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Recent trends in international migration

Poland 1996

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1. Performance of the economy

1.1. Major developments in 1995 and main economic indicators

Economic performance in 1995 was quite formidable, and, as a matter of fact, in many respects the best in decades [CPO, 1996]. This can clearly be seen in Table 1 (Appendix) which contains principal economic indicators for the period 1990-1996.

It was fourth straight year of economic recovery and accelerated growth. GDP increased by 7 per cent to reach the level of around 3,000 US $ per capita (according to the official currency exchange rate) or more than 6,000 US $ (according to actual purchasing power). Industrial output grew by 9 per cent whereas agricultural output by 13 per cent. The fastest growth, however, was observed in capital goods (17 per cent).

As in previous three years, labour productivity increased substantially, i.e. by 5.5 per cent. The 7.0 per cent growth in GDP was matched with only 1.4 per cent growth in total (annual average) employment.

The rise in real incomes, which after five years of sharp decline was barely noticeable in 1994, intensified. In public sector the increase (for the first time after 1989) was 5.2 per cent whereas in the private sector 3.4 per cent. This contributed to growing propensity to save. By the end of the year total household savings deposited in banks amounted to 21.2 per cent of the GDP level, i.e. by 0.8 point more than the relevant 1994 figure. This seemed to alleviate the situation in public finance. Due to higher budget revenues and lower spendings, budget deficit became much lower than predicted (2.7 vis-a-vis 3.2 per cent).

Also financial situation of firms improved. Credit became cheaper, and firms in large numbers, for the first time after 1989, resorted to banks to finance their investment. In addition, Polish economy attracted more foreign capital. In 1995 foreign companies invested around 2.5 million US $, twice as much as a year before. As a result the total volume of investment increased by 19 per cent, compared to 8 per cent in 1994. Unlike under centrally planned regime when a bulk of outlays went to the construction of huge new plants, priority in investment outlays was given to the modernisation of machinery and purchases of technologically advanced equipment.

Foreign trade virtually soared as the volume of exports (measured in US $) grew by 34 per cent and the volume of imports by 35 per cent. At the same time the central bank almost doubled its foreign currency reserves; the reserves amounted to around 20 billion US $ at the end of 1995 compared to around 11 billion US $ at the beginning of the year. Among major sources of such unprecedented growth were: an intensified inflow of foreign portfolio investment and revenues stemming from massive purchases made by foreign citizens coming from neighbouring countries. In 1995 the trade with CEFTA countries seemed to undergo a long awaited breakthrough, with the volume of exports higher by 58 per cent and the volume of imports higher by 86 per cent relative to 1994. Nevertheless countries of the European Union have remained major trading partner of Poland; exports into the block increased by 38 per cent while imports from the block by 36 per cent (in case of Germany, the main individual country, the increases were 47 and 35 per cent, respectively).

Although perceived by many analysts as erratic and insufficient, privatisation of the economy kept on going. In effect, the private sector contributed in 58 per cent to the 1995 GDP, and in December 1995 it accommodated as much as 63 per cent of the total employment. Its share in foreign trade was nearly 65 per cent.

From among negative developments observed in Poland's economy, one should first mention persistent high inflation. Average annual inflation rate in 1995 was 27.8 per cent, and the rate comparing December 1995 to December 1994 was 21.6 per cent. It meant 4.4

and 7.9 points less than the respective 1994 rates, and an improvement in terms of the pace of decline but simultaneously a deterioration relative to what has been predicted. All in all, 1995 proved to be sixth year in a row with inflation rate significantly exceeding official (government-proclaimed) expectations.

Second disturbing phenomenon was high unemployment rate, standing at 14.9 per cent at the end of 1995 (according to labour offices' data). On the other hand, over the year there occurred a substantial decrease in the number of the unemployed (by some 210 thousand) and in the unemployment rate (by 1.1 point).

Finally, a large share of the population continued to live in poverty. The estimate of the Institute of Labour and Social Security claims that in 1995 6-10 per cent of the population received income which was below the poverty line. There is no evidence, however, that poverty in Poland expanded in 1995.

Economic boom extended into 1996. According to the Central Planning Office (CPO) estimate, GDP is expected to grow by around 6 per cent, industrial output by 8.5 per cent, investment by 13 per cent, exports by 16 per cent and imports by 18 per cent. Real incomes will probably increase at the pace observed in 1995, and the inflation rate (measured on average annual basis) will be brought down to below the 20-per cent level. Also unemployment is likely to decline substantially. The projected value of basic 1996 economic indicators are presented in Table 1.

1.2. Labour market characteristics

With introduction of a deep market-oriented economic reform by the end of 1989 Poland entered two-year period of recession. In 1990 alone industrial output declined by almost 25 per cent. Reaction of firms to the recession was i.a. abstaining from recruitment of new labour if not lay-offs. Within relatively short time there accumulated huge unemployment. By now, after six years or so, the level of output generated by Polish economy is distinctly higher than in the pre-recession period, and the economy continues to grow rapidly. Still, however, employment is far lower than it used to be and high unemployment persists. Why?

Officially registered (by local labour offices) unemployment appeared in Poland in January 1990, and since that time until March 1994 it had been growing rapidly. Between March and September 1994 a peak figure of 2.9 million unemployed was reached which meant 16.9 per cent of economically active population. From October 1994 systematic decline in unemployment is being observed. As already mentioned, December 1995 saw 2.6 million officially registered unemployed (14.9 per cent) and most recent Central Statistical Office estimate (September 1996) claims only 2.3 million unemployed or, in terms of the unemployment rate, 13.2 per cent.

Labour Force Survey (LFS), initiated in May 1992 and since then conducted on quarterly basis, produces even lower estimates of unemployment (e.g. 14.0 per cent in February 1996, compared to 15.4 per cent based on official data of labour offices). On the other hand, recent trends revealed by those two sources are by no means coherent. For instance, according to LFS, between May and October 1995 the unemployment rate increased from 12.6 to 13.1 per cent, whereas according to data collected by labour offices it decreased from 14.8 to 14.7 per cent. The major reason for this discrepancy seems to be the difference in definition of unemployed adopted in the two sources (LFS adheres to ILO/OECD definition which follows active job seeking requirement).

However, some analysts point to ambiguities in the wording of relevant questions included in LFS, and suggest that the number of active job seekers and consequently the number of unemployed is systematically overestimated due to unjustified inclusion of those who declare job seeking but in fact do nothing about it (in a given reference period).

Appropriate adjustment (produced so far for the period May 1992 - February 1995) yields astonishing result: not only that the rate is obviously much lower than any other known estimate[1] but it practically shows no trend (seasonal variation is contained within the range of 10-12 per cent). After having a closer look at the adjusted data, Gora concludes that "it gives the correct idea on the limited relationship between unemployment developments and recovery" [Gora, 1996, p. 143].

The above hypothesis might be viewed from another angle, namely the diversification of responses of regional labour markets to the transition in Poland. In my 1995 SOPEMI report for Poland I found very week link between economic performance of various regions and unemployment developments (the actual rate and trends), and between these two phenomena and labour mobility (migration). This issue was also examined by Gora and Lehmann, who after using refined statistical techniques were prompted to state that their "exercise do not support the hypothesis that labour market transitions are strongly determined by region" [Gora and Lehmann, 1995, p. 140]. In other words, different patterns and diversified pace of the transition on regional scale are not sufficiently reflected in labour markets adjustments.

It seems that recent labour market developments in Poland reflect the influence of two forces (partly independent and of different nature): the operation of newly revealed market mechanisms and transitional character of labour market institutional arrangement. The fact that the process of labour market adjustments does not fit the expectations stemming from conventional economic knowledge can almost entirely be attributed to the latter. Three of those transitional factors seem to be worth of emphasising in the present context: a peculiar character of industrial relations giving workers highly preferential treatment[2], enhanced role played by informal sector of the economy, and immense labour hoarding inherited from the centrally-planned regime. These factors strongly contributed, on the one hand, to relatively weak reactions of firms recruitment policies to market signals, and, on the other hand, passive behaviours displayed by labour, especially the unemployed. In addition, important labour market developments have been contained within the informal sector, and thus remained concealed.

1.3. Informal sector of the economy

Deregulation of the economy and many other more specific factors (e.g. relatively high taxes and other obligatory contributions levied by the state on firms, imprecise, or rather generous, regulations concerning "conduct" of the unemployed, etc.) stimulated growth and, as a matter of fact, expansion of the informal sector.

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[1] Comparison with two main estimates of the unemployment rate is the following [Gora, 1996; CSO, 1996c]:

period	local administration (labour offices)	LFS	LFS adjusted	difference (in points) between: adm. and adj.	LFS and adj.
May '92	12.6	12.6	9.9	2.7	2.7
August '92	13.7	13.6	10.6	3.1	3.0
November '92	13.7	13.5	10.9	2.8	2.6
February '93	14.4	13.8	11.4	3.0	2.6
May '93	14.4	13.4	10.5	3.9	3.2
August '93	14.1	13.0	9.4	4.7	3.6
November '93	14.5	13.9	9.7	4.8	4.2
February '94	16.8	15.9	12.0	4.8	3.9
May '94	16.2	13.9	10.9	5.3	3.8
August '94	16.8	13.9	10.1	6.7	3.8
November '94	16.1	13.9	9.9	6.2	4.0
February '95	15.9	14.7	11.0	4.9	3.7

[2] Gora, Socha and Sztanderska (1995) point to ill-conceived institution of unemployment benefits as an important, if not major, disturbing factor.

A survey pursued in early 1994 on a national sample implied that around 30 per cent of the adult population might be receiving incomes from employment in the grey economy As much as one-sixth of those persons were said to be unemployed [Grabowski, 1994]. The sample, however, was very small (1,050 respondents) what gave rise to doubts about the reliability of results. Consequently, in 1994 and 1995 the Central Statistical Office carried out two large-scale surveys partly or entirely devoted to the subject of informal sector.

An estimate of the size of the informal sector for 1994 based on those studies suggests that it contributed to 15.4 per cent of adjusted GDP (or 18.2 per cent of unadjusted GDP). The value added generated by this sector amounted to 36 billion Polish zlotys. Legal economic entities had the largest share in this value, i.e. 74 per cent, with trade (44 per cent) and manufacturing industry (14 per cent) taking the lead. The contribution of illegal (unregistered) entities was 20 per cent and households (smuggling [sic!]) 6 per cent.

Estimates of the informal sector generalised for 1989-1995 indicate that genuine decline in GDP in 1989-1992 (the period of recession) was 4.7 per cent whereas according to official (government) data it was 15.7 per cent. The overall adjusted GDP change between 1989 and 1995 was +8.4 per cent while according to official data the change was still negative (-2.0 per cent). The dynamics of the two sectors (formal and informal), which proved strikingly divergent in early years of the transition, in 1995 became almost identical [Zienkowski, 1996].

Such large scale of the grey economy and such vast impact it has on overall economic performance cannot be indifferent for labour market developments. In fact, the influence on the labour market seems tremendous. It stems from the above mentioned CSO surveys that in 1995 over 2.5 million persons were employed in the informal sector of which 1.1 million exclusively (or mainly) worked there, and for 1.4 million it was related to having an additional job. This means that the main source of income for 7.2 per cent of the labour force is employment in the grey economy, and 16.4 per cent receive some regular income from that sector.

Very young workers (below the age of 25) receiving income from the informal sector tend to rely much stronger on this kind of employment than older workers, i.e. for two-third in the former group main (or exclusive) job is in the grey economy, while in case of the remaining workers a majority (63 per cent) have their main job in the formal sector. In urban areas predominant informal activities seem to be: construction industry (14 per cent), house repairs and improvements (14 per cent), horticulture (12 per cent) and trade (10 per cent) while in rural areas: agriculture (38 per cent), residential construction (14 per cent) and community self-help (18 per cent).

On the other hand, in the middle of 1995 (June/July) as much as 33 per cent of households hired unregistered labour. Looking at this phenomenon in a yearly perspective, around a half of the households continued to do so for longer than one month [Kalaska and Witkowski, 1996].

Widespread of the informal sector and irregular employment makes it rather easy for many unemployed persons to perform clandestine work, and to abstain from active job seeking (in the formal economy) at least until unemployment benefits are being paid [Herk, Socha and Sztanderska, 1996]. A popular strategy has developed in many households according to which certain members, usually very young, instead of seeking or taking up a job in the formal sector of economy drift in irregular employment somewhere in the space between Polish economy growth poles and peripheries of western economies [Jazwinska and Okolski, 1996].

1.4. Transition vis-a-vis migration

International movements of people have become one of most distinct components of the transition to democratic state and market economy in Poland. After careful examination of migratory trends in the period 1989-1996, and even though the evaluation of those trends cannot rely much on hard evidence, it is possible to suggest that a new migration pattern has emerged which appears to be specific to transitionary period of Poland's contemporary history.

This pattern consists of three fundamentally different phenomena, of which one overwhelms two other in terms of the numbers of people involved and the scale of resultant economic and social consequences[3].

The essence of first of those three phenomena, the most sizeable and important, is its quasi-migratory character[4]. This means that the people involved do not strictly or hardly at all fulfil preconditions which are generally set for a migrant. On the other hand, they realise to a high degree, probably higher than any other migrants, economic function of migration. Those are international passengers or travellers for whom the only (or by far more important than any other) aim is to exploit economic opportunities offered by travelling or visiting alien countries.

For those migrants registration of their stay or business or work abroad is a matter of secondary importance. In fact, they are usually compelled to act under the tourist cover. Neither do they care about getting access to public health system, social security and education of host countries. Very rarely they intend to settle abroad. Instead, those persons split their lives between making money in foreign countries (or through purposeful operations in those countries), and using basic (public) social services and spending holiday time (vacations, national or religious holidays, certain week-ends) in home country. This is greatly facilitated by an extensive use of fast and relatively inexpensive means of telecommunication and transportation. As they mostly travel alone, family life of those migrants usually goes undisturbed in home country. Many migrants falling into this type of movements are socially and economically loose individuals, at any time ready to move or go back.

An important social trait of this type of migration is that a large majority of the migrants move between a periphery of their home country and peripheries of target countries, especially between peripheries of the respective labour markets.

As far as Poland is concerned, presently hundreds of thousand Polish citizens and few million foreigners (on annual basis) might be systematically involved in migration of this type.

In addition, two relatively marginal migratory phenomena are also characteristic for the transition period in Poland, of which one seems deeply rooted in traditional movements of Polish people and relatively stable, and another is very new and unstable.

The stable and historically-driven phenomenon consists primarily of settlement emigration from Poland and (much less frequently also reemigration or repatriation of ethnic Poles). It has been marginalised from (on average) around 100 thousand flows in the 1980's to recent 20-30 thousand flows annually. Majority of Poles now go to settle abroad only if they have secured their legal status, employment and social benefits there. It has by and large become migration related to family reunion or marrying a foreigner. While economic effects of this type of migration are incomparably lower than in the past (lower remittance flow and lower amount of other financial assistance to family in Poland), its social effects are favourable. It helps in repairing strained family ties and bringing together members of split families. It also feeds Polish diaspora scattered all around the world with new blood of Poles, hopefully more open-minded and better educated than the past generations of migrants from Poland.

Finally, the new and relatively unstable migrations embrace foreigners who are on their way to some other (western) country, and come to Poland not because of transportation necessity but for some other reasons which on aggregate might be perceived

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[3] I disregard here a few other types of migrations whose annual measure would barely be around 1-2 thousand (bona fide refugees, migrant workers with highest professional skills, etc.).

[4] It is described in some more detail in part 2, where I propose to call it "incomplete migration".

as difficulty with getting access to a country of destination. They constitute a large and formerly unknown brand of transit migrants. Poland has became an attractive transit country or rather a vestibule for those people because of a combination of two factors: its favourable geopolitical location and its liberal attitude to foreigners and inability to strictly monitor their movements. A cautious "guestimate" (surely, informed one) would imply a number of 50-100 thousand such migrants on annual scale. Consequences of transit migration seem by all means negative, i.e. they are pathology- and crime-conducive.

2. Economic transition and foreign travelling of people

2.1. Introduction

For a large majority of people from Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, foreign travelling has a significantly different meaning than for a typical traveller from the West. While for the latter it is usually in this or that way connected with leisure time and very often it involves spending considerable amounts of money on tourism, travellers from the East tend, as a rule, to economize on their trips.

It has already been mentioned how strong is the impact of the purchases made by daily or week-end shoppers coming from the neighbouring countries to border areas of Poland on the balance of payment. It has also been pointed to a habit of continuous flowing of many officially unemployed persons between the grey economy of Poland and certain western countries. These phenomena are just an illustration of a new socially and economically influential and contagious trend of mass foreign travelling across Poland's borders which started with economic and political liberalisation.

In more general terms, one can observe in Poland the rise of an entirely new type of mass migration, i.e. "incomplete migration" whose virtue seems to be a combination of the following three features of a migrant: "loose" social and economic status in Poland, irregularity of stay or work in host country, and maintaining close and steady contacts with migrant's household in Poland (i.a. through frequent home visits). No regularity can be observed as far as duration of stay abroad or country of destination are concerned; some migrations are such short (from few days to few weeks), that they would fail to meet criteria inhered in any popular definition of migration and they tend to be recurrent according to a cycle typical for a particular (national/regional/local) labour market of host country (or to any other opportunities to earn more money that it might have been possible by staying in home country) while some others might extend to over one year, and the migrants hardly follow traditional routes marked by earlier migration waves from Poland and rather they precisely react to foreign demand for (seasonal, irregular) labour or to other foreign-travelling-related gainful opportunity. This type of migration, by its very nature and probably more than any other type of migration, inescapably limits people to a movement between peripheries of various countries.

The factors that recently stimulated "incomplete migration" can equally be found in the developments of migration policies in the West and in a fast liberalisation and modernisation of Poland. Under circumstances characterized by following much more rigid immigration or refugee procedures by a large majority of western countries, and lifting of many privileges enjoyed till not long ago by visitors, immigrants and asylum-seekers from Poland (the East, in general) in western countries, it has been increasingly more difficult for Poles (easterners) to immigrate to (or just be tolerated) and/or settle in the West. It should simultaneously be emphasised that rigidities introduced toward foreign migrants in western countries have by no means reduced the demand for cheap and undemanding foreign labour. On the other hand, in technical and administrative terms, travelling between Poland and the

West has become much easier (no visa requirement for tourists, better air, rail and road connections, etc.). At the same time, coming back to Poland after shorter or longer stay abroad invites no longer any reaction (harassment, retaliation) on the part of the Polish administration. Finally, what contributed to the widespread of "incomplete migration" were the improvements in transportation facilities (variety of cheap trans-European coach lines reaching remote areas of Poland) and easy access to telecommunication (practically each village in Poland can immediately and directly be reached by a phone from any place of Western Europe)

Massive "incomplete migration" can also be observed as far as the inflow to or flows through Poland are concerned. This phenomenon actually takes a whole variety of forms. It ranges from week-end shopper visits of foreigners living in close neighbourhood of Polish borders to sophisticated trafficking in migrants originating from relatively distant parts of the world.

So far the bulk of "incomplete migration" in Poland is wrongly treated as tourist movement, and generally there is a strong resistance among migration experts to include this type of flows within the area of their study. I think it is somehow a narrow-minded attitude, and for this reason this part of the present report will deal with at least some manifestations of incomplete migration to Poland (at least those which typically escape attention in migration studies[5]).

2.2. Basic statistics on foreigners coming to Poland

In the middle of 1980s the annual number of foreigners visiting Poland was around 5 million, and many of those foreigners participated in organised and state-controlled tours, often within the co-operative framework of travel agencies of ex-Soviet-block countries. Other important portion of that movement constituted family visits.

In 1990, after a phenomenal increase (by more than 120 per cent), the number of incoming foreigners was already 18 million. It doubled next year, and reached 60 million in 1993. The recent two years saw further spectacular rise, and finally in 1995 as many as 82,250 visits of foreign citizens were recorded.

A large majority of journeys to Poland in 1995 (57.4 per cent) was made by German citizens, followed by visitors from the Czech Republic (18.4 per cent), Ukraine (5.8 per cent) and Slovakia (5.3 per cent). The share of citizens of the three remaining countries bordering with Poland (Belarus, Lithuania and Russia) was 8.3 per cent which means that foreigners coming from countries with which Poland has no common border accounted for merely 4.8 per cent of all visits.

In the recent three years the influx from Germany (and Lithuania) has stabilised (and was slightly decreasing in relative terms) while the influx from the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Slovakia and Belarus accelerated[6]. Among citizens originating from non-neighbouring countries fastest increases (around or above 100 per cent in 1993-1995) were observed for Estonians, Latvians, Belgians, Dutch and British.

Not only that a predominant majority of foreign visitors come from the neighbouring countries, but they as a rule happen to be residents of frontier or not-too-remote areas. For instance, typically from 40 to 90 per cent of travellers crossing Polish-Czech border (depending on check point) arrive from a place which is located 20 kilometres away of the border or less. In turn, a majority of visitors crossing western border of Poland (from 55 to 85 per cent) live in localities within 100-

[5] Other parts of the report will (though rather implicitly) cover that part of "incomplete migration" to Poland which would be more readily identified as migration in its proper sense.

[6] In case of Russia the stabilisation was observed after 1993 (in fact, similarly to visitors from Germany, small decline in 1995).

kilometer distance. A major check point on Polish-Belarussian border (Terespol) is being crossed in more than 50 per cent by persons who live within a 20-kilometer distance. In only two cases of eight investigated check points on eastern border of Poland was the share of foreign visitors living within the range of 100 kilometres lower than 50 per cent. Otherwise, from 60 to 85 per cent of travellers have to go no more than 100 kilometres in order to arrive in Poland[7].

This holds even more so as far as the distance between border and place of destination in Poland is concerned. The proportion of foreign visitors who after crossing western border of Poland do not travel farther than 20 kilometres varies between 60 to 95 per cent. In case of a large majority of check points on western and southern borders only a tiny part of travellers (up to 5 per cent) head for destinations located beyond the 100-kilometer limit. Foreigners entering Poland through its eastern border tend to reach more distant localities but nevertheless a clear majority of them visit places within the range of 100 kilometres; only from 10 to 35 per cent go further on [CSO, 1996a].

It is estimated that only around 23 per cent of foreign visitors stay for longer than 24 hours. Therefore in 1995 19.2 million visitors would qualify as foreign tourists, according to the definition used by the World Tourist Organization[8]. However, only a minority among them are genuine tourists.

Typically, those foreigners whose stay in Poland is longer than just one day spend only few days there before going back home. The average length of visit within this group in 1995 was 4.7 nights (almost no change was recorded in 1993-1995). From among the neighbouring countries, visits made by Ukrainians were on the average the shortest (3.4 nights) while visits made by Russians the longest (5.5 nights). The length of stay seems to be more related to the distance from the country of origin than to any other factor. For instance, in 1995 the average length of visit in case of citizens of the United States was 21.8 nights, whereas in case of citizens of the United Kingdom 6.4 nights, France 5.9 nights and Germany 4.5 nights. Only 38 per cent of visitors who formally would qualify as tourists spent at least five nights in Poland in 1995 [IT, 1996].

2.3. Purpose of visiting Poland

It should be stressed that foreigners visiting Poland are "addicted" travellers. In 1995 for more than 50 per cent of persons who did not go back home on the day of entry, it was already at least their fifth journey to Poland. This proportion is certainly higher among those who leave on the same day.

According to a survey carried out by the Institute of Tourism (IT), only 30 per cent of foreign visitors who comply with the international definition of a tourist declare tourism as the main purpose of their travel to Poland. This percentage seems to be relatively stable over time. In addition, a considerable proportion (rather unstable over time) come to visit their relatives or friends[9]. Small fraction of visitors are pilgrims or persons making a

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[7] I quote here the results of a survey conducted by CSO in the winter and summer 1995 [CSO, 1996a].

[8] Comparison between the 1995 distribution by main citizenships of all journeys to Poland and journeys which formally qualify as tourist is as follows:

	all journeys	only tourist journeys
German	57.4	34.9
Czech and Slovak	23.7	3.1
Belarussian, Lithuanian and Russian	8.3	26.0
Ukrainian	5.8	16.1
other	4.8	19.9

[9] It was 19 per cent in 1995 but only 13 per cent in 1994.

sentimental trip (seeking own roots). However, for around a half of those persons earning money or, in broader terms, economising on a trip constitutes the major purpose.

It might be presumed that nearly all 73 million visits that in 1995 ended on the day of entry were related to shopping. In addition, 5.3 million foreigners who spent in Poland at least one night came to do shopping although in many instances this was combined with other business (e.g. selling goods or services).

In general, in 1995 as many as 3.7 million incoming foreign citizens who could formally be labelled as tourists were involved in some kind of business. In addition, more than 1.8 million of those "tourists" came with an intention to seek a job.

It stems from the above that the magnitude of movements of foreigners related to various gainful activities in Poland is enormous. There were recently a couple of systematic attempts at finding what precisely are the economic consequences of those movements. Although the results of relevant surveys are not fully consistent, they uniformly point to a number of tendencies. According to one of those tendencies, expenditures made by foreign citizens visiting Poland constitute an important component of the balance of payment. It has recently been argued that in 1995 they significantly contributed to an unprecedented growth of reserves of foreign currencies, and, indirectly, to higher than expected inflation [Central Office of Planning, 1996].

2.4. Expenditures made by foreign visitors in Poland

A survey pursued in 1995 by the CSO was fairly representative for passenger movements across Poland's borders except for air and sea routes. Traffic by sea, however, is negligible, and even air traffic constitutes a small fraction of all movements (around 1 per cent).

It was possible by means of this survey to establish the value of expenditures per one person by groups of goods and services. This i.a. enabled the research team to estimate the total revenues obtained in Poland from the passenger movement in 1995. On the average it was 131,1 zloty (around 60 US $) per one visit which led to a total annual estimate of 9,076.3 million zloty (around 4,125 million US $) [CSO, 1996a]. Compared to the volume of Polish exports registered in 1995 this constituted an equivalent of nearly 18 per cent of all documented export revenues [CSO, 1996b]. The (current price) value of all goods and services purchased by foreign visitors in Poland in 1995 was by 30 per cent higher than the comparable figure for 1994. The expenditures made by foreigners crossing eastern border of Poland increased by 66 per cent while in case of foreigners entering/leaving Poland through southern border their expenditures increased by 45 per cent, and in case of foreigners entering/leaving Poland through western border by 16 per cent.

On the average, persons coming from the East spend much more money than other visitors. In 1995 their expenditure per one visit was 377.0 zloty of which 79 per cent went to purchase of goods other than food. Foreigners crossing western border spent 115.6 zloty per one visit, and in this case food constituted a major purchase (49 per cent). Finally, visitors arriving from behind southern border of Poland spent only 65.1 zloty per one visit (69 per cent of this on food stuffs). Expenditures on hotels, restaurants and other tourist services or fees constituted from 3 per cent of the total (visitors from eastern side) to 24 per cent (visitors from western side).

Generally, visitors from neighbouring countries contributed much more to the total value of expenditures than other visitors. For instance, the share of Germans on western border was 87 per cent, the share of Czechs and Slovaks on southern border 59 per cent, and the share of Belarussians, Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians on eastern border 56 per cent. As far as the neighbouring countries are concerned, the expenditures of citizens of

Ukraine in 1995 increased by 173 per cent, Belarus by 151 per cent and Lithuania by 68 per cent. In case of other nationalities the growth was more moderate (15-25 per cent).

A survey conducted in the same year by the Institute of Tourism aimed i.a. at assessing the value of annual expenditures per one person (a given person might have been involved in more than one visit) and per one day of stay in Poland. The results suggest that the average expenditure per one person was 174 US $ and per one day 32 US $, which is not directly comparable with the CSO estimate. This, however, would lead to a rather inflated estimate of total expenditures by foreign citizens in 1995, namely around 6,400 million US $[10], i.e. 50 per cent more than the respective CSO estimate.

According to the Institute of Tourism survey, average expenditure (per one person and time unit) decreased (relative to 1994) by 4 per cent while the total foreign currency receipts increased by 5 per cent. Individually, the biggest spenders were citizens of the United States (982 US $ per person), followed by citizens of the United Kingdom (509), France (449), Benelux countries (324), Italy (290) and Russia (225) [IT, 1996].

It might be mentioned that the largest individual group of goods on which money was spent by foreign visitors in Poland, especially those coming from behind eastern and southern border turned out textiles and footwear (27 per cent) [CSO, 1996a]. The demand of foreign travellers appears to be a leading factor in unprecedented growth of small-scale privately-owned textile and shoe factories in Poland in recent years.

2.5. The case of Warsaw Bazaar

The mechanism through which foreign passengers coming to Poland became engaged in various gainful occupations can be illustrated by using the example of Warsaw Bazaar (located almost in the centre of Poland's capital, on the premises of largest Warsaw's stadium[11]). The bazaar is one, albeit the largest one, of many markets scattered across Poland[12] where foreigners can make a bargain on selling and buying goods and where occasional employment is not difficult to find.

The bazaar has been spontaneously set up in 1989, and at first it was a place where individual travellers from the ex-USSR used to offer goods they brought in to Poland. Those were usually basic commodities, unsophisticated, poor quality and often second-hand but relatively very cheap. In the course of time, but still in early years of its existence, the bazaar trade underwent deep specialisation. Still low-priced but increasingly more solid and almost exclusively brand new merchandise became a norm. Organised groups of traders imported (in invisible way) cheap Russian brandy, vodka and sparkling wine, canned fish, tools, cameras, toys and luxury goods such as Astrakhan caviar and perfumes branded with the names of renowned French makers. However, petty traders from the former Soviet Union were quickly joined by suppliers from Bulgaria, China, India, Romania, Turkey, Vietnam and some other countries. With growing participation of foreigners form Asia, the bazaar turned into a huge predominantly textile-oriented market place. At the same time, individual traders started to increasingly buy goods at the bazaar with intention of reselling them somewhere else. Wholesale activities started to flourish. The range of customers making purchases, which was initially limited to inhabitants of Warsaw metropolitan area, quickly extended to embrace people (usually traders themselves) coming from relatively remote areas of Poland, and other countries, including western countries.

At present the bazaar is a professionally operated holding composed of a large number of retail outlets (and a small number of wholesale firms) run by citizens of many

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[10] That would mean around 28 per cent of the 1995 total exports which seems rather unlikely.

[11] The stadium (Stadion Dziesieciolecia) has long time ago been deserted by sport organisations and sportsmen.

[12] It is ofter referred to as the largest bazaar in Europe.

countries[13]. Masses of petty traders who laid its foundations and contributed to its rise either transformed into regular businessmen, or joined the staff of bazaar-based firms, or became buyers supplying markets in other countries with goods acquired at the bazaar. Final goods (textiles, shoe, etc.) sold at the bazaar are no longer smuggled through Polish borders by tens of thousands false tourists but as a rule come from newly established Poland-based small plants. Operation of those plants is by all means internationalised: the capital is mixed (largely Chinese, Polish and Vietnamese), technology (machinery) largely comes from Taiwan, the style and patrons are western (Paris and Roma designs), fabrics and other materials are imported (mostly from Asia), customers originate from practically all over the world, and employees are often irregular migrants (mostly from ex-USSR) [e.g. Smolenski, 1996].

The story of the Warsaw Bazaar is full of paradoxes. One of those paradoxes pertains to its "international flavour". For although it operates legally, and all retailers are registered firms who pay taxes, many (if not a large majority of) businessmen, dealers, suppliers, buyers and, above all, employees holding foreign passports are in irregular situation in Poland (illegal migrants, overstaying visitors, faked refugees, employees with no work permit, etc.).

In May 1996 economic activity of the bazaar became a topic of a survey carried out by the Institute of Research on the Market Economy (IRME). It was based on a simple random sample of 420 stalls (nearly 10 per cent of the total). The results of the survey give rise to a number of important quantitative findings [IRME, 1996].

As widely noticed on many other occasions, textiles are now the major article traded in the bazaar. They constitute over 70 per cent of all sales. Other important merchandise include shoe, household equipment (small electric machines, cutlery, cooking pans, etc.) and electronic hardware (chiefly audio-visual).

Each day the market is visited by 20-30 thousand people[14]. Some 200 coaches with traders come daily from behind eastern border of Poland[15]. It is estimated that around 60 per cent of customers are foreign citizens. That means that on yearly basis the bazaar receives 5.5 million foreigners. Transactions contracted by visitors from abroad constitute 58 per cent of the total, of which wholesale-type transactions as much as 32 per cent. In clear contrast, local customers are more often retailers (26 per cent of all transactions) than wholesalers (16 per cent).

The estimated bazaar turnover in 1995 was around 1.2 billion zloty (on the average 100 million per month)[16]. The first five months of 1996 witnessed further increase of sales to a monthly average of 110-120 million zloty. In terms of turnover volume, the bazaar ranks among the biggest Polish enterprises (in fact it would occupy 30th top position if such ranking is made). More than 80 per cent of the 1995 sales was due to wholesale transactions.

The value of direct imports as a proportion of the bazaar's total supplies is estimated at 12 per cent. The imported goods usually originate from China, and seem to be duly cleared by Polish customs.

The goods purchased in the bazaar are being by and large exported. In 1995 66-67 per cent of sales went abroad, mainly to the former USSR. Thus an approximate value of 1995 exports is close to 350 million US $, i.e. 1.5 per cent of the total value of all goods exported from Poland and 8.5 per cent of expenditures made in Poland by all foreign

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[13] The offcial name of that entity reads: Centrum Handlowe "Jarmark Europa" na Stadionie Dziesieciolecia. It is managed by Polish company Damis Co.

[14] The attendance is strictly registered as all visitors are obliged to pay entry fee.

[15] Among other things, the bazaar premises accomodate a mini coach terminal (with fixed time-table pertaining to a majority of lines).

[16] This is an equivalent of more than 500 million US $. The authors of the study suggest that this figure might be underestimated by some 20-25 per cent.

citizens[17]. In 1995 only four Polish firms (KGHM Polish Copper, Fiat Auto Poland, Katowice Steel Works and Shipyard Szczecin) recorded higher exports.

The Warsaw Bazaar gives regular full-time employment to over 6,500 persons. In addition, around 1,000 persons work part-time[18]. It might be cautiously said that at least 3,000 among them are foreign citizens. Moreover, some 30,000 workers are employed in Polish factories that solely supply the bazaar, and around 25,000 workers in factories whose more than a half of output goes there. Altogether, the Warsaw Bazaar activities create jobs for at least 60 thousand persons.

3. International migration in accordance with Poland's legal definition of migration

3.1. Introductory remark

As pointed out in earlier SOPEMI reports for Poland, Polish statistics are able to capture only two remote ends of the interval covering the "truth" about international migration. One end is the data on international passenger movements (described in part 2, above), while another end the data reflecting reported arrivals to or departures from Poland related to a change of "permanent residence". Both are far away from what might be sensed as the letter and spirit of international migration. As after many years of exerting pressure on statistical authorities (and decision makers dealing with migration policy), status quo in migration statistics in Poland has been fully preserved, we have still (which also pertains to the present report) to rely on data based on evident misconceptions. This part of the report will entirely draw on the statistics related to the concept of "permanent residence". The source has been central population register (PESEL)[19].

3.2. General trend

The data for 1995 (Table 2) and the first half of 1996 (Table 3) do not show any significant change in recent trend.

Steadily increasing immigration which has already been observed since 1988 (with an incidental disruption in 1993) has continued in 1995 and the first half of 1996. Although the 1995 annual figure increased by 18 per cent, actually the number of registered immigrants (settlers) was relatively low[20], i.e. barely above 8 thousand.

As far as emigration was concerned, the level observed in 1994 was maintained in 1995 (26.3 thousand), with a negligible rise of 1.7 per cent. However, in the first half of 1996 the number of emigrants decreased by a significant proportion (20 per cent) relative to respective period of 1995. The level recorded in 1995 was considerably higher than in 1990-1993 (by some 25 per cent on annual basis) but at the same time much lower (by around 30 per cent) than in the years preceding the transition (1987 and 1988). Generally, over two recent decades the number of emigrants seems to be relatively stable; in 1976-1995 it fell mostly (13 years) within the range of 21-29 thousand (with 3 years below the lower limit and 4 years above the upper limit of that interval).

[17] See section 2.4 of this report.

[18] From the view-point of employment size, the bazaar also ranks among the largest Polish companies (actually, in the top fourth ten).

[19] The data come from regional registers, and are centrally compiled (into PESEL) by the Government Information Centre subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. However, most of statistics exploited in this part were provided to the author in a highly aggregate and processed form by the Central Statistical Office, the organisation which has exclusive entitlement to processing of PESEL data.

[20] Compared for instance to the number of registered emigrants or the total population of Poland.

Also the negative migration balance failed to change considerably. As a matter of fact it decreased by 4.1 per cent to (minus) 18.2 thousand. This was less than in the 1980s (more than minus 25 thousand on the average) but more than in 1990-1993 (minus 15 thousand on the average). However, the emigrants-to-immigrants ratio fell to one of the lowest levels in decades, i.e. 3.2 (only in 1992 was that ratio lower than in 1995).

3.3. Destination of emigrants and origin of immigrants

No changes in the distribution of emigrants by major target countries took place in 1995 (Table 4). The by far major destination remained Germany who received more than two-third of migrants from Poland. The next two top positions were retained by the United States and Canada. Fourth position was taken by Austria who replaced (and exchanged the position with) Sweden. At least 500 migrants went to each of those countries. There were in addition four more countries who became destination for more than 100 emigrants (Australia, France, Italy and the United Kingdom). Compared to 1994, the outflow for Germany diminished (by 700 persons), while it increased for the United States (by 400), Canada (by over 200) and Austria (by nearly 200). This caused a decline in a relative importance of Germany (from 72.9 to 68.9 per cent of all emigrants) and strengthening of importance of the United States (from 10.7 to 12.1 per cent), Canada (from 5.6 to 6.4 per cent) and Austria (from 1.7 to 2.3 per cent). Similar situation was noted in the first half of 1996.

The pace of changes as far as immigration to Poland (distributed by major countries or continents of origin) is concerned (Table 8) was much faster than in case of emigration. The number of immigrants from Canada increased in 1995 by 175 per cent (to nearly reach 1,000) and from European part of the ex-USSR by 26 per cent. Meanwhile two major sending countries contributed relatively very little to the total immigration rise; the increase for Germany was by only 6.6 per cent and for the United States by 15.4 per cent.

The shares (as per cent of the total) of immigrants arriving from major places of origin in 1994 and 1995 were as follow:

	1994	1995
Germany	26.7	24.2
other European (excluding ex-USRR)	23.5	20.0
USA	17.0	16.7
European part of ex-USRR	14.4	15.5
Canada	5.0	11.7
rest of the world	13.4	11.7

Statistics on immigration do not distinguish between the citizens of Poland and foreigners. Citizens of foreign countries can register as immigrants only when they receive a permanent residence permit, in short PRP (which is unnecessary for immigrants of Polish citizenship). The data on PRP's granted (which are collected by district administration and centrally processed by the Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs, in short OMRA), however, are not linked with the central population register (PESEL), and it is not possible to verify the consistency between relevant information included in the latter and the OMRA-managed register of foreigners who acquired PRP (the official name of the register is OBCY which means alien)[21]. Nonetheless the following figures, extracted independently from these two registers, do shed some light on the nationality of immigrants coming from the major countries of origin[22]:

country of origin	immigrants recorded by PESEL[23]		OBCY[24]		the difference[25]	
	1995	1996	1995	1996	1995	1996
Germany	1965	961	199	63	1766	892
USA	1352	571	49	20	1303	551
Canada	950	571	9	2	941	207
Ukraine	502	267	585	283	-83	-16
France	397	139	32	20	375	119
Russia	289	150	343	147	-54	3
Austria	241	113	30	16	211	97
United Kingdom	218	87	39	17	179	70
Italy	211	84	31	17	180	67
Kazakhstan	200	120	239	136	-39	-16
Australia	160	62	10	2	150	60
Belarus	160	100	225	123	-65	-23
Vietnam	150	90	200	136	-40	-46
Sweden	117	39	45	32	72	7
Lithuania	106	37	73	51	33	-14
Netherlands	88	40	37	13	51	27
Armenia	.	29	81	22	.	7
Algeria	.	15	56	16	.	-1

Leaving aside the fact that certain numbers in the last two columns are negative[26], one might arrive at the following conclusions. First, the list of major countries of origin of reemigrants (or other immigrating Poles) substantially differ from the list of immigrating foreigners. The top 10 countries in the former include (in descending order): Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Vietnam, Germany, Lithuania, Armenia, Algeria and USA while in the latter: Germany, the USA, Canada, France, Austria, the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, the Netherlands and Sweden. Second, the countries of origin that take a lead in reemigration are entirely countries that traditionally, and particularly in the 1980's were the destination for emigrants from Poland and that belong to the western world (OECD members), whereas the major countries of origin in case of immigrants who are not Polish citizens are (with only two exceptions: Germany and the United States) located in the non-western world. Third, the major countries of origin for foreigner immigrants seem to be much more heterogeneous (from the point of view of basic characteristics of migrants and causes of their migration) that in case of reemigrants. For instance, many if not most of immigrants from Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus are ethnic Poles with no Polish citizenship (the same may apply, though to a lesser extent, to the citizens of the USA and

21 Incidentally, the organisations responsible for running the two registers are subordinate of the Ministry of the Interior.
22 Figures for 1995 are complete annual numbers whereas for 1996 they embrace only the first half of the year.
23 Immigrants according to legal definition in use in Poland (both Poles and foreigners). No 1995 data for Algeria and Armenia were available at the time of this writing.
24 Foreigners who obtained PRP, i.e. permission (and, at the same time, became obliged) to register as immigrants.
25 Proxy number of immigrants of Polish citizenship.
26 Those numbers point to inconsistences between the registers whose possibility has been mentioned before.

Germany[27]), among migrants from Armenia economic refugees predominate, and Vietnamese are an example a genuine new immigration wave which appears to be driven primarily by two factors: a long-standing tradition of coming to Poland to study (and perceiving Poland as a relatively familiar country) and favourable economic opportunities (for skills typically possessed by migrants) offered by the economic transition[28]. Fourth, and paradoxically, a large proportion of foreigner immigrants seem to be ethnic Poles which furthermore suggests that migration statistics in Poland, i.a. due to disfunctional definition of a migrant and unclear concept of a foreigner, confuses immigration with reemigration or repatriation, and hardly capture any inflow of "true" foreigners.

As far as recent trends in documented settlement of foreigners in Poland (PRP) is concerned, relevant data are presented in Table 11. The data reflect the "flows" registered between 1 January 1993 and 30 June 1996.

It stems from the table that almost 9,000 foreigners became "permanent residents" of Poland in the period referred to. Annual numbers were constantly and steadily growing. In the course of time, a group of the countries of origin was consolidated with highest share in the total number of foreigners granted PRP. In 1993 the top 10 countries accounted for 50.9 per cent and the top 15 countries for 63.9 per cent of the total, whereas in the first half of 1996 for as much as 71.1 and 77.6 per cent, respectively.

Among the top 15 countries as many as six belonged in the past to the former Soviet Union (Ukraina, Russia, Belarus, Kazkhstan, Lithuania and Armenia), there were in addition two other former socialist countries of Europe (Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) and four western countries (Germany, Sweden, the USA and the United Kingdom). The remainder (in this group) consisted of Vietnam, Algeria and Syria. While Kazakhstan, Armenia and Vietnam displayed fastest growth (at least around triple in 1993-1995), and increases in case of Algeria, Ukraine and Germany were also substantial (around double), the trend for Yugoslavia was a steady decline, and for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Sweden, Syria, the United Kingdom and the USA no clear changes were observed. Among other (below the top 15) important countries of origin, the following countries were strongly on the rise: Turkey, India and China (despite highest, besides Armenia, refusal rate) whereas a number of Middle East countries (especially Iraq) experienced a decline.

Major geographical regions of origin of foreign citizens who in that period reportedly settled in Poland were the following: the ex-USSR (49 per cent of the total), the countries of the European Union and EFTA (15 per cent), former socialist countries of Europe other than the ex-USSR (8 per cent), Vietnam (6 per cent) and Middle East countries (4 per cent).

3.4. Migrants by sex, age and marital status

With the total number of emigrants slightly increased, the number of males declined by 1.1 per cent and the number of females rose by 4.7 per cent. Despite this a new tendency that appeared in 1994 of males over females excess among emigrants was maintained in 1995 (102 males per 100 females). It should be reminded that in the 1980's males were

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[27] In the latter case they might be persons who during past decades emigrated to Germany as Aussiedler (and in the course of administrative procedures related to that migration had given up their Polish citizenship) and nowadays return to Poland or, what is observed quite frequently, tend to maintain two residences at a time: one in Germany and another in Poland.

[28] The case of immigrants from Algeria seems to be a half way through between Armenians and Vietnamese. It might also be speculated that non-negligible part of immigrants from Russia and Ukraine are non-Poles for whom acquiring of PRP is a logical step in their shorter or longer story of working or doing business in Poland. A mention should perhaps also be made of reported (by mass media) and apparently popular matching pairs business which involves arranging marriages between Russian or Ukrainian brides and Polish grooms who usually are farmers living in areas suffering from strong "deficit" of females.

greatly underrepresented in the registered outflow (159 females per 100 males in 1981-1988)[29], and since 1989 female excess has been gradually disappearing. In 1995 the sex distribution of immigrants became less even than in previous years. More than 114 males were registered per 100 females compared to 107 in 1994. The tendency for increasingly more male dominated immigration emerged in 1990, after a decade of moderate (reflecting a general demographic regularity rather than sex selectivity among migrants) excess of females.

As far as age distribution of emigrants is concerned, no significant changes could have been noticed in 1995 vis-a-vis 1994 (Table 5). There continued a tremendous overrepresentation of young males below the age of 25 and females aged 20-39. Generally, middle-age and old emigrants were underrepresented (relative to the population of Poland).

Percentage structure of male and female emigrants by three major age brackets in 1994 and 1995 was as follows:

age	males		females	
group	1994	1995	1994	1995
-24	46.7	46.7	33.2	33.1
25-39	25.5	26.4	30.7	32.7
40+	27.8	26.9	36.1	34.2

As in previous years, on the average immigrants were older than emigrants. For instance, in 1995 the share of male emigrants aged 0-19 was 32.0 per cent whereas in case of immigrants 12.9 (in females 22.9 and 14.5 per cent, respectively, and the share of male emigrants aged 50 years or over was 16.4 per cent whereas in case of immigrants 20.4 per cent (in females 17.1 and 23.7 per cent, respectively). The changes in the age distribution of immigrants in 1995 seemed to be rather unimportant and at that inconsistent with the changes observed in 1994 (Table 9):

[29]On the whole almost perfect sex parity existed among emigrants as males predominated in unreported ("illegal") outflow.

age group	males 1993	males 1994	males 1995	females 1993	females 1994	females 1995
-19	14.0	13.7	15.6	16.5	11.9	14.4
20-49	65.3	66.0	64.0	58.9	62.6	61.9
50+	20.7	20.3	20.4	24.6	25.5	23.7

The changes in emigrants' structure by marital status were by all means significant, and they cannot be entirely explained by changes in the age distribution. Both for males and females the number of married (and widowed) persons declined - for the former by 11 per cent and for the latter by 4 per cent (for widowed by 13 per cent for the both sexes), whereas the number of bachelors/spinsters (and divorced persons) increased - by 6 per cent in males and 16 per cent in females (for divorced by 13 and 12 per cent, respectively).

The deepest changes took place among emigrants aged 15-34, especially among females. The respective percentages for 1994 and 1995 are the following:

year	males bachelors	males married	males other	females spinsters	females married	females other
1994	81.0	18.4	0.6	59.1	37.1	3.8
1995	83.5	16.0	0.5	71.8	24.1	4.1

Could that be a symptom of a decrease in emigration for settlement of whole families?

3.5. Educational attainment of migrants

At the time when the present report was drafted no data for 1995 were yet available concerning the education of immigrants. For this reason, the following remarks will be limited to the population of emigrants.

The declining trend of the number of highly educated emigrants, which started after 1988, was continued in 1995 (Table 7). The only category of educational attainment which displayed an increase as far as the number of emigrants is concerned was elementary education (completed or non-completed). Age groups 25-34 and even more so 35-44 recorded the strongest rise in the number of poorly educated emigrants in 1995 relative to 1994. In males it amounted to 20 per cent and in females to 24 per cent. The percentage changes for major categories of education for migrants 15-year old or over were as follow:

educational attainment	males	females
all emigrants 15+	-2.5	+4.7
post-secondary	-8.7	+0.4
secondary	-18.6	-9.6
vocational	-13.7	-5.7
elementary	+3.1	+10.1

In effect, the predominance of emigrants having attained at most elementary education in all emigrants has greatly increased. The data presented below (percentage shares of two extreme educational categories in 15+ male and female subtotals) suggest that official settlement emigration as registered by Polish statistics has become almost exclusive domain of lowest educated people:

	males		females	
year	post-secondary	elementary	post-secondary	elementary
1988	11.7	39.7	6.2	34.7
1989	8.2	36.5	5.6	35.3
1990	5.5	51.2	4.1	53.1
1991	3.7	59.5	2.9	62.6
1992	3.6	66.4	2.7	67.3
1993	2.8	70.2	2.1	71.9
1994	2.4	69.3	2.1	69.5
1995	2.2	73.2	2.0	73.0

It might be noted in addition that a trend described (in my earlier SOPEMI reports for Poland) as "adverse brain drain" was continued in 1995. In that year, despite the fact that in general emigrants outnumbered immigrants by factor 3.2, the number of immigrants with university diploma was by over 280 per cent higher than the respective number of emigrants, and even the number of immigrants with completed secondary education (including not completed post-secondary) was by more than 10 per cent in excess of the respective number of emigrants[30].

4. Stocks of migrants

4.1. Stock of immigrants (foreign citizens)

According to the definition of migrant which is in use in Poland, the stock of foreign citizens should include the foreigners who after being granted PRP were registered as permanent residents of Poland, and until a given moment (day) did not leave for any other country nor acquired Polish citizenship. For two reasons the central population register does not render it possible to arrive at any reliable estimate of such population: primarily, it does not include information on citizenship and secondly (and consequently), it does not follow the changes in nationality (citizenship). Neither, population census (nor microcensus) ever inquired into the issue of citizenship. Finally, the register of foreigners who obtained permission to settle in Poland (PRP) is still (after many efforts to overcome the problem of past data) incomplete as it covers only recent few years. Moreover, it is unable to follow all changes in the status of foreigners in Poland (e.g. naturalisation), and above all does not grasp the virtue of Polish migration statistics, i.e. the fact of formal registration of permanent residence in Poland. For all these reasons, it is not possible at this moment to say anything about the stock of foreigners in Poland.

[30] All in all, the immigrants with post-secondary education constituted 22.6 per cent of the total, and the immigrants whose attainment was at least secondary education constituted 61.8 per cent of the total.

4.2. Stock of emigrants (residents of Poland)

There exist two sources which would eventually make it possible to estimate the size and basic socio-demographic characteristics of the stock of "permanent residents" of Poland who in 1995 were migrants in any foreign country: a quarterly labour force survey (LFS), known in Poland as BAEL, which since May 1993, on the basis of national sample (around 50 thousand adult persons), inquires i.a. into this issue, and microcensus. The both surveys adopted very similar approach to defining a migrant, i.e. a person who at the time of inquiry stayed abroad and the length of that stay extended over two months was identified as a migrant. In addition, LFS distinguished between those whose stay abroad was contained within the 2-11-month interval and those whose stay abroad lasted at least two months. In other words, LFS adopted the definition recommended by the United Nations, although based on the ex post assessment. In turn, in contrast to LFS, the participation in the microcensus was mandatory for the selected individuals. In addition, in the latter case the sample size was much larger than in the former what obviously mattered because the proportion of migrants in the total population is generally rather low. Both, LFS and microcensus covered only those households where at least one person was actually residing in Poland at the time of inquiry. This means that neither has accounted for migrants who stayed abroad in the company of all other members of their household. For this reason the both surveys must have underestimated the numbers of emigrants.

In spite of the fact that the surveys have been conducted by the same organisation, i.e. the Central Statistical Office, therefore *lega artis*, data concerning migrants extracted from those sources differ, and some differences are striking. The major discrepancy is that the microcensus provided much larger estimate of the size of residents of Poland staying abroad than LFS. This would not be entirely surprising as the former was addressed to much larger number of respondents, and in that case the respondents were prevented from refusing their answering the questions what would have lead to a larger coverage of the incidence of emigration, and at the end should have secured better accuracy of data. On the other hand, since May 1993 (until the end of 1995) 11 waves of LFS were executed, and all of them produced remarkably consistent results as far as the size and structure of the stock of emigrants are concerned. Bearing all this in mind I would hesitate at this moment to predetermine to what extent are these two sources reliable, and which is more reliable.

In this report I will rather refer to LFS, and (for the sake of comparability with my three earlier SOPEMI reports for Poland) to its wave pursued in May 1996.

The major conclusion which became clear in 1994-1996 is that the number of Polish permanent residents living (staying) abroad has been steadily declining (Table 12). In May 1994 (similarly to what was observed in May 1993) LFS "recorded" 208 thousand persons in such situation, in May 1995 178 thousand and in May 1996 merely 168 thousand (nearly 20 per cent less than in 1994). This almost equally pertains to males and females but, on the other hand, much more to long-term than short-term migrants (number given below are in rounded thousands):

	male emigrants		female emigrants	
year	short-term	long-term	short-term	long-term
1994	43	78	35	51
1995	51	53	32	42
1996	48	49	32	39

As a matter of fact, it was only the number of long-term migrants (which in 1994 was much higher than the respective number of short-term migrants) that decreased in 1994-1996. At the same time, the number of short-term migrants (men and women taken together) did hardly changed what resulted in a drastic narrowing of the gap relative to the former.

As at previous dates, the population of temporary migrants was heavily masculinised in May 1996. Altogether 137 males were recorded per 100 females. This meant a steady but slow decrease of male excess (from 141 in May 1994). A large majority of migrants staying abroad at the time of LFS conducted in May 1966 were relatively young people, with female migrants considerably younger than female migrants (58 per cent of males fell into 25-44 age interval and 61 per cent of females into 18-34 age interval). No significant differences in age distribution were observed with respect to duration of stay abroad, and no changes compared with earlier years (Table 12).

In a sharp contrast to recent emigrants leaving Poland with an intention to settle abroad (see: section 3.5), educational attainment of emigrants who retained their permanent residence in Poland was rather high (Table 13). Poorly educated migrants (with elementary education at best) by no means prevailed, and highly educated migrants did not constitute a marginal group in all migrants. However, a large majority of migrants had a diploma of secondary or vocational school. Between 1994 and 1996 a meaningful trend could be observed: the numbers and proportions of migrants with post-secondary and elementary education increased, and the numbers and proportions of migrants with secondary and vocational education decreased. This phenomenon will be discussed later in the present report. The percentage shares of four major categories of educational attainment in the total, in May 1994 and May 1996 were as follows:

	level of completed education			
year	post-secondary	secondary	vocational	elementary[31]
1994	9.1	45.8	32.9	12.1
1996	13.7	40.5	29.8	16.1

Two major traditional destinations for emigrants from Poland: Germany and the United States were also two major countries where Polish temporary migrants lived, with Germany taking the lead in case of short-term migrants and the USA in case of long-term migrants. These two countries hosted as much as 59 per cent of the total number of temporary migrants, as estimated by LFS in May 1996 (Table 14). It is worth to be mentioned that the third important country of residence for this category of migrants turned out Italy (with 10 per cent of the total), country which practically does not count in the statistics of emigration for settlement (permanent stay abroad). As far as the distribution of the stock of temporary migrants by foreign country of residence is concerned, no major changes were observed comparing May 1996 with May 1995, except for diminished role of Spain (especially in case of short-term migrants) and increased role of France (especially in case of long-term migrants).

[31] This category also includes persons who did not complete elementary education.

5. Migrant workers

5.1. Migration for work from Poland

As it has been mentioned in the last (1995) SOPEMI report for Poland, LFS directly inquires into the purpose of temporary stay abroad of Polish residents, and it distinguishes a category of migrant workers. It is the sole source of complete and comprehensive information on this subject.

According to this source (Tables 13 and 14), in May 1996 118 thousand Polish residents were employed abroad for at least two months. This was by 12 thousand less than in May 1995, and generally distinctly less than in 1995 (irrespective of LFS wave). Compared to May 1995, the number of short-term migrant workers stayed at exactly the same level (60 thousand) and the number of long-term migrant workers declined substantially (from 70 to 58 thousand).

People migrating for work are generally very young. A modal age bracket in females is 18-24 and in males 25-34. In the course of time they become even younger. Males clearly predominate (170 males per 100 females in May 1996). Very few migrant workers (11 per cent) are poorly educated (elementary educational attainment at best) and presumably unskilled. Migrant workers with vocational education constitute by far largest category among short-term migrants while those with secondary education among long-term migrants.

Men tend to be short-term migrant workers and women long-term migrant workers. For males major country of employment in May 1996 was Germany, followed by the USA and France, and for females the USA, followed by Germany and Italy. In Germany migrant workers from Poland are more often short-term than long-term migrants whereas in the United States the opposite is true.

As was the case with all temporary migrants, in recent three years the proportion of migrant workers with post-secondary education greatly increased (from 7 per cent in February 1995, 12 per cent in May 1995 and 14 per cent in August 1995 to 17 per cent in May 1996). In contrast, the proportion of migrant workers with secondary and vocational education declined (in each case from 40 per cent in February 1996 to 35-36 per cent in May 1996). This (contrasted with a decline in the number of Polish workers abroad) may suggest growing difficulties in finding temporary employment abroad by medium-skilled people from Poland, even in such familiar countries as Germany and the USA.

According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy estimate, the largest group of migrant workers from Poland seem to be persons in regular employment who get a job on the basis of intergovernment agreements. By far the most important sub-group constitute Polish seasonal workers in Germany. Their number is growing year-by-year:

1992	131 thousand
1993	148 "
1994	160 "
1995	165 "
1996 (1st half)	182 "

On the other hand, a decline is being observed in the number of workers who belong to the second large category of migrants employed in accordance with intergovernment agreements, i.e. workers employed by Polish firms (mostly contractors in construction industry) operating in Germany (the so-called project-tied employment). The peak was reached in 1992 and 1993 when that form of employment involved 60-70 thousand migrant workers from Poland annually. In 1995 and 1996, however, the respective figure seem to be much lower (around 30-40 thousand)[32].

Altogether intergovernment agreements concerning access to national labour markets give way to work of Polish migrants in 8 countries. In Germany, in addition to two forms which have been already mentioned, several hundreds of Poles find employment as guest workers (770 in 1995 and 500 in the first half of 1996). Significant numbers of employees from Poland are registered in the Czech Republic (12,700 in the first half of 1996). Finally, France provides jobs for a few thousands of seasonal workers (and a handful of on-the-job trainees), most recently 3,700 in 1995 and around 3,000 in 1996 (a projection made in September 1996 by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy), and this year also Russia receives Polish workers in a meaningful quantity (2,500 in the first half). The number of Polish employees who work in the remaining countries concerned (Belgium, Libia, Switzerland and Ukraine) is negligible (from few tens to few hundreds)[33].

No combined account of Polish workers officially employed abroad has been produced for 1995, and there is no intention to do so. An estimate made by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy in 1993 suggested that the total annual figure might be close to 250-300 thousand. A similar range was offered[34] as probable for 1994 and a little less for 1995. However, the ministry officials point out that a downward, albeit by no means strong, trend has already been established.

A survey carried out in December/January 1994/1995 (and in September 1996) by the Institute for Social Studies indicates that in certain regions of Poland the incidence of migration for work is much larger than implied by the results of LFS and estimates produced by the government. It follows from the survey that in 1994 in the investigated communities on the average around 20 persons per 1,000 inhabitants aged 15 years or more migrated for work abroad (for at least three months) [Jazwinska and Okolski, 1996]. By generalising this rate for national scale one would arrive at the estimated number of Polish workers migrating for work in 1994 of some 600 thousand.

5.2. Migration for work to Poland

No proper statistics (neither flow- nor stock-type) exist on the number of foreigners regularly employed in Poland, not to mention those who might be in irregular employment. The incidence of foreigner labour seeking jobs in Poland, however, is significant and by all means growing. It has already been indicated in this report (see: section 2.3) that in 1995 as much as 9.5 per cent of foreign tourists entering Poland declared an intention to seek temporary job. That was 4.4 points more than in 1994. This means that around 960 thousand foreign citizens were ready to work in Poland in 1994 and as many as 1,800 thousand in 1995. It might be presumed that almost all of them intended to accept some form of irregular employment[35].

The actual numbers of those who found a job are unknown. The only statistical record concerning work of foreign citizens in Poland pertain to those who hold a specific temporary residence permit (so-called visa 06), and they deal with work permits issued rather than actually employed persons. This can hardly be regarded as a proxy of complete

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[32] The recruitment for this form of employment takes place entirely through German institutions of labour market, and no data are available in Poland.

[33] All data quoted in this paragraph are the official estimates of District Labour Office in Warsaw who is an "intermediary" in recruitment of Polish workers within the framework of intergovernment agreements.

[34] Informally, on the occasion of various meetings and seminars.

[35] Due to formal requirements, a large majority of foreigners legally employed in Poland are secured a specific job (with a specific employer) before entering Poland. Their number, as it will be shown later, is very small (hardly in excess of 10 thousand).

record of foreigners in the regular employment as it does not account for foreign citizens who are permanent resident permit holders of whom a large part work in Poland, and the fact that many foreigners with a temporary residence permit (other than visa 06) may legally take a variety of jobs (e.g. persons studying in Poland). Still the record is of some value for the present analysis because it throws light on how the opening up of labour market in Poland proceeds and on structural features of foreign labour force in Poland.

The number of permissions granted each year to foreign workers does not undergo dramatic changes. In recent years it is within the 10-12 thousand range. What, however, is the total employment of foreign labour. Doubtless, it must be much higher than 10-12 thousand. But how much? Government officials suggest that as many as 100 thousand foreign citizens might have worked in Poland in 1995 [Dryll, 1996]. Obviously it is a "guestimate" only, as no hard evidence exists concerning the scale of irregular employment.

Results of the survey recently conducted in the Warsaw Bazaar (see: section 2.5) imply that around 3,000 foreigners are directly employed on the market ground over there[36]. According to official classification by industry, they all should be considered as working in trade. On the other hand, in the first half of 1996 only 2898 foreigners were supposed to work legally in all Warsaw district (metropolitan area of the capital). Around 1,500 foreign workers were allowed to work in trade in all Warsaw of which 280 from ex-USSR and 520 from China and Vietnam, i.e. from practically the only foreign nations involved in the bazaar activities. Assuming now that only a half of those legally employed (or rather permitted to be employed) trade workers from ex-USSR, China and Vietnam had a job somewhere else[37], one might arrive at a minimum estimate of the incidence of irregular employment in trade in Warsaw Bazaar. It would be 86 per cent. If this is applied to (what, however, seems risky and unsound) calculating of an approximate number of all temporary residents of Poland having foreign citizenship and employed in Poland in 1995, one would arrive at a figure of around 100 thousand (of which at least around 88 thousand in irregular situation).

As far as the recorded regular employment of foreigners is concerned, in 1995 11,361 work permits were issued to foreign citizens who wanted to become (or already were) temporary residents in Poland. In the first half of 1996 the respective number of permits was as many as 6,069. The latter figure was almost identical with that recorded for the second half of 1995, it was, however, by 13 higher than the figure for the first half of 1995, and by 12 per cent lower than the figure for the second half of 1994. Although no consistent changes over time were observed in 1993-1996, it might be noted that in 1995 and 1996 growing number of refusals to employers applications submitted of National Labour Office was recorded[38]. They were turned down on the grounds of protecting Polish labour market (native labour). For instance, in 1995 a number of big state-owned companies (e.g . shipyards in Gdansk and Szczecin) came up with huge demand for foreign workers in highly skilled occupations, i.e. occupations in case of which local workers are often laid off in search of lowering the costs [Dryll, 1996].

In the first half of 1996 around 8 per cent of permits were granted in connection with project-tied employment of foreigners, i.e. the employment by foreign contractors operating in Poland (no change relative to 1995). In addition, as much as 20.5 per cent of permits were related to the extension of contract, and only 79.5 per cent were newly issued permits. Permits allowing for 6-11-month employment constituted a predominant majority (68 per

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[36] A certain number of foreigners also work for firms whose sole or major activity is to supply the bazaar with merchandise (warehouses and small textile or shoe factories).

[37] This seems to be a very cautious assumption as there are few other bazaars and many other trading firms in Warsaw that employ persons from the former Soviet Union, China and Vietnam.

[38] This means that the statistics of work permits issued can by no means be treated as a reflection of free interplay between supply of foreign workers and the number of vacancies in the labour market in Poland. On the contrary, administrative instruments tend to an increasing degree obstruct that interplay.

cent), followed by permits allowing for 2-5-month employment (22 per cent). It should be noted that permits for workers seeking employment lasting up to three months (which appears to be a norm among irregular foreign workers) were in a small minority (3 per cent).

How accurate is the estimated (maximum[39]) number of regular foreign workers which is implied by the register of work permits issued in 1995 or first half of 1996? At this moment it is very difficult to make any strong statement on this as no studies have been yet attempted with an objective to verify the proportion of actually utilised work permits and to measure the magnitude of foreigners' regular employment for which work permit is not a prerequisite.

Structural characteristics of temporary foreign labour in Poland did not change in 1995 nor in the first half of 1996, except for the ranking of top countries of migrants' origin. Compared to earlier periods, the workers from the Czech Republic and ex-Yugoslavia are no longer in the top 10 (not even in the top 12), whereas the workers from France and Italy advanced to that group of countries[40].

There are at present (1995) two countries (Ukraine and Vietnam) which send to Poland more than 1,000 workers annually, six countries (the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Belarus, Germany and the USA) sending between 501 and 1,000 workers and four countries (France, Italy, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands) sending between 200 and 501 (Table 17). Eight additional countries (Turkey, India, ex-Yugoslavia, Sweden, Denmark, Mongolia, Canada and Armenia) are (were in 1995) represented by around or more than 100 migrant workers. As can be seen in Tables 15 and 16, over the recent three six-month periods, fastest growth in the number of permits issued was observed (among the top 8 countries) in case of the United Kingdom, Germany, the United States, and Ukraine, while the number of permits in case of Belarussians consistently declining. It should be mentioned that in 1995, and particularly in the first half of 1996, workers from a number of new countries started to matter in the statistics of work permits, especially from Korea[41], Turkey, Mongolia and India.

In the first half of 1996 most foreign workers were sought in private sector, in firms with foreign capital only (36 per cent), followed by exclusive Polish-capital firms in private sector (33 per cent), firms in private sector but with mixed capital (17 per cent), state-owned firms (8 per cent) and other firms (6 per cent). The situation does not tend to evolve rapidly; the only distinct change seems a consistently growing importance of firms with mixed capital (Table 15). Ukrainians, Russians and Belarussians are most readily employed by Polish-capital-owned firms, a large majority of persons from the United Kingdom are more or less evenly distributed between three types of private firms, and Vietnamese, Chinese,

[39] In fact, the number of foreigners who actually work in Poland might be lower (but not higher!) than the number of work permits issued. The reason is that many permits (visa 06) are issued before coming to Poland, and indeed it is mandatory to apply for the permit from beyond Poland's boundaries in case of one's first employment in Poland. Consequently, certain applicants may change their mind give up their trip to Poland even though they might be granted a permit

[40] The top 12 countries in the first half of 1996 were as follows (the number of individual work permits combined with permits related to project-tied employment):

1. Ukraine	1,204	7. Belarus	317
2. Russia	495	8. China	299
3. United Kingdom	490	9. France	177
4. Vietnam	456	10. Italy	167
5. Germany	390	11. Netherlands	146
6. USA	324	12. Korea	128

[41] Korea presents a clear case of a country for which a major flow of direct foreign investment to Poland triggered off a considerable flow of labour. In 1994 hardly any permit was issue for citizens of Korea, in 1995 - 51, and in 1996, the year when Daewoo took over a major Polish car maker FSO - 128 (until 30 June).

and, to a lesser extent, Germans and Americans predominantly (or almost exclusively) find employment in foreign-owned companies.

According to the data in Table 16, trade and catering are major branches which receive work permits for migrant workers (32 per cent in the first half of 1996). Next branches are: industry with transportation (24 per cent), education (11 per cent) and agriculture (8 per cent). The relative importance of education, however, strongly fluctuates seasonally (with downs in first halves and ups in second halves of a year). There is a strong national pattern of being employed in particular branches. For instance, industry attracts largest group of Germans, agriculture is a domain of Ukrainians, in trade and catering a majority of Chinese and Vietnamese seek employment, most of British and Americans work in education and a large part of Russians become employees in sport and entertainment.

The largest category of migrant workers (expatriates) are managers (23 per cent in 1995), followed by owners and co-owners of Poland-based firms (15 per cent), teachers and instructors (13 per cent), experts and consultants (12 per cent), skilled workers (11 per cent) and unskilled workers (10 per cent). In the remainder (15 per cent) members of artistic profession, middle level administration and medical profession constitute largest groups. A strong concentration by nationality can be observed in many professional categories (Table 17). For instance, the share of migrants from the top 12 countries in the total number of permits was 76 per cent in 1995, but it was 95 per cent in case of unskilled workers (with Ukrainians being the largest national group), 84 per cent in case of teachers and instructors (with British indisputably taking the lead) and 81 per cent in case of owners and co-owners (Vietnamese having the by far largest contribution) whereas only 65 per cent in case of experts and consultants (with a distinct share of Americans, Russians and Ukrainians) and 68 per cent in case of managers (with British, Americans, Chinese and Germans playing major role).

As much as 39 per cent of Ukrainians sought employment as unskilled workers, 14 per cent as skilled workers and 13 per cent as teachers or instructors. More than 55 per cent of Vietnamese received a permit for work as owners or co-owners, 19 per cent as skilled workers and 16 per cent as managers. In case of the migrants from Britain almost 55 per cent flocked in education and 28 per cent sought a job in management. A majority of Russians was evenly split between four occupational categories: owners and co-owners, experts and consultants, teachers and instructors, and the remainder (entertainers, etc.), each with 17-per cent share. Chinese wanted primarily to become managers, owners and skilled workers, Belarussians - unskilled and skilled workers, Germans - managers and owners, Americans - managers, teachers and experts, and French, Italians and Dutch - managers.

Manual work (mostly in horticulture or agriculture) was a domain of Belarussians and Ukrainians, small or medium-scale enterpreneurship characterised Vietnamese and Chinese (who also, to a moderate extent, resorted to skilled manual work), teaching (of languages, as a rule) attracted large numbers of British, Ukrainians and Americans (and also Russians and Germans), the citizens of the United Kingdom, the USA, Germany, Italy, France and the Netherlands played a major role in management of medium and larger companies. In addition, American and German experts seemed to be representatives of most sophisticated skills in the Polish labour market. Finally, relatively large numbers of Germans and Russians were probably involved in medium-scale businesses.

Generally, a leading rule pertaining to regular employment of migrant workers in Poland during the first half of the 1990s was an implicit linking of that kind of employment with the inflow of foreign capital. There were only few, albeit very important exceptions to that rule, i.e. allowing for practically unlimited employment of foreign language teachers, and accepting Ukrainian and Belarussian workers in professions that usually require low skills. Otherwise, foreigners could easily get a job either in enterprises founded or owned by themselves or their compatriots (the case of Chinese and Vietnamese) or in companies with a substantial participation of foreign capital where recruitment policies practically precluded hiring of Poles for certain strategic positions (mainly the case of many westerners).

Operation of that rule resulted i.a. in a relatively large proportion of relatively well educated or experienced migrants from western countries among all migrant workers permitted to take a job in Poland. However, a survey conducted at the end of 1995 by the Institute for Social Studies (for Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung) investigating the issue of movements of highly skilled professionals from the West to Poland revealed that a quick and radical change in that trend is to be expected soon. This is because of changes observed in many firms with participation of foreign capital in the policies of recruitment with regard to personnel occupying top management or expert positions. The essence of those changes is in rapid replacement of western managers and top professionals with local specialists [Okolski, 1996]. Therefore in near future we might witness a serious net loss of western professionals in Poland.

6. Repatriation of Poles

The subject of repatriation deserves a separate place in this report even though in statistical terms very little can still be said about it.

It is roughly estimated that at present at least several hundred Poles living in diaspora found themselves beyond Poland's boundaries for involuntary reasons, i.e. either due to deportations or administrative changes on geopolitical scene (Yalta)[42]. Almost all of them are currently the residents of the former Soviet Union, and the citizens of such new states as Belarus, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. In the past most of them were denied of the right to migrate to Poland. Over time, many potential ethnic Poles living beyond Poland's eastern border have lost a feeling of their Polish national identity and blended in the ex-Soviet society. For the others, i.e. those who were able to preserve their Polish selfidentity, the chances of being ever returned to Poland seemed bleak for very long, and most of them, even before the collapse of communist system, had abandoned their dreams of repatriation.

However, with the break up of the ex-USSR, national feelings in this country, which were artificially concealed under the Soviet rule, reappeared, revived or came to the fore of political issues. In certain former republics an implicit and tacit policy of ethnic cleansing was enforced. The civil rights enjoyed until that time by Poles (as well as by members of other minorities) were put at stake. Those who suffered were even sovietised descendants of Poles. Reportedly, it became more difficult to educate children in national (Polish) language, pursue traditional cultural activities, have a voice in local social or political matters, etc. In certain newly established post-Soviet states new barriers to life careers were raised, like e.g. prerequisite of proficiency in titular language. No wonder then that Polish diaspora in the former Soviet Union, until recently apparently well integrated, after 1991 or 1992 started to feel uneasy if not insecure. This give an impetus to a revival of "Polish spirit", the restoration of formal and informal links with Poland, exploratory travelling to Poland, making efforts aiming at children' admission to schools or universities in Poland, etc.

Alienation, sense of deprivation and fear for the future are most commonly experienced by Polish communities in Kazakhstan, the most remote (and at the same time most culturally distant, if not alien) of all areas in the ex-USSR (and earlier imperial Russia) where Poles were deported in large numbers. Meaningful estimates of the size of Polish diaspora in Kazakhstan range from 100-120 thousand to 250-300 thousand. Various recent

[42] As a matter of fact, most of estimates published in Poland speak of the magnitude of 1.5-2.0 million.

surveys indicate that around 100 thousand would be keen on being instantly repatriated [Iglicka, 1996][43].

In 1994 a principle was recommended by the government of Poland for a community-based repatriation of Poles living in Kazakhstan. According to that principle, the repatriation is to be limited by annual number of invitations issued to particular families in Kazakhstan by administration of communes in Poland. In other words, commune has to bear major burden of repatriation, i.e. before issuing an invitation it is *i.a.* obliged to arrange for the cost of transportation, provide a decent housing and find suitable jobs. In 1995 and 1995 formal steps were taken by the government to facilitate the process of repatriation (see: part 9).

The year 1993 saw only 26 citizens of Kazakhstan of Polish origin trying to settle in Poland, i.e. applying for permanent residence permit (PRP). In the following years this process was accelerated in many respects. While in 1994 27 thousand persons from Kazakhstan visited Poland, 440 persons requested a temporary residence permit and 67 persons actually applied for PRP (only 46 persons were granted permission in that year), in 1995 the number of visits increased to 51 thousand, the number of temporary residence permits to 600 and the number of PRP's to 274 (239 granted). In the first half of 1996 almost 200 further applications for PRP were submitted.

Since practically only ethnic Poles are among citizens of Kazakhstan who apply for PRP, the above quoted figures give a rough idea on what is the size of and at what speed does the repatriation go on. In 1993 there were less than 30 repatriants, in 1994 less than 70, in 1995 more than 270 and in the first six months of 1996 nearly 200. This indicates that despite relatively small numbers, the pace of increase is very high. It seems that the process has already reached dynamics that stimulates various networks and facilitates transmission of information (between those who have already settled in Poland and those still staying over there) and provides enough illustrations of successful stories of repatriated families to encourage others to follow in their footsteps. This may ultimately and rather soon lead to incomparably larger and perhaps uncontrolled inflow of ethnic Poles from Kazakhstan.

Besides repatriants from Kazakhstan, Poland also receives members of Polish diaspora living in countries much closer to the borders of Poland, who in earlier periods were effectively prevented from migrating to Poland. As a matter of fact, the magnitude of inflow of the latter seems much greater than that of the former. "Returns" of those persons, however, are not related to any assistance organized or provided by Polish government nor does they receive any publicity. Those quasi-repatriated usually have to rely on family ties or their own enterpreneurship or skills and competitiveness in labour market in Poland.

7. Asylum-seekers and refugees

Poland is not an important target country for refugees, and very few foreigners seek asylum in Poland. On the other hand, many refugees and asylum seekers (mostly from Asia) transit through Poland to the West.

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[43] Though a sizeable "community" of Poles in Kazakhstan was already captured by the 1897 Russian population census (over 11 thousand detainees from Poland of which around 90 per cent males), massive deportations of Poles that matter for present repatriation issue took place later on. There occured two distinct waves: in the late 1930's at least 250 thousand ethnic Poles were deported from eastern parts of Ukraine (they were the descendents of colonists who arrived in that part of Ukraine in 16th and 17th century), and during the World War Second (particularly during early period of the war, since 17 September 1939) around 150 thousand Poles (not just ethnic Poles but at the same time Polish citizens too) were deported from Poland's territories occupied by the Soviet Union. The former involved whole families, the latter mostly women and children (the estimated proportion of females all among adult deportees was 80 per cent) [Iglicka, 1996]. Between 1995 and 1948 around 60 thousand Poles (only from among those who on 17 September 1939 held Polish citizenship) were allowed to be repatriated to Poland (on the basis of Polish-Soviet agreement).

The only available statistics on the subject deal with the applicants who formally requested refugee status in Poland. Although the numbers revealed by those statistics may seem negligible, they quite precisely reflect geographical location of major ethnic and political conflicts currently taking place in Europe, Asia and North Africa. As those locations change over time so does the origin of refugee applicants.

In 1991 persons from Somalia, Ethiopia and the ex-USSR predominated, in 1992 a leading position in the statistics was taken over by people from Bosnia, Yugoslavia and Ethiopia (altogether 51 per cent), and in 1993 refugees from Bosnia virtually overwhelmed those statistics (67 per cent). In 1994 a half of applicants came from Armenia and the share of no other nationality was close to 10 per cent. In 1995 the distribution became relatively even with Armenia taking the lead but this time closely followed by India, Russia, Afghanistan and Somalia (altogether 59 per cent). Finally, in 1996 (until mid-September) major countries of origin turned out Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Armenia and Iraq (altogether 54 per cent).

The number of applicants shows a declining trend: from more than 2,000 in 1990 to less than 600 in 1994. In recent two years, however, this trend has been reversed, as in 1995 almost 850 persons applied and in 1996 (over the period of less than nine months) almost 1,250. It should be noted that in 1995 almost 50 refugee applicants happened to be the persons readmitted after being expelled from Germany. Since no such person is included in the 1996 figure, the increase in the present year seems so much more remarkable.

The list of the top 10 countries of origin in 1995 and 1996 is the following:

	1995		1996 (until 30 September)	
rank	citizenship	number of applicants	citizenship	number of applicants
1	Armenia	151	Sri Lanka	449
2	India	110	Afghanistan	244
3	Russia	83	Iraq	204
4	Afghanistan	73	Armenia	153
5	Somalia	73	Bangladesh	130
6	Sri Lanka	60	India	123
7	Iraq	57	Pakistan	108
8	Algeria	35	Somalia	102
9	Pakistan	34	Russia	55
10	Georgia	23	Lebanon	35

In contrast to earlier years, one might observe a strong (and increasing) domination of citizens of (southern) Asian countries among all applicants. In addition, after 1993 a general trend is towards lower concentration of applicants arriving from main countries of origin: in 1994 persons from the top 10 accounted for 85 per cent of the total, in 1995 for 83 per cent, and in 1996 for 79 per cent.

8. Transit migration

The magnitude of transit migration in Poland, other than lawful travelling through the country because of technical reasons (e.g. international rail or road network), is unknown and for its very nature must remain obscured. It is, however, a common experience of a number of organisations in Poland (border guard, police) that it is by all means non-negligible phenomenon.

As it has just been remarked, for many asylum-seekers or refugees Poland plays only a role of transit country. Its is quite striking that in case of citizens of certain countries, even among those who formally request refugee status in Poland, refugee applicants usually travel alone or sometimes are exclusively males (e.g. in 1995 this was the case of all applicants from Algeria, India, Pakistan, Somalia and Sri Lanka, and in 1996 from Algeria, Bangladesh, India, Lebanon, Pakistan and Somalia[44]).

Certain indications of structural characteristics of transit migrants are provided by statistics on attempted illegal border crossing by nationality and on deported foreigners by nationality. Let me refer here to the latter.

In 1995 in as many as 3,200 cases a decision on deportation was taken by the Polish authorities. Compared to 1994, a large increase (by 74 per cent) took place. In the first half (which is usually a part of year with lower incidence of illegal activity of foreigners) of 1996 the respective number was 2,060. This suggests a significant further increase (on annual basis)[45].

Major countries that count in deportation statistics for the first six months of 1996 (compared with 1994 annual data) are as follows:

	1996	(1994)
Ukraine	402	(826)
Romania	333	(184)
Armenia	332	(149)
Bulgaria	155	(146)
Moldova	145	(21)
India	123	(4)
Russia	82	(151)
Belarus	78	(82)
Bangladesh	67	(0)
Pakistan	55	(2)
Algeria	53	(53)
Sri Lanka	40	(0)

Since the basis (total) in 1994 and the first half of 1996 is similar, it could be concluded that in case of certain countries the cases of deportation radically shrunk in recent period while in some other cases they increased considerably. The former group includes Ukraine and Russia, and the latter group - Armenia, Bangladesh, India, Moldova, Romania, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In addition, in case of Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka hardly any deportation warrant was issued in 1994. This is very symptomatic as Ukraine and Russia belong to the countries from which large numbers of visitors come to Poland each year, and citizens from the remaining countries travel to Poland very rarely.

9. Migration policy

Migration policy has not undergone major changes in 1995 and 1996. It remains basically unchanged since 1990 when principles restricting international mobility of people

[44] In case of Sri Lanka, the largest represented country, all 225 applicants were accompanied by only 10 family members.

[45] Relevant figures for the recent six quarters are as follows: 511; 796; 887; 1,032; 941 and 1,123.

(dated back to early communist period) have been removed. Only small alterations in legislation were then necessary to trigger off massive movements of people across Poland's boundaries. However, it turned out that effective managing of those movement requires much deeper changes in law, the changes that would result in comprehensive and coherent regulations concerning migration.

Meanwhile, Poland still lacks a basic legal act, i.e. the Aliens Law. What I wrote on this issue in my previous report, reads as follows: "Unlike in case of its predecessors [a reference to a number of aborted drafts of that law devised in 1990-1993], a draft of the Aliens Law prepared and discussed by the government in 1994 has been finally approved by the Council of Ministers, and (in 1995) submitted to the Parliament for endorsement. At the moment of this writing, however, it still awaits to be considered by the Parliament". After another year I can hardly add anything to this.

The present draft was read in Parliament on several occasions, a large number of legal reviews were collected, and only minor changes were proposed to its contents. The only important new ingredient recommended by deputies seems accounting in the Alien Law for repatriation of Poles living in diaspora, particularly those living in Kazakhstan. This suggestion, however, has been duly formulated and inserted to the act by the government at least six months ago.

The organisational structure underlying migration policy is also stable. There is no state (government) agency co-ordinating activities of main actors who influence the policy. It sometimes appears that those actors see their major objective in covering as much of the migration-related area as possible and in competing with each other. Within certain organisations (ministries) there operate two or more mutually independent units dealing with various, often overlapping issues of migration. A formal organ the Socio-Political Committee of the Council of Ministers, entrusted with some co-ordinative prerogatives concerning migration policy, deals with so many topics that it can hardly focus on migration.

Despite inadequate guidance from the top level of policy making, specialised services dealing with various migration matters (perhaps, except for registration of migrants and statistics of migration) have been further maturing and solidifying. This particularly pertains to refugee administration, the judicial system (its sections handling foreigners who face legal problems), border guard operations, police departments responsible for the reception of readmitted foreigners (mostly from Germany), management of detention centres and deportation of unwanted foreign citizens, activities of labour controllers, and various NGO's. They have become highly profesionalised and their efficiency has increased substantially.

Situation looks more clear and orderly as far as formal relations between Poland and other countries are concerned. Since 1990 Poland has entered a number of international agreements concerning foreign travelling, employment, refugees, readmission, etc. The agreements concerning employment have been mentioned in part 5 of this report and described in more detail in my previous SOPEMI reports. Various references to agreements of other kind can also easily be found in those reports. Here (on separate non-numbered sheets) a combined list of the following bilateral agreements is reproduced:

- agreements concerning non visa (visa-free) rules of entry;
- readmission agreements.

In addition to bilateral agreements, Poland became a party to a number of international conventions, organisations and fora. Major convention ratified by Poland is the 1951 Geneva Convention concerning refugees (together with the 1957 New York Protocol). Among important conventions which, however, are still to be ratified one should mention: ILO conventions nos. 97 and 143, and the European Social Charter. Organizations and fora in which Poland actively participates include: Council of Europe, ILO, IOM, OECD, OSCE, UNHCR, ECE, and, more specifically, CDMG, CAHAR, Vienna-process, Budapest-process, ICMPD, Central European Initiative Migration Group, Baltic Sea Council Migration Group and few others.

In 1995 and 1996 Poland initiated and organised or hosted a number of important international conferences devoted to migration:

- "Migration in Central and Eastern Europe", a conference of ministries responsible for migration matters representing 13 countries in transition (co-organiser: ILO);
- "Second International Conference on Refugees in Central and Eastern Europe" (co-organiser: UNHCR);
- "Sixth Conference of European Ministers Responsible for Migration Affairs" (co-organiser: Council of Europe);
- "Economic Aspects of the Impact of Migrations and Refugees on State Security" (co-organiser: NATO).

Despite the lack of major developments in the area of migration policy in Poland in 1995 and 1996, public interest in the issue of migration and related public debate were much more lively than in previous years. Undoubtedly, the main topic became repatriation of Poles from Kazakhstan [e.g. JOL, 1996 and Kaczynski, 1996]. This was related to a series of steps taken by the government whose aim was to facilitate and channel that phenomenon. On 14 May 1996 the Council of Ministers has adopted a document which formulates the principles of repatriation policy[46].

Other topics which attracted wider public attention were: new migration legislation [e.g. Kacperska 1995 and Kaczynski, 1996], demand for foreign labour [e.g. Dryll, 1996], conditions of work of migrant workers [e.g. Wilk, 1996], irregular employment of foreigners [e.g. Dryll, 1996, Smolenski, 1996], inflow of false tourists to Poland [Henzler, 1996], deportations of illegal foreigners [e.g. Grochowska, 1996], small enterpreneurship of foreigners in Poland [e.g. Henzler, 1996 and Smolenski, 1996], trafficking in female prostitutes from or through Poland [e.g. Grabowski, 1996], combating of trafficking in migrants [e.g. EKI, 1996].

[46] The basic principle (repatriation based on commune-based resources, i.e. local initiatives, funding and assistance) was already mentioned in part 6. The government set the limit for the 1996 repatriation at (unrealistic as it looks today) at the level of maximum 100 families. Furthermore prior to arrival in Poland, all repatriants must receive a certificate of their Polish origin which will solely be issued by local Polish consulates. The procedure that follows arrival in Poland involves application for PRP with district administration (specific to the location of a commune that "invited" and is supposed to host a repatriated family), and naturalisation. Acquisition of Polish citizenship by repatriants should be fast (typically, in all other cases it takes years, or, more precisely, it is expected that an applicant has "permanently" lived in Poland for at least five years).

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Appendix: statistical tables

Table 1. Basic macroeconomic indicators. Poland: 1990-1996

Indicator	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996 (a)
The level in previous year = 100							
GDP	92.5	93.0	102.6	103.8	105.2	107.0	106.0
Industrial production sold	75.8	92.0	102.8	106.4	112.1	109.4	108.5
Total agricultural output	97.8	98.4	87.3	106.8	90.7	113.0	103.0
Investment outlays	89.9	95.9	100.4	102.3	108.2	119.0	113.0
Total employment (31 December)	92.8	95.6	97.2	98.3	101.1	100.2	102.0
Industrial price level (average)							
Consumer price level	722.4	140.9	134.5	131.9	125.3	125.4	118.0
- annual average	685.8	170.3	143.0	135.3	132.2	127.8	119.8
- December-to-December	349.3	160.4	144.3	137.6	129.5	121.6	117.0
- mean of monthly averages	11.0	4.0	3.1	2.7	2.2	1.6	1.3
Real wage level (net)	75.6	99.7	97.3	97.1	100.5	104.8	103.3
Real pension level (net)	84.9	114.5	93.5	97.1	102.9	103.3	102.5
Real total money supply	56.5	89.9	109.1	98.8	106.7	110.9	106.0
Real debt due to credits							
- households	188.9	103.7	115.7	136.6	114.3	139.1	.
- enterprises	123.2	118.0	96.6	95.3	96.6	111.1	.
Real debt of public sector	.	.	149.2	114.8	104.1	85.0	98.0
Central budget expenditures as per cent of GDP	34.6	29.9	33.2	32.3	32.7	32.6	31.3
Budget deficit/surplus as per cent of GDP	0.4	-3.8	-6.0	-2.8	-2.7	-2.7	-2.8
Public debt as per cent of GDP	94.9	81.4	85.2	86.0	69.5	60.2	55.0
Foreign debt in bln US $	48.5	48.4	47.0	47.2	42.2	43.9	.
Profitability of banks (gross)	65.7	26.5	19.0	6.7	4.9	19.6	.
Profitability of enterprises (gross)	.	4.6	2.1	2.8	4.1	4.5	4.8
Exports in bln US $	14.3	14.9	13.2	14.1	17.2	23.1	26.8
Imports in bln US $	9.5	15.5	15.9	18.8	21.6	29.1	34.3
Foreign debt paid as per cent of exports	6.8	10.5	11.0	13.2	8.7	9.5	.
Official unemployment in mln	1.13	2.16	2.51	2.89	2.84	2.63	2.47
Unemployment rate in per cent	6.5	12.3	14.3	16.4	16.0	14.9	13.9

(a) Central Planning Office projection

Source: CPO, 1996.

Table 2. International migration (a); year-by-year figures and five-year annual averages. Poland: 1945-1995 (in thousand)

Year	Emigrants	Immi-grants	Year	Emigrants	Immi-grants
1945-1949	797.8	754.9	1970-1974	17.6	1.6
1950-1954	15.4	4.0	1975-1979	25.8	1.7
1955-1959	66.7	53.2	1980-1984	24.4	1.3
1960-1964	23.8	3.5	1985-1989	29.8	1.9
1965-1969	23.8	2.1	1990-1994	20.9	5.4
1945	1,506.0	2,283.0	1971	30.2	1.7
1946	1,836.0	1,181.0	1972	19.1	1.8
1947	542.7	228.7	1973	13.0	1.4
1948	42.7	62.9	1974	11.8	1.4
1949	61.4	19.1	1975	9.6	1.8
1950	60.9	8.1	1976	26.7	1.8
1951	7.8	3.4	1977	28.9	1.6
1952	1.6	3.7	1978	29.5	1.5
1953	2.8	2.0	1979	34.2	1.7
1954	3.8	2.8	1980	22.7	1.5
1955	1.9	4.7	1981	23.8	1.4
1956	21.8	27.6	1982	32.1	0.9
1957	133.4	91.8	1983	26.2	1.2
1958	139.3	92.8	1984	17.4	1.6
1959	37.0	43.2	1985	20.5	1.6
1960	28.0	5.7	1986	29.0	1.9
1961	26.5	3.6	1987	36.4	1.8
1962	20.2	3.3	1988	36.3	2.1
1963	20.0	2.5	1989	26.6	2.2
1964	24.2	2.3	1990	18.4	2.6
1965	28.6	2.2	1991	21.0	5.0
1966	28.8	2.2	1992	18.1	6.5
1967	19.9	2.1	1993	21.3	5.9
1968	19.4	2.2	1994	25.9	6.9
1969	22.1	2.0	1995	26.3	8.1
1970	14.1	1.9			

(a) in legal sense only, i.e. migration related to the changes of "permanent" residence; this also pertains to Tables from 2 to 10

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 3. International migration by half-year. Poland: 1992-1996

Period	Number of emigrants	Number of immigrants	Migration balance
1992			
1st half-year	8,576	3,135	-5,441
2nd half-year	9,239	3,377	-5,862
1993			
1st half-year	8,693	2,827	-5,866
2nd half-year	12,683	3,097	-9,586
1994			
1st half-year	11,949	3,027	-8,922
2nd half-year	13,955	3,880	-10,075
1995			
1st half-year	13,312	3,428	-9,884
2nd half-year	13,032	4,693	-8,339
1996			
1st half-year	10,596	3,586	-7,010

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 4. Emigrants by major destinations. Poland: 1993-1995

Country of destination	1993	1994	1995	
	as per cent of the total			actual
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	26,344
Europe	79.6	81.8	79.6	20,979
Austria	1.2	1.7	2.3	620
France	1.0	1.2	1.4	380
Germany	71.7	72.9	68.9	18,161
Italy	0.7	0.7	0.7	199
Sweden	1.3	2.0	2.2	570
United Kingdom	0.4	0.5	0.6	154
other	3.2	3.1	3.4	895
Africa	0.3	0.2	0.2	54
America North	18.5	16.3	18.5	4,878
Canada	6.4	5.6	6.4	1,677
USA	12.1	10.7	12.1	3,181
America Central and South	0.1	0.1	0.1	27
Asia	0.2	0.2	0.2	42
Oceania	1.1	1.3	1.4	383
Unknown	0.0	0.0	0.0	1

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 5. Emigrants by sex and age. Poland: 1994 and 1995

Age category	Males			Females		
	1994 per cent	1995 per cent	1995 actual	1994 per cent	1995 per cent	1995 actual
Total	100.0	100.0	13,305	100.0	100.0	13,039
0-14	14.4	15.6	2,074	14.4	14.4	1,881
15-19	14.6	16.4	2,179	8.6	8.5	1,109
20-24	17.7	14.7	1,960	10.2	10.2	1,334
25-29	8.2	8.1	1,077	10.1	10.1	1,319
30-34	8.1	8.2	1,096	9.5	10.5	1,368
35-39	9.2	10.1	1,341	11.1	12.1	1,582
40-44	8.1	9.3	1,232	10.3	11.2	1,459
45-49	5.0	5.6	741	5.6	5.8	753
50-54	4.0	3.2	420	4.5	3.8	492
55-59	4.0	3.2	429	5.4	4.6	598
60-64	3.5	2.5	337	4.5	3.6	468
65-69	1.7	1.8	236	3.0	2.4	320
70 or more	1.4	1.4	183	3.0	2.7	356

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 6. Emigrants by sex and marital status (for 1995 also by age). Poland: 1981-1995

Year and age category	Marital status				
	total	bachelor or spinster	married	widower or widow	divorced
males					
1981-85 (a)	10,937	5,357	5,270	114	197
1986-90 (a)	13,734	7,347	5,988	82	317
1991-95 (a)	11,337	6,464	4,609	84	180
1991	10,264	5,305	4,673	85	201
1992	9,063	5,230	3,577	93	161
1993	10,603	5,560	4,783	84	176
1994	13,451	7,891	5,306	84	170
1995	13,305	8,333	4,707	73	192
0-14	2,074	2,074	0	0	0
15-24	4,139	4,000	135	0	4
25-34	2,173	1,266	874	1	32
35-44	2,573	623	1,846	18	86
45-54	1,161	190	913	13	45
55-64	766	103	625	18	20
65+	419	180	314	23	5
females					
1981-85 (a)	13,092	4,864	7,120	783	326
1986-90 (a)	15,630	6,466	8,208	541	416
1991-95 (a)	11,206	4,973	5,447	452	334
1991	10,713	4,646	5,447	306	314
1992	9,052	4,253	4,329	247	223
1993	10,773	4,481	5,356	656	280
1994	12,453	5,318	6,170	562	403
1995	13,039	6,167	5,932	489	451
0-14	1,881	1,794	0	0	0
15-24	4,443	4,137	294	1	11
25-34	2,687	985	1,424	23	84
35-44	3,041	172	2,266	55	169
45-54	1,245	171	934	57	95
55-64	1,066	324	717	133	56
65+	676	123	297	220	36

(a) annual average

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 7. Emigrants aged 15 years or above by sex, age and education. Poland: 1994 and 1995

Age category	Educational attainment				
	total	post-secondary	secondary (a)	vocational	elementary or less (b)
1994					
males					
total	11,513	277	1,250	2,013	7,973
15-24	4,356	1	221	471	3,663
25-34	2,195	43	363	541	1,248
35-44	2,335	133	403	542	1,257
45-54	1,200	66	142	252	740
55-64	1,004	22	90	164	728
65+	423	12	31	43	337
females					
total	10,659	226	1,922	1,106	7,405
15-24	2,334	2	269	201	1,862
25-34	2,435	46	657	355	1,377
35-44	2,662	128	606	363	1,565
45-54	1,257	33	206	104	914
55-64	1,230	11	137	58	1,024
65+	741	6	47	25	663
1995					
males					
total	11,231	253	1,018	1,738	8,222
15-24	4,139	2	179	409	3,549
25-34	2,173	49	252	494	1,378
35-44	2,573	110	354	490	1,619
45-54	1,161	48	148	207	758
55-64	766	32	60	96	578
65+	419	12	25	42	340
females					
total	11,158	227	1,738	1,043	8,150
15-24	2,443	0	204	186	2,053
25-34	2,687	54	560	328	1,745
35-44	3,041	110	648	372	1,911
45-54	1,245	47	215	104	879
55-64	1,066	14	85	33	934
65+	676	2	26	20	628

(a) including post-secondary not completed
(b) including elementary not completed and (rare cases of) unknown

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 8. Immigrants by country or continent of origin. Poland: 1994 and 1995

Origin of immigrants	Actual numbers		Per cent of annual total	
	1994	1995	1994	1995
Total	6,907	8,121	100.0	100.0
Europa	4,469	4,866	64.7	59.9
Austria	168	241	2.4	3.0
Belarus	(a)	160	(a)	2,0
France	303	397	4.4	4.9
Germany	1,843	1,965	26.7	24.2
Italy	160	211	2.3	2.6
Russia	(a)	289	(a)	3.6
Sweden	115	117	1.7	1.4
Ukraine	(a)	502	(a)	6.2
United Kingdom	237	218	3.4	2.7
other	1,643	766	23.8	9.4
Africa	209	197	3.0	2.4
America	1,606	2,366	23.3	29.1
Canada	348	956	5.0	11.7
USA	1,175	1,356	17.0	16.7
other	83	54	1.2	0.7
Asia	482	529	3.5	6.5
Oceania	137	162	2.0	2.0
Unknown	4	1	0.1	0.0

(a) included in Europe, other

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 9. Immigrants by sex and age. Poland: 1994 and 1995

Age category	Actual numbers		Per cent	
	1994	1995	1994	1995
males				
total	3,569	4,321	100.0	100.0
0-19	490	556	13.7	12.9
20-29	681	799	19.1	18.5
30-39	1,005	1,171	28.2	27.1
40-49	669	915	18.7	21.2
50-59	290	375	8.1	8.7
60-69	259	301	7.3	7.0
70+	175	204	4.9	4.7
females				
total	3,338	3,800	100.0	100.0
0-19	396	550	11.9	14.5
20-29	414	742	12.4	19.5
30-39	684	912	20.5	24.0
40-49	746	699	22.3	18.4
50-59	310	348	9.3	9.2
60-69	316	337	9.5	8.9
70+	222	212	6.7	5.6

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 10. Immigrants by sex and marital status. Poland: 1981-1995

Year	Marital status				
	total	bachelor or spinster	married	widower or widow	divorced
males					
1981-85 (a)	610	195	356	25	34
1986-90 (a)	1,021	277	630	22	72
1991-95 (a)	3,424	1,164	1,968	73	208
1991	2,717	939	1,537	65	176
1992	3,468	1,196	1,959	93	163
1993	3,046	1,009	1,771	59	207
1994	3,569	1,200	2,070	68	231
1995	4,321	1,476	2,504	80	261
of which:					
age 15+	3,910	1,065	2,504	80	261
females					
1981-85 (a)	719	171	394	115	39
1986-90 (a)	1,054	277	545	167	64
1991-95 (a)	3,077	795	1,809	255	212
1991	2,323	654	1,292	210	167
1992	3,044	777	1,808	247	223
1993	2,878	752	1,686	207	197
1994	3,338	824	1,989	312	213
1995	3,800	969	2,272	301	258
of which:					
age 15+	3,415	584	2,272	301	258

(a) annual average

Source: Central Staistical Office

Table 11. Premanent residence permits granted between 1 January 1993 and 30 June 1996 by citizenship (15 major citizenships). Poland

Citizenship	1993	1994	1995	1996 (a)	Total
Total	1,964	2,457	3,060	1,415	8,896
Ukraine	285	515	585	283	1,668
Russia	219	283	343	147	992
Belarus	146	145	225	123	639
Vietnam	70	105	200	136	511
Germany	105	121	199	63	488
Kazakhstan	16	44	237	136	443
Lithuania	64	74	73	51	262
Yugoslavia	81	68	47	14	210
Sweden	59	66	45	32	202
Armenia	20	64	81	22	187
Bulgaria	47	57	50	28	182
Syria	48	67	42	10	167
USA	40	38	49	20	147
Algeria	27	45	56	16	144
United Kingdom	28	38	39	17	122
all others	709	727	789	317	2,542

(a) between 1 January and 30 June

Source: Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs

Table 12. Polish citizens staying abroad for longer than two months who at the time of inquiry were the members of households in Poland by sex and age (in thousand; rounded). Poland: May 1994, May 1995 and May 1996

Age	Males		Females	
	duration of more than two months	of which: duration of more than 12 months	duration of more than two months	of which: duration of more than 12 months
1994				
total	121	78	86	51
0-14	1	1	2	1
15-19	3	3	2	0
20-24	18	11	22	9
25-29	22	15	13	9
30-34	20	12	9	5
35-39	20	14	9	8
40-49	29	17	14	8
50-59	4	4	8	5
60+	3	3	7	5
1995				
total	104	53	74	42
0-17	2	2	4	2
18-24	19	9	20	12
25-34	32	18	22	11
35-44	33	13	14	10
45-54	13	8	10	6
55-64	3	2	2	1
65+	1	1	2	1
1996				
total	97	49	71	39
0-17	4	3	5	4
18-24	15	7	22	10
25-34	33	16	21	12
35-44	23	10	12	8
45-54	19	10	9	5
55-64	3	1	2	1
65+	2	2	2	1

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 13. Polish citizens staying abroad for longer than two months who at the time of inquiry were the members of households in Poland by education, duration of stay and activity (in thousand; rounded). Poland: May 1994, May 1995, May 1996

Duration of stay and activity	Total	Level of completed education			
		post-secondary	secondary	vocational	primary or lower (a)
1994					
duration:					
up to 12 months	78	8	36	26	7
over 12 months	129	11	59	42	18
1995					
duration:					
up to 12 months	83	10	30	34	9
working	60	6	19	29	5
non-working	23	4	11	5	4
over 12 months	95	13	46	26	9
working	70	10	34	22	4
non-working	25	3	12	4	5
1996					
duration:					
up to 12 months	79	11	30	27	11
working	60	10	19	24	7
non-working	19	1	11	3	4
over 12 months	89	12	38	23	16
working	58	10	24	18	6
non-working	31	2	14	5	10

(a) including children in pre-school age (less than two thousand)

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 14. Polish citizens staying abroad for longer than two months who at the time of inquiry were the members of households in Poland by country of temporary residence, length of stay and activity (in thousand; rounded). Poland: May 1966

Country	Males		Females	
	less than 12 months	12 months or longer	less than 12 months	12 months or longer
All migrants				
Germany	21	12	8	7
USA	8	21	5	17
Italy	2	1	8	3
Canada	1	4	2	3
Austria	1	2	1	2
France	2	3	1	2
other	13	6	7	5
Of which: working abroad				
Germany	19	11	5	5
USA	6	12	3	10
Italy	2	1	6	2
Canada	1	2	1	1
Austria	0	1	1	1
France	1	3	1	2
other	11	5	4	2
Total				
all	48	49	32	39
working	40	35	21	23

Source: Central Statistical Office

Table 15. Work permits granted individually by ownership of enterprise (eight top countries of origin). Poland: between 1 January 1995 and 30 June 1996

Country	Total	Ownership of enterprise				
		state	private; Polish capital	private; foreign capital	private; mixed capital	other
01.01-30.06.1995						
total	4,813	290	1,750	1,804	698	271
Ukraine	807	89	627	24	29	38
Vietnam	492	2	58	405	12	15
Belarus	379	19	309	22	8	21
United Kingdom	343	11	100	143	53	36
Russia	333	48	129	52	74	30
China	315	0	21	263	30	1
Germany	235	10	19	105	97	4
USA	219	17	37	94	64	7
other	1,853	113	576	696	331	119
01.07-31.12.1995						
total	5,628	710	1,706	2,042	856	314
Ukraine	1,008	277	576	28	45	82
Vietnam	587	4	77	470	29	7
United Kingdom	542	51	224	144	83	40
Russia	375	65	134	58	100	18
China	371	1	37	290	42	1
USA	359	32	80	131	87	29
Germany	354	69	31	155	65	34
Belarus	294	44	187	11	11	41
other	1,738	167	360	755	394	62
01.01-30.06.1996						
total	5,557	430	1,824	2,020	974	309
Ukraine	1,022	130	726	58	36	72
United Kingdom	482	37	151	152	129	13
Vietnam	456	3	58	371	15	9
Germany	368	26	49	168	111	14
Russia	363	42	175	60	71	15
USA	321	34	52	118	77	40
China	296	0	24	248	23	1
Belarus	231	25	148	15	30	13
other	2,018	133	441	830	482	132

Source: National Labour Office

Table 16. Work permits granted individually by branch of economic activity (eight top countries of origin. Poland: between 1 January 1995 and 30 June 1996

Country	Total	Branch of economic activity						
		industry trans-porta-tion	con-struc-tion	agri-culture fore-stry	trade, catering	edu-cation	culture sports health	other
01.01-30.06.95								
total	4,813	921	191	569	1,664	255	318	895
Ukraine	807	98	29	364	77	13	125	101
Vietnam	492	26	0	0	446	1	0	19
Belarus	379	26	57	159	50	9	30	48
UK	343	49	4	3	46	141	2	98
Russia	333	82	19	5	96	12	37	82
China	315	45	28	0	228	0	2	12
Germany	235	86	11	2	82	4	1	49
USA	219	59	10	1	29	31	7	88
other	1,853	450	33	35	610	44	114	398
01.07-31.12.95								
total	5,628	1,069	163	395	1,815	1,007	638	541
Ukraine	1,008	181	13	310	86	184	220	14
Vietnam	587	35	0	0	529	2	17	4
UK	542	49	5	0	25	338	11	114
Russia	375	95	18	6	103	65	80	8
China	371	30	28	0	300	1	11	1
USA	359	80	0	0	46	105	19	109
Germany	354	90	9	1	82	94	13	65
Belarus	294	43	42	63	36	44	61	5
other	1,738	466	48	15	608	174	206	221
01.01-30.06.96								
total	5,557	1,316	169	447	1,766	629	(a)	1,230
Ukraine	1,022	211	28	364	131	77	(a)	211
UK	482	61	5	1	52	237	(a)	126
Vietnam	456	25	0	0	413	0	(a)	18
Germany	368	132	9	0	102	37	(a)	85
Russia	363	64	20	8	99	32	(a)	140
USA	321	62	5	1	40	95	(a)	118
China	296	19	0	0	246	0	(a)	12
Belarus	231	41	32	37	36	27	(a)	58
other	2,018	701	75	36	647	124	(a)	462

(a) included in other activities

Source: National Labour Office

Table 17. Work permits granted individually by occupation (top 12 countries of origin). Poland: 1995

Country	Total	Occupation						
		manager	owner	expert, consultant	teacher	skilled worker	unskilled worker	other
total	10,441	2,411	1,588	1,302	1,412	1,146	1,056	1526
Ukraine	1,815	39	42	143	238	258	707	388
Vietnam	1,079	173	597	56	4	205	1	43
UK	885	247	30	60	483	1	1	63
Russia	708	90	120	119	121	92	47	119
China	686	213	211	73	7	115	3	67
Belarus	673	20	21	48	72	146	229	137
Germany	589	210	137	80	98	6	1	57
USA	578	224	40	124	131	0	1	58
France	276	140	31	36	23	3	0	43
Italy	235	151	24	42	7	1	0	10
Czech R.	229	26	7	11	4	50	15	116
Netherland	212	101	26	53	5	3	0	25
other	2,476	777	302	457	219	267	51	400

Source: National Labour Office