markets and introduction of (limited) convertibility of Polish currency as a result of shock therapy administered to the Polish economy on 1 January 1990, produced a major change in profitability of economic migration (particularly, incomplete migration): the movements of Poles became much less beneficial while the movements of foreign citizens (to Poland) much more beneficial.

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<sup>21</sup>A brief discussion of the relevance of major migration theories to the explanation of current migration trends in Poland is included in the Appendix ("A note on the relevance of migration theory").

Finally, fifth, some other factors that underlay the migration of Poles in that decade are still operating, and their effect is strongly independent of the changes introduced since 1989. The most important of these factors seems the existence (and activity) of the Polish diaspora in the West and respective migratory networks<sup>22</sup>. One might also mention here a specific skill (if not art), developed by the Poles under the socialism, of finding "small niches" by individuals, by which I mean the skill of exploiting the opportunities created by gaps in legislation, ineffectiveness of the state bureaucracy, corruption of administrators and deep market imbalances in Poland but above all a limited freedom of travelling abroad.

Taking into account the above arguments, the phenomenon of incomplete migration might be interpreted in the following manner: it is to a large extent the form of international mobility that feeds on transitory character of the reality, inadequacy of law or its inefficient enforcement, and floating or amorphous social and economic structures. The list of pertinent specific factors would be too long to be quoted here, but let me just mention two of them which often escape attention of researchers. One of them is the emergence of a powerful incentive to seek additional income abroad, i.e. a determination to defend/maintain the level of living achieved until the transition started, in a situation of dramatic decline in real incomes and scarcity of jobs in home country, and another factor the emergence of masses of idle or loose people finding no obstacles to travelling.

In particular, the mobility of people from the ex-Soviet republics resembles the westward movements of Poles in the 1980s when migrants had a lot of time to spare, and the price of their time was very cheap. In such circumstances it practically does not matter what profit (if any) is made on migration. At present this seems specially relevant to a large part of people from Belarus and Ukraine (but also Armenia and some other more remote countries) involved in incomplete migration who formally remain in the employment in their home countries but due to the economic slump their factories do not operate, and no wages (or only a small fraction of the wage) are paid to those people. For them migration is often a matter of survival.

The determinants and motivation in case of many Poles appear very much different. At least three different "patterns" can be distinguished in this respect [Jazwinska and Okolski, 1996].

For migrants coming from relatively modern agricultural regions the major determinant seems to be newly revealed acute overemployment of family farms. This is primarily caused by two factors. First, market influence made many farmers act more rationally, and in fact, in some regions of Poland technological improvements and increased labour productivity were quickly noticeable. In effect, the demand for labour of family members greatly diminished in case of more successful farms. Second, mass lay-offs in the Polish industry after 1989 affected mostly the so-called peasant-workers, the commuters from villages encircling industrial centres who seasonally also worked on their farms. Recently a majority of those workers joined their already overcrowded family farms on full-time basis. Various empirical evidence suggests that a considerable part of that superfluous agricultural labour switched to international migration.

Different factors seem responsible for participating in incomplete migration of persons from more backward agricultural regions where no distinct efforts to improve farming were recently made. It is quite common in those regions that sending abroad one or more migrants by a family constitutes a strategy whose aim is to subsidize declining family farm with money earned in other countries. What can be observed is that the remittances sent from abroad do not serve the modernisation but rather perpetuation of traditional familial mode of production.

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<sup>22</sup>To a certain degree this also pertains to stable communities of foreigners in Poland.

A lion share of incomplete migration, however, seems to include movements that exploit and improve the experiences gathered by Polish migrants in the 1980s. Here I am referring to the already introduced notion of "small niche". As far as the international reach of those niches is concerned, in the 1980s they above all included the so-called Polish bazaars in certain European metropolises, most notably in West Berlin. A variety of such niches exploited by migrants from Poland has recently been widened to extend far beyond petty trading. It includes good-oriented "specialisation" in pedlar trade in certain cities, regions or even whole countries, monopolising of certain seasonal jobs on certain markets, establishing by family members or just people from same communities chain migrations of very short duration to continue irregular employment with the same employers, occasionally benefiting from gaps in the legislation of certain countries and many other semi-legal or illegal activities (such as running an international trade in stolen cars or engaging in prostitution in certain big cities). A nursery for those migrants might be "yuma" a newly developed phenomenon involving thousands of teenagers from regions located in a close proximity to Germany who regularly plunder German department stores. On the other hand, migrations of Polish gypsies to the United Kingdom in 1994 and 1995 who made money on generosity of the British system of refugee protection might be quoted as an anecdotal illustration of a more refined activity. Incomplete migration from Poland related to the exploitation of foreign-located small niches displays a strong regional and social pattern, and networks of the people directly involved seem to be of crucial importance here.

As follows from the above description, this segment of incomplete migration is basically a continuation of the movements initiated in the 1980s, and in my opinion stems from a peculiar spirit of entrepreneurship developed by many people under communism. The factors related to the on-going transition, however, greatly contributed to the modification of those movements. Apparently because of much better balanced consumer good markets and lower purchasing power of foreign currencies in Poland, on the one hand, they became more diversified and more sophisticated, and on the other hand, their magnitude considerably diminished.

Now coming to the causes of the influx of transit migrants to Poland, they seem to be primarily of political nature. Strictly speaking, it is Poland's new geo-political situation that attracts those migrants. For apart from two so to speak natural conditions, namely that Poland has a long and relatively easy to cross common border with Germany, and that, in addition, the country is large enough to secure safe hiding, the regulations concerning the entry of foreigners are very liberal, the monitoring of foreign visitors is practically inexistent, and the rule of law is strictly followed when it comes to readmission or deportation of foreign citizens. Needless to say, these conditions have been established since 1989 as a result of broader political transformation of Poland. Moreover, the existence of many pathologies of the transitory period, from large grey economic sector to various criminal networks, facilitates the transit migrants' entry and stay in Poland, and ultimately their transfer to Germany.

Finally, my interpretation of underlying factors of the change in conventional flows of migrants also tends to point to political rather than economic or any other factors as the most important.

First, a crucial change has taken place in Poland herself. People wishing to migrate no longer face the alternative: "stay or go once and for all". Before 1989 a common practice followed by the Polish passport authorities (the police) virtually compelled travelling Poles to limit the duration of their stay abroad to the prescribed (usually very short) time. Those who did not comply were punished, usually they were not permitted to make next trip abroad for a number of years. Since economic migrations, in order to become profitable had to take rather long time, they usually involved "lawless" overstaying. Consequently a number of overstayers, confronted with the expected punishment upon arrival to Poland, chose not to return at all. Of course, this ceased to be the case in 1989 and in the following years.

Second, the West is generally closing the doors to migrants from outside, including migrants from Poland. Moreover, since 1989 migrants from Poland hardly meet any requirements set for asylum-seekers or refugees, and logically are not accepted as such even if (what now happens very rarely) apply.

Third, in the middle of the year 1990 the Federal Republic of Germany has changed the procedure related to Aussiedler applicants from Poland, and generally her policy towards German ethnic group in Poland. According to the new course, ethnic Germans are encouraged to stay in Poland, and those who insist on being repatriated are subject to a very careful scrutiny before they are eventually allowed to enter Germany. This is in striking contrast with a practice common in the late 1980s when it was possible to place an application upon arrival in Germany, and when a hard evidence of German roots was by no means a prerequisite.

Contrary to many spectacular hypotheses that link the shifts in the post-1989 migratory trends with the economic transition, it is the above mentioned individual decision, taken (and the related policy package introduced) by the German government that should be held responsible for these changes. To illustrate this point statistically, the number of Aussiedler received from Poland declined from the peak 250 thousand in 1989 to 2-4 thousand on annual basis recently.

These three politically-determined factors, supported by certain new economic circumstances, resulted in a deep decline of long-term migration from Poland. It has by and large become the migration related to the reunion of close family members or marrying a foreigner. Otherwise, most of the long-term migrants (or, more specifically, settlers) from Poland registered in western countries in recent years were not those who actually arrived but rather those who succeeded in regularisation of their already long-lasting stay in those countries.

In turn, the contraction of long-term migration and the change in cost/benefit-based migratory preferences seem to have become major reasons for much greater than e.g. in the 1980s popularity of short-term conventional migration. As far as the change in migration-related cost-to-benefit ratio is concerned, it might be argued that, with dramatically elevated cost of migration (removal of subsidised tariffs, removal of institutional protection of migrants, increased risk of deportation, etc.) and the lack of any meaningful rise in benefits (wage increase was unlikely to cope with a sharp decrease in the purchasing power of money remitted to Poland), the movements involving short distances and relatively short stay abroad became much more profitable and started to attract many more migrants.

In view of the above interpretations, the role of factors related to the economic transition in shaping migratory trends in Poland in the period that has began in 1989 does not seem crucial. It is remarkable that hardly any effect has been caused by the emergence of mass unemployment. In fact, not only the newly-introduced market mechanisms but also certain institutional arrangements proved inefficient in transferring the Polish unemployed to employment in other countries. For instance, the German-Polish inter-government agreement of 1991 concerning the access of relatively large number of Polish workers to the labour market in Germany explicitly aimed at workers from the regions particularly affected by unemployment. However, a predominant majority of those who actually benefited from that agreement were not the unemployed but the workers already having a job in Germany but until that time remaining in irregular situation [Okolski, 1993]. The meaning of this allegation might be much wider: despite large regional differences in the unemployment rate and job availability within Poland, recently the territorial mobility of its population (including intra- and inter-regional migration) sharply declined [Okolski, 1996c].

Undoubtedly, however, the economic-related factors were of primary importance for bringing back thousands of relatively highly educated Poles who emigrated in the 1980s, and, generally, for changing the proportion between highly and low educated emigrants and immigrants, and making Poland a net beneficiary in that process, a country of inverse brain drain. On the other hand, frankly speaking, return migration to Poland and inverse brain drain in the first half of the 1990s were, at least in numerical terms, of rather marginal scale.

Finally and summing up, current migration of foreigners to or through Poland can be interpreted as a joint effect of two systemic transformations: political (wide opening up of Polish borders and the restoration of freedom of travelling in the former socialist countries) and economic (creation of business and employment opportunities in Poland, be it official or informal sector of the economy, and acute market imbalances, shortages and disturbances in certain other former socialist countries). The base of migration of Polish citizens, however, seems much more complex. Besides transition-related factors, in this case a significant role can also be attributed to a strong tradition of migration, the existence of large and dynamic diaspora (with its extended networks), a skill, inherited from earlier period, of benefiting from migration more than expected (and allowed) in view of the relevant rules and regulations, and certain deeply-rooted structural characteristics of the Polish society. As many those factors are far from being stable, we may hypothesise that recent changes in migration observed in Poland are by no means final in her modern history.

### Appendix: A note on the relevance of migration theory

Reviewing migration theories from the causation perspective, one might find out two meta-paradigms<sup>23</sup>. One of them claims that man is by his nature a settled creature, and another that migrants ultimately aim at the improvement of material standard of their living. Logically then, as a rule migration theories attempt to elucidate on what makes some people move (rather e.g. than on what makes some other people stay), and seek means of subsistence or income or employment or shelter outside of their (original) place of residence/living.

More recent theories offer at least four paradigms pertaining to this question. The neo-classical theory of migration [e.g. Todaro, 1976] points to the labour market imbalances existing on international scale and the following wage differences as the main factor. In turn, the theory known as the "new economics of labour migration" [e.g. Stark, 1980] emphasizes economic and family relationships within the household<sup>24</sup>. A sister paradigm stems from the globalisation theory of migration [Wallerstein, 1974] which asserts that the introduction of market mechanisms to traditional societies<sup>25</sup> create a mobile population which is prone to emigration. Finally, the theory of dual labour market [Piore, 1979] implies that modern market economies generate a permanent demand for workers who are willing to accept relatively unstable, harsh-condition and low-paid jobs, a demand that cannot be met by local labour but anyway attracts migrants from less modern economies.

It seems obvious from this brief review that the most popular theories offer only a partial explanation of the causal mechanism of international migration, and take account of only a small number of relevant determinants. Moreover, depending on the form or type of movement explained, those determinants appear in different proportions or different contexts in these theories what makes the theories hardly compatible or complementary. In particular, it cannot be taken for granted that even the joint application of all popular paradigms to the causal analysis of a specific migratory episode would bring us closer to its understanding. For instance, as we could see in part 3 of this paper, in order to arrive at plausible explanation of the causes of mass emigration from Poland in the 1980s, an institutional perspective (including political factors) had to be adopted, a perspective whose message might be contradictory to that resulting from the four paradigms.

I am sceptical about great usefulness of these paradigms to the present analysis either. In particular, it would be rather unlikely for any of them to grasp the essence of such specific, diversified and transitory phenomenon as incomplete migration. On the other hand, each of the four paradigms is of certain relevance. For instance:

- it is in accordance with macro-model built on the basis of neo-classical paradigm that recently migrant workers from Poland "switched" from labour markets in countries like Russia or Libya to labour markets in the West, and that foreigners started to be employed in Poland;

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<sup>23</sup>the term "meta-paradigm" of migration theories has been coined by Kubat and Hoffmann [1987]. Actually the authors identified only one meta-paradigm (of natural immobility of people) common to all contemporary migration theories.

<sup>24</sup>It maintains that a primary determinant of migration are (credit and money) market imperfections in sending countries that limit a transition from subsistence/traditional to commercial production within individual households. In a strive for initial capital necessary to finance this transition, households often first invest in migration by their family members. By contributing to the diversification of households income sources, remittances generated by migrants decrease risks inherited in the transition.

<sup>25</sup>Or, according to the original parlance, the "intrusion" and penetration of capitalist mode of production in the periphery of the world economy.

- moreover, the fact that new flows of migrant workers are directed to specific industrial branches and specific positions or (partly) to irregular sector, and take place in certain seasons stems to a large degree from the segmentation of labour markets which is postulated by the dual labour market paradigm;

- on the other hand, the inflow of migrant workers from the ex-USSR can be interpreted in the context of the globalisation paradigm because this inflow is in a sense an effect of recent further modernisation which finally liberated and "commercialised" labour, and made it fully mobile;

- the spread of transition-adaptive strategies followed collectively by many Polish households which in an effort to diversify economic activities of their members also involve migration might be perceived from the viewpoint of the new economics paradigm; as transition to the market economy contributed to the extenuation of range of individual strategies but also to the increase of risks related to a given strategy choice, it appears rational that households try to diminish their combined risk by diversifying members roles.

Irrespective of how attractive might seem these hypotheses at first sight, the contents in case of each of them is strikingly insufficient. Each of them not only tends to explain one single flow but the explanation provided is far from exhaustive. It might more aptly be assumed, however, that in sketching the causes of recent population movements in Poland basic migration theories are highly complementary. Indeed, the combination of the four paradigms seem to relatively well fit many migration flows observed in the present world.

Obviously, there must be "something" which prompts immobile by its nature population to consider migration. Thus a "market softener", or the globalisation paradigm. In order to make potentially mobile people actually move, countries must become distinct in terms of job/wage attractiveness, and moreover, once a link between the country of origin and destination is established in the mind of a potential migrant, the financial and technical means are needed to execute the movement. Insofar as the former is concerned, the neo-classical paradigm sets the precondition for a dichotomic differentiation of countries into sending and receiving ones, whereas the dual labour market paradigm allows for a "fine tuning" of this distinction. It is thanks to the latter that we can plausibly explain why some people would even leave a country with no unemployment in order to seek a job in a country with high unemployment. Finally, the new economics of labour migration suggests the mode of explanation on what principles the mobility is being organized and funded.

It would be quite easy to notice that all but one paradigms underlie the theories which are generalisations of empirical observations, and hardly stem from any unambiguous theorems. The only exception is the neo-classical migration theory that is based on and coherent with neo-classical economic theory, in particular on the theorem that implies unequal endowment of various countries with production factors and the mechanism which provides for levelling off in the international scale of the resultant differences. The neo-classical theory, however, fails even more often than other migration theories in producing sound predictions of actual trends. On the other hand, a great (and growing) multitude and diversity of migratory phenomena in the present world makes the theories which are basically empirical generalisations particularly vulnerable and time or space-limited, and exposed to the risk of being instantly/constantly challenged, refuted, modified or replicated by other theories of similar construction. It appears that the validity of these theories will continue to be severely restricted until a commonly shared causation framework stimulating the convergence of various theoretical concepts is proposed.

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