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**Migration between Poland
and the European Union:
the perspective of Poland's future
membership of EU**

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Marzec 1999

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**Marek Okólski
Dariusz Stola**

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1. Introduction

One could hardly overestimate the importance of international migrations in the modern world. It is not without reason that this century is called the "age of migration" [Castles and Miller, 1993], and the chances are that at the beginning of the new age, ever greater crowds of people will be swept by the international movement. Both in Poland and in the European Union, this is a mass phenomenon involving hundreds of thousands, nay millions of people. Migrations and their immediate effects - agglomerations of immigrants and Diaspora groups dispersed in various countries - significantly influence the demographic and economic processes, cultural changes, and political events both in the immigrants' host countries and in those of their origin. Yet Poland and the European Union in its today's shape see migrations, especially mutual migrations, from different perspectives. Poland is a country from which people migrate, and the EU is their destination. The migration balance between Poland and the Union is strongly negative. The above facts make migration one of the delicate issues of the negotiations concerning Poland's accession to the European Union, and arouse a natural interest. At the same time, many popular opinions on this question are doubtful or even obviously mistaken.

This paper deals with migration between Poland and EU countries, that is migration from Poland to the EU and - proportionally to the size, and thus to a much smaller extent - also migration from Western Europe to Poland. Poland's prospective membership of the Union as the context of the future evolution of such migrations sets a specific time frame of analysis. We assume that Poland will be formally admitted to the Union in about five years, while the effects of that admittance in the sphere of principles regulating migration (labour flows and residence) will be delayed due to introduction of a transition period of five to ten years (see Section 3.1).

It is difficult to forecast international migrations a mass, complex and diversely conditioned phenomenon, and - in the case of Polish migrations - one that has been evolving dynamically during the last decade. While we can present some hard data and reliable appraisals of today's migrations, as well as their evolution so far (which will be done in Part 2), the picture of future evolution of migrations (discussed in Part 3) is not and possibly cannot be unequivocal. That picture is a set of equations with many, often interrelated, variables. Constant elements are few, and just as few are those as to which changes can be anticipated with considerable certainty. Difficult to anticipate is the future shape of the political, legal and economic conditions, and even more difficult - the social reactions to such conditions, which translate into actual population movements through individual migration decisions [Zolberg, 1989]. Required are therefore certain justified but somewhat arbitrary assumptions thus one should borne in mind the limited degree of certainty of such forecast.

2. Migration from Poland to EU and other Western countries¹

2.1. Sources of information

If appraising migration from Poland to the West is based on Polish sources exclusively, and on the official ones in particular, serious mistakes and misconceptions would be unavoidable. According to definition that is operative in Poland, migration from Poland means leaving the country for at least 2 months. What is more, recorded on a regular basis are only the reported departures of permanent residents planning to settle abroad (or already living abroad, and only reporting their departure some time after the actual migration). Thus the recording procedure fails to correspond with the definition. Basing on data from countries that receive migrants from Poland, it can be estimated that the number of Polish migrants is several to several dozen times higher than that shown in Polish statistics. On the other hand, though, the migrants' countries of destination have various definitions and principles of recording immigration, and the completeness of their records is far not only from perfect but sometimes even from satisfactory. It would thus be wrong to believe that data from those countries might reveal the actual picture of outflow from Poland either².

In view of the above circumstances, the observations to follow will be based on many different sources, both Polish and foreign, the sources of various credibility. In many instances the present authors will be compelled to use the data in a very selective way, and implicitly to evaluate those data by best of their knowledge.

2.2. Basic migration phenomena

2.2.1. Before 1990

There are serious grounds for inclusion of several decades before 1990 in this analysis, and also for separation of the transformation period (1990-1997) from previous years, and especially from about a dozen years immediately preceding that period. This seems to be appropriate, because migrations of the Polish population that took place in earlier periods significantly influence a number of features of that phenomenon in the 1990s.

The importance for the recent migration of the outflow from Poland that took place until late 1940s, and of accompanying mass displacements or deportations of Polish population, is unquestionable. What seems, however, to have been much more important from that viewpoint are population movements of the seventies and eighties. Migrations of the present decade are a continuation of those observed in years immediately preceding the year 1990. Instead, they are separated from the more distant past by a break that lasted one generation (at least twenty five years), during which the freedom of migration from Poland was largely restricted³.

Early in the 1970s, the provisions regulating Polish citizens' travel abroad were made more liberal. The passport policy with respect to travel out of the communist bloc was markedly liberalized during the latter half of the decade. This contributed to renewed mass-scale migration from Poland. In a relatively short time, several major types of the outflow emerged.

¹ This part of the paper draws on analyses previously prepared by a number of authors, including above all P. Korcelli [1991 and 1994] and M. Okólski [1990 and 1996a].

² Added to this should be the dimming effect of repeated arrival of one and the same migrant from Poland, if that person keeps traveling from one country to another.

³ This dated from 1948, although official statistics still show over 150 thousand emigrants in the years 1948-1950. Most were, however, late departures of persons affected by the postwar ethnic displacements. In the middle of the period when the way out of Poland was barred, there was also a short increase in repatriations. None of these, however, were free and spontaneous migrations.

The most important type was emigration of persons who declared their German origin or ethnicity, and received a privileged treatment from West German authorities, being granted the status of "late displaced persons" (*Aussiedler*) [Wisniewski, 1992]. The tide of those migrants, initially strictly controlled by Polish authorities and recorded as emigration for settlement⁴, became ever more spontaneous starting from 1980 and gradually escaped Polish official records.

The second important flow was emigration to countries with big and active Polish diaspora, mainly to the USA. Formally, the migrants would go on a visit but actually stayed on abroad forever or for a long period of time. Some - close relatives of citizens of a given country - acquired the legal status of immigrant (before leaving Poland or soon after arriving in the country of destination), some other ones, however, stayed abroad illegally. Many migrants of that period who were to spend many years abroad, in fact went to the West to work there and left their families in Poland.

The third type of flow, initiated on a large scale in 1980, was the outflow of people who went abroad to settle there and - for lack of other effective grounds in many cases - applied for political asylum in the West, having stated their purpose of travel as "tourist" before leaving the country. In a decided majority of cases, this type was migration of entire families (even if individual family members had to leave Poland one by one).

The fourth type was incomplete migration, which involved movement that went beyond the conventional conception of foreign migration. Within this type, persons who officially called themselves tourists would travel (or, rather, circulate) between Poland and other countries in a pendular manner. Their aim was to gain a relatively high profit in a very short time; they made use of the unbalanced Polish market, distorted relations of prices (compared to world prices), and the extraordinary purchasing power of Western currencies in Poland. Such travellers mostly sold Polish goods abroad or foreign goods in Poland, and also took short-termed illegal jobs (almost exclusively in the West).

Finally, the fifth type was that of classical migrant workers, persons sent to work abroad or employed there under a contract negotiated through an authorized Polish State agency. Most contracts were for relatively long periods (from one to several years), and thus permitted the employee to take her/his family with her/him. This type of migration was subject to the most effective administrative control, due chiefly to the fact that a decided majority of workplaces were situated in countries never seen by Polish migrants as attractive countries of destination. Unlike other types of the flows, it involved very rare cases of migrants' overstaying or settlement abroad.

Very high in the ranking of attractive countries was Germany, as well as USA (in the case of long-term and settlement migrations). The two countries attracted about three-fourths of all migrants with the exception of the pendular/shuttle travelers whose favourite countries of destination, beside West Germany, included other Western countries not far away from Poland (e.g. Austria or Switzerland), European "socialist" countries (e.g. Hungary or the former USSR), and some of the less developed countries (e.g. Turkey or Thailand). Migrant employees went mainly to Czechoslovakia, East Germany, USSR and the Muslim countries of North Africa and the Near East. Worth mentioning here are countries where large colonies of political emigrants of those days were formed: Austria, France, Greece, West Germany and Italy; some of them had never before experienced a large-scale inflow of Poles.

⁴ In official statistics: "emigration for permanent stay abroad".

2.2.2. The year 1990 and subsequent years

At the end of 1988, all Polish citizens were granted the right to freely leave their country. Starting from 1990, that right could in fact be exercised to the full, due among other things to the gradual abolition by Western countries of the visa requirement with respect to Polish tourists. Moreover, several Western countries and first of all West Germany signed agreements with Poland on Polish citizens' limited access to their internal labour markets. At the same time, Poland was declared a safe country, the country free of persecutions, which barred the way to the West of further potential asylum and refugee status seekers. Additionally, German administration drastically sharpened the criteria of granting the "late displaced person" (*Aussiedler*) status (which first and foremost "affected" Polish citizens). Those facts had a fundamental impact on migration from Poland.

As opposed to the previous period, what prevailed then among cases of "conventional flow"⁵ was short-time migration (up to 12-month stay abroad); the proportion of such short flows compared to emigration (long-time migration) changed radically. Unchanged, instead, was the West as the destination of migrations. The prevalent motivation of short-term migrants was work (in many cases, under individual contracts consistent with the law of the receiving country), and of the long-term ones - reunion with their family members who had emigrated before, or emigration of the entire household (family) planning to settle abroad. People going to work usually migrated alone, leaving most of their family in Poland. As opposed to the previous period, a clear "geographical pattern" of migrations emerged: migrations to nearby countries were usually short-term, while going to distant lands ("overseas") most migrants intended to settle there.

The phenomenon of incomplete migration persisted; in most cases, it involved a very short stay abroad (under 3 months) and the migrant's activity inconsistent with the status (usually that of tourist) granted to him by the receiving country. However, the average stay abroad of such migrants grew much longer compared to the previous period and petty trade as their prevalent activity was replaced by casual or seasonal work. An important change within this type of mobility was a drastic reduction in the proportion of flows to countries of the former communist bloc.

The role of Germany as the country that received migrants from Poland grew more important, even if the reason was mainly the intensified inflow of migrant workers. At the same time, settlement emigration to that country was radically reduced, which was the main factor of the above-mentioned drop in this type of outflow in general. Many migrant workers headed for new (or long forgotten) geographical destinations, such as e.g. Greece, Norway or Italy. What partly contributed to this trend were networks formed by Polish asylum-seekers from before 1990, most of whom had in the meantime managed to settle overseas. In those days, many migrants of the earlier period, who had been staying abroad illegally, managed to legalize their stay, e.g. through mixed marriages, "amnesty programmes" applying to unregistered foreigners, or (in the USA) the so-called immigration visa lottery. Still in progress, though showing a downward trend, was also migration of asylum-seekers of before 1990 from the places where they originally applied for asylum (e.g. Austria, Germany or Italy) to their countries of destination (Australia, Canada, USA). Such movements (or, in fact, merely changes in status) were shown in migration statistics as new migrations.

⁵ Which term, in the case of Poland, means travel abroad of a person who had spent at least 2 months at a stretch in Poland and intended to stay abroad for at least 2 months.

2.3. Statistical appraisal of the basic trends of Polish citizens' migrations abroad

To discuss the estimates – in quantitative terms - of Polish citizens' migration in the 1990s, it seems advisable first of all to define a specific time perspective, and at least briefly to characterize the basic trends of the immediately preceding period, e.g. of the years 1970-1989.

The outflow of the 1970s, during the initial liberalization of so-called passport policy, has not been submitted to systematic analysis so far. About 210 thousand people left Poland declaring that they were emigrating never to return, and further 70-100 thousand actually settled abroad having left the country as tourists. Over a half of those migrants headed for West Germany; most were inhabitants of the Upper Silesia (mainly the Opole province) [Okólski, 1996a].

From 1980 till 1989, about 1,100 - 1,400 thousand people left Poland to stay abroad for a long time (at least 1 year). A decided majority among them were "false tourists". West Germany alone then received about 630 thousand "late displaced persons" (*Aussiedlers*) and several dozen thousand asylum-seekers. At the same time, Polish migrants intensely penetrated other countries during short-term migrations (at least 2-3 months): their number (or the number of such migrations, to be exact) was about 1,000 - 1,100 thousand [Okólski, 1994]. A large majority of migrants came from several provinces: the highest urbanized ones or those inhabited by indigenous Silesian population: as many as 59% of long-term migrants came from seven provinces (Katowice, Warsaw, Opole, Gdańsk, Wrocław, Cracow and Szczecin), which accounted for 32% of the overall population of Poland. Among the long-term migrants (estimate for 1981-1988), about 53% went to settle in West Germany and 14% in USA. The rest, somewhat under one-third, emigrated to Italy (5.2%), Austria (4.6%), France (4.1%), Canada (2.8%), Greece (2.5%), Great Britain (1.7%), Australia (1.0%), and many other countries (about 11%). Most were either single persons (the youngest age groups of working age) or entire families with (usually very small) children. Young adult men definitely prevailed among the "illegal" emigrants ("false tourists"), while children and young adult women - among the rest of emigrants. On the average, the emigrants were much better educated than the overall population of Poland [Okólski, 1996a].

In a micro-census of May 1995, the number of people considered permanent residents of Poland but actually staying abroad for a long time (of at least 2 months) was about 900 thousand. There is a lot of evidence to show that such persons left Poland many years ago, most of them during the eighties. Over a half of them (about 540 thousand) are entire families (parents and minor children). In that group, as few as 21% of persons aged at least 15 had elementary or incomplete elementary education only, while 10% were university graduates [GUS, 1998]: they were no doubt much better educated on the average than emigrants of the transformation (post-1989) period.

Official statistics showed a noticeable if relatively slight drop in the number of emigrants (persons leaving Poland to "permanently stay" abroad) during the years of transformation. In 1975-1979, the number of migrants was about 26 thousand a year on the average, followed by about 24 thousand in 1980-1984, and about 30 thousand in 1985-1989. In 1990-1994, instead, that number was merely about 21 thousand [GUS, 1998]. What is however more important than the trends shown by Polish official sources are changes in the overall size of emigration, both that documented and undocumented in Poland. There are grounds to believe that undocumented migrations, and thus also the overall quota of long-term migration (settlement migration included), decreased rapidly after 1989.

This is manifested among other things by the findings of an ethnosurvey carried out in four regions of Poland in 1994-1996, which cover the population movements that took place since 1975. Among six localities showing the typical regional trends, the share of population outflow for over 1 year in the total outflow went down by 12-21 percentage points in four localities and by 4 points in one locality⁶. In five cases, there was a dramatic drop in the proportion of long-term migrations other than those for settlement: in one of the localities, that drop was from 45% of all migrations before 1990 to 7% in 1990-1994, and in the least spectacular case, it was nevertheless from 41% to 30% respectively [Jaźwińska, Łukowski and Okólski, 1997].

Yet the most convincing argument for the thesis as to a drop in long-term migrations after 1989 is the marked decrease of the inflow to West Germany of people seeking the status of displaced persons (*Aussiedler*), which used to be decisive for the trends of emigration from Poland in the previous period. From 250 thousand in 1989, the number of such immigrants dropped to several thousand a year in 1994-1996⁷. Noted at the same time was a drop in the inflow of immigrants in many other countries that had been receiving considerable numbers of immigrants from Poland in years immediately preceding transformation (such as e.g. Austria, Greece, or Italy). Only in the USA, there was a significant growth in the number of immigrant Poles; to a large extent, however, it was but a sham upward trend as it included numerous cases of legalization of earlier inflow, or of inflow of Polish emigrants of before 1990 who had applied for the right of entry to the USA from the territory of a "third country". The actual scale of this growth was much smaller than the overall drop noted in other countries⁸. To recapitulate, one might estimate the overall long-term emigration in the earlier half of the nineties at about 50 thousand persons a year - at most a half of the eighties' figures.

From the viewpoint of the migrants' countries of destination, there has been a marked geographical concentration. After 1989, three countries only still continued as important for emigrants from Poland: West Germany, the USA and Canada. According to Polish statistics, over 87% of all emigrants (68.9, 12.1 and 6.4% respectively) headed for those three countries in 1995. The next most frequent country of destination was chosen by about 2% only. The proportions of men and women among emigrants grew equal, and their age went up on the average. In particular, the middle age groups of productive age were best represented. The most striking change, however, consisted in a radical drop in the proportion of better-educated persons and a growing proportion of those at the lowest educational levels. For example, the proportion of persons (aged at least 15) who had at most the elementary education went up from about 36% of all emigrants in 1989 to about 73% in 1995 [GUS, 1998]⁹.

The above figures corroborate the thesis as to significant changes: a smaller size of emigration, a decreasing proportion of emigrants among all migrants from Poland, a stop of mass emigration to nearby countries (other than Germany), and an older age and lower level of education of emigrants.

⁶ It remained unchanged in one locality only - the one where this type of migration had been insignificant even before 1990.

⁷ In 1996, there were 1.2 thousand such persons.

⁸ Data quoted in this paragraph have been borrowed from SOPEMI reports prepared annually by correspondents from individual OECD member countries.

⁹ The corresponding analyses are contained in Polish correspondent's annual SOPEMI reports.

There are no global data on migration from Poland other than the "emigration to a new country of permanent residence" (that is, roughly speaking, settlement or long-term emigration). Basing on estimates for 1994-1996, the number of Poles who temporarily stay abroad and work there under a legal contract is believed to range from 300 to 350 thousand a year¹⁰. In 1996, nearly 220 thousand of them worked abroad under bilateral contracts of employment concluded with other countries. An overwhelming majority were seasonal workers (185 thousand in Germany alone). It can thus be supposed that calculated in terms of full-time employment, the number of permanent residents of Poland legally employed abroad was actually 4 to 5 times smaller than the "nominal" one (for example, Poles have recently worked not the original 300-350 thousand "years per person" but a mere 60-80 thousand). Extremely few of those persons get jobs in countries other than the Western ones, among which Germany definitely prevails. All of this means a radical departure from the trend observed in the 1980s when seasonal work was relatively infrequent. On the one hand, with the smaller in that decade nominal number of legally employed persons (a little over 150 thousand in 1989), the actual number was probably much bigger than in the 1990s; and on the other hand, the proportion of those working in the West in the 1980s was much smaller as it only slightly exceeded 10% [Okólski, 1990].

Migrations to legal seasonal work abroad take place mainly from south-western regions of Poland with the "old" industrial structure (prevalence of the mining and heavy industry), and to the relatively smallest extent - from central Poland, especially from provinces bordering on the two important industrial centers of the period of transformation: Łódź and Warsaw. There is, however, no explicit relationship between these trends and the local level of unemployment or - in the case of most provinces - the existence of migrants' supporting networks [Okólski, 1996b].

The biggest gap in the knowledge on the recent migrations of Poles concerns persons going abroad for a short time (under 3 months as a rule) to take a job in the shadow economy. From a survey conducted in 1994-1996 by the Institute of Social Studies, it follows that the major part of short-term migrants work abroad illegally [Jaźwińska and Okólski, 1996]. If this is indeed the case, the nominal number of such migrants is bound to be much bigger compared to the number of persons going abroad to work legally. It seems that, as opposed to the pre-transformation period, there is among such migrants a very big proportion of people from regions with relatively low levels of urbanization and industrialization, which formerly provided seasonal, flexible and unskilled manpower for the better urbanized and industrialized regions of Poland. Migrations abroad have largely replaced the former local commuting of so called peasant-workers to regular or seasonal work and other such types of mobility.

Analysis of such migrations also leads to a thesis as to development of specific and relatively permanent geographical bonds between local labour markets in Poland and abroad¹¹. Such bonds can be found, for example, between many micro-regions of Małopolska (e.g. the mountain region of Podhale) and Austria, the western borderland and Germany, Podlasie region and Belgium (Brussels in particular). Sometimes, the bonds proceed at the level of local communities, as e.g. between Stare Juchy commune and Reykjavik in Iceland, or Giżycko municipality and Ostia in Italy. Temporary labour migration in countries such as Greece or Norway may be supposed to follow similar principles. As for going abroad to work in the shadow economy, Poles migrate to nearly all countries of Europe; such migrations are in fact a shuttle circulation between the community of origin of a given group of migrants and a given labour market or indeed a given employer. Despite the relatively short individual migrations, coordinated exchange of migrants (family members and friends) gives this kind of employment the nature of constant rotation.

¹⁰ This is an appraisal of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy [1997], corroborated by researchers' estimates [IPiSS, 1996]. The quarterly BAEL survey carried out by the Central Statistics Office on a representative random sample suggests (on the grounds of data for 1995-1996) that "at any moment" some 150-200 thousand Poles are temporarily staying abroad (for at least 2 months). Of them, about 70-74% (some 110-140 thousand) work abroad (for under 1 year in 40-45% of cases) [Okólski, 1997]. Those 110-140 thousand Poles shown in statistics as working full-time abroad include both the legally and illegally employed persons.

¹¹ Cf. e.g. Cieslińska, 1992; Fassmann, Kohlbacher and Reeger, 1995; Jaźwińska, Łukowski and Okólski, 1997; Lehman, Siewiera and van Broeck, 1995; Mydel and Fassmann, 1997; and Romaniszyn, 1994.

To end with, let us quote some estimates of the recent migration from Poland published abroad. According to data collected by the Eurostat, the total of 438.4 thousand Polish citizens were living in all countries of European Union in 1993, the largest groups staying in Germany (285.5 thousand), France (47.1 thousand), Italy (21.2 thousand), Great Britain (21.0 thousand), Sweden (16.4 thousand), Greece (10.7 thousand), and Austria (10.3 thousand) [Eurostat, 1995]. That same year, 5.2 thousand Poles were granted citizenship of those countries¹², and a further 5.4 thousand Polish citizens became Germans, having acquired the status of “displaced persons” (*Aussiedler*). Rough estimates pertaining to Poles staying in the West illegally suggest that there are several hundred thousand such persons. In 1993 in Greece alone, the number of unregistered Polish workers was estimated at 30-100 thousand; the number of Poles in Belgium was estimated at 20-50 thousand, and in the US - at 91 thousand¹³.

Data on the numbers of immigrants from Poland, compiled by destination countries, speak little about the actual outflow from the country. In the case of EU countries, for example, such data usually do not include inflow for periods shorter than 3 months (to work in the shadow economy among other reasons). Moreover, due to different definitions of immigration, they embrace different categories of people. In 1993, the largest number of migrants from Poland - 75.2 thousand - came to Germany; yet an even larger group (101.9 thousand) left that country. Migration to other countries west of the Polish border was moderate: it amounted to 500-1,250 in the case of the Netherlands, France, Great Britain, Belgium, Sweden and Denmark, and to 150-450 in the case of Switzerland, Greece, Norway and Spain (even smaller numbers of Polish immigrants were recorded in Luxembourg, Iceland, Finland and Portugal) [Eurostat, 1995]. That same year, USA admitted 27.8 thousand immigrants from Poland, Canada - 2.5 thousand (1994), and Australia - 0.7 thousand; in each of those three cases, most of the immigrants were settlers coming with their families¹⁴. Data for 1996 suggest a drop in the number of immigrants from Poland coming to most of the countries (the largest being that found in the US - to 15.8 thousand), although there are some (not too significant) deviations from this rule (as e.g. Greece and the Netherlands). The receiving countries (with the exception of Germany) registered small numbers of migrant workers from Poland in 1996. While about 212 thousand permanent residents of Poland were working in Germany that year, there were the total of about 31 thousand such persons in 11 other West-European countries jointly (of them, 10.1 thousand worked in Austria, 7.0 thousand in Sweden, and 3.7 thousand - in France)¹⁵. Most of them were seasonal workers.

Worth mentioning to end with is the inflow to the West of specific categories of Polish citizens who in the 1980s were the most likely to be accepted and granted the residence permit: those marrying a citizen of the receiving country, asylum-seekers (or those applying for the refugee status), as well as members of national minorities (mainly German displaced persons)¹⁶. Although generally, marriage with a foreigner (a Westerner) has lost some of its attraction to Poles, the phenomenon can still be observed in some countries: in 1996, for example, of the 526 Polish women who came to Belgium, as many as 211 married Belgian men. At any rate, the scale is not big here in absolute numbers. The same concerns the inflow of ethnic Germans to Germany (*Aussiedler*), which has already been mentioned above. Paradoxically, Poles still apply for asylum. Among countries that published detailed data for 1996, the biggest number of applications was recorded in Great Britain (890, family members of applicants not included) and Norway (209). In other countries, the corresponding figures are below 100. So-called asylum procedure is still pending in cases of many

¹² Data available for 7 countries only (lacking are data for e.g. France, Great Britain, and the Benelux).

¹³ In 1996, the number of Polish citizens illegally staying in the US was estimated at 70 thousand. That same year, about 4 thousand formerly illegal Polish workers were "regularised" in Italy. Estimates of this type are naturally dispersed, non-systematic and highly uncertain. Data on the number of illegal migrants quoted in this paper have been borrowed from SOPEMI national correspondents' reports, and also from: US Dept. Of Justice, 1994, and Romaniszyn, 1997.

¹⁴ Data from SOPEMI reports from OECD member countries.

¹⁵ Besides, over 1,000 persons were employed in each of the following countries: Denmark, Switzerland, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain.

¹⁶ See Note 12.

thousands applications submitted by Polish citizens (e.g. about 2.8 thousand in the US). In the case of emigrants applying for the refugee or *Aussiedler* status, the extent of inflow from Poland is greatly dependent on the receiving country's immigration policies and its detailed regulations pertaining to the situation of such groups of immigrants. Such regulations now tend towards ever more restrictive solutions.

All data and estimates quoted above suggest that the scale of outflow from Poland to the West decreased during the 1990s as compared to the 1980s and continues to show a downward trend (during the last 5 years). Of no greater importance here is the change in proportions in favour of short-term as opposed to long-term migrations. Despite the relatively big migration potential of Poles (e.g. the rather considerable group of economically redundant persons at working age in rural regions), and the strong migration ties abroad, the profit involved in migration has been reduced so greatly as to result in a situation where individuals who migrate most often are those with specific demographic and socio-professional traits, migrating within collective family strategies, and in this context - persons with relatively smaller chances for professional success in Poland and usually willing to migrate for a short period of time. From the viewpoint of outflow from Poland in the most immediate future it is also of importance that despite the intense circulation of persons between Poland and the West, Poles have failed to gain a strong position on Western labour markets (comparable to the position in the West of e.g. citizens of former Yugoslavia or other South-European countries), and still function there as a flexible fringe that can be eliminated with a relative ease.

The present pattern of foreign migrations of Poles seems to show beyond all doubt that - against some appearances - the Polish population's migration potential of today is in fact small, not only as compared to e.g. the late 1980s. In recent years, Poles have no longer been demonstrating in their migration patterns the strong determination typical of their "predecessors" who decided to leave Poland during the 1980s. The today's migration behaviour is strongly calculated, and the circumstances both in Poland and abroad prompt well-considered and reasonable decisions. Despite the fact that many big Polish colonies in the West managed to survive the period when no "fresh blood" arrived from Poland, and despite the favourable conditions (found especially during the 1980s) for transformation of those colonies into lively and strong migration networks, Polish migrants only managed to form small, shallow and unstable niches in the West. Combined with the absence of dramatic circumstances, which would force people to leave their home country, this is inevitably a factor that will restrain mass migration in the next years to come. This diagnosis is formulated against the above-mentioned appearances of a strong if not increasing migration pressure in Poland. For example, judging from a survey carried out in 1995 by the Institute of Sociology, Jagiellonian University [Slany, 1997], as many as 870 thousand persons were prepared to leave Poland during the next 2 years; about 5.4 million would be willing to migrate by 2010, and 1.6 million among them would be going abroad to get a job. At the same time, however, in that as in any other survey, strong subjective or objective limitations of the intention to migrate were found in respondents' consciousness. What is more, the nature of those limitations as perceived by potential migrants seems decidedly to stifle pro-migration attitudes: instead of actually conditioning the decision to leave Poland, they belong rather to the sphere of wishful thinking.

3. Migration from Poland to EU: expected developments

The question about the future of migration from Poland to EU countries is an equation with several unknown quantities. The changes that have taken place in this area in recent years considered, including in particular the development of new forms and directions of migration as well as the considerable dynamics of change, it would be difficult to forecast population movements in 10-15 years or in longer perspective. This reservation does not pertain only to some demographic forecasts, which speak of anticipated effects of processes going on in the population of persons, who are already born. The demographic factor, however, is but one of many conditions of migration. Impossible, therefore, is a forecast that would be both reliable and precise. What can be indicated instead is a number of factors and expected processes that will determine the trends of migration and the probable directions of such trends.

3.1. Main conditions and the time perspective

There are three groups of factors that now shape and will continue to shape migration from Poland: a) migration policies of the receiving countries; b) the market and demographic forces shaping the migration potential in Poland, and similar forces that shape the demand for migrant labour in the European Union; and c) inner dynamics of the social processes of migration. Poland's integration with the Union will have a bearing on the former two groups; additionally, changes in the labour markets will also depend on conditions unrelated or partly related to the process of European integration, such as restructuring of Polish economy that has been in progress for several years, and demographic changes.

Poland's accession to the EU will lead to two types of changes, and their impact on Poles' migration propensity will operate in two opposite directions. A direct effect of the EU membership will be abolition of today's restrictions on migration, which will thus be facilitated. Economic integration will influence migrations through the expected economic growth in Poland and the trend towards equalization of prices; this, in turn, is likely to reduce the Poles' migration propensity. Thus, were the restrictions on migration abolished today, the phenomenon would grow proportionally to the degree to which today's barriers force a lower level of mobility. In the perspective of over a decade of the integration process, instead, assuming a dynamic economic growth in Poland, the actual extent of the future free migrations will not be a simple effect of the abolition of restrictions.

Our choice of the perspective of over a decade follows from the conviction that removal of the legal barriers on migration of Poles to the European Union will not take place all at once, but will rather be preceded by a transition period or perhaps introduced by stages. From the viewpoint of migrations, it would be more correct to speak of Poland's future *process of accession* to the EU and not of accession as a single event. Despite the at least verbal maximalism of the recent official Polish standpoint on the matter, the Union's resignation of the transition period or mechanisms seems unlikely. This is understandable, the following considered: a) political weight of the issue of foreign labour inflow to EU countries, which are affected by high unemployment and stagnation of some wages; b) precedents of the previous extensions of the European Communities, which made the transition period with respect to labour flows a rule; and c) the unfounded but widespread Western fears of being *flooded by from the East*. Such fears were voiced previously with respect to migrations from Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. In none of the cases did they prove justified [Fiejka, 1993].

The only questions open to discussion seem: the length of the transition period and the nature of provisional solutions for that period. The former issue is not entirely open: we expect the transition period to last at least 5 and no more than 10 years. If, as optimistic scenarios suggest, Poland joins the Union in about 5 years, full liberalization of population flows will come in 10 to 15 years. The chances for making this period significantly shorter seem rather slight. A greater room for maneuver is in negotiations on provisional solutions for the transition period, as - to mention just some of the reasons - migration policies of individual EU member countries may be more flexible and the catalogue of possible instruments of those policies is quite extensive. At present, different

EU members have various programs under which they admit specific groups of foreigners from outside the Union to their labour markets, on temporary basis in most cases¹⁷.

3.2. Removal of barriers

The removal of barriers will be conducive to development of migrations from Poland to the EU; yet, as has been mentioned before, this is not to say that the effect is bound to be an upward trend. Basically, the EU countries have been closing their frontiers to immigration for several decades now. Four categories of extracommunitari (foreigners from outside the Union) are admitted on special terms, as a specific exception to the restrictive rule. They are migrants who acquire residence thanks to their family ties with nationals; refugees and asylum seekers admitted for humanitarian reasons; "patrials", that is persons who belong to the given nation in terms of culture and ethnic origin (as e.g. ethnic Germans from Central Europe and former USSR or descendants of Italian emigrants); and foreign workers admitted on a temporary basis. Three of the above categories potentially apply to Poles. We left out of account here the group of refugees, although different countries still register the total of up to several thousand – mostly unsuccessful – applications for the refugee status submitted by citizens of Republic of Poland.

3.2.1. Ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*)

The only group of emigrants from Poland under the category of "patrials", and one that played a most important part in the past, are persons who declare their German origin. They are officially called *Aussiedler* (re-settlers), but the term no longer seems adequate today. As we mentioned in part 2.3 above, this stream of emigrants showed a rapid downward trend starting from mid-1990. This resulted first and foremost from changes in the relevant German policies. Yet this change in the German policies towards immigrants from Poland was not an introduction of restrictions that might possibly disappear after Poland's accession to the European Union: in fact, it was a withdrawal from the former policy of active encouragement of immigration, and that particular policy is unlikely to be resumed (though of course its resumption cannot be excluded). What made this channel of migration from Poland to Germany attractive was not just the right to settle and work in Germany (which right will be granted to Polish citizens once Poland becomes member of the European Union), but also the automatic recognition of such immigrants' German citizenship and - even more importantly - comprehensive governmental assistance during the adaptation period [Wiśniewski, 1992]. Thus integration with the Union can hardly be expected to result in a revival of the exodus. Today, German assistance to the German minority in Poland aims rather at preservation of the group in its homeland. Double citizenship, Polish and German, allows many inhabitants of e.g. the Opole region to freely migrate to Germany and back; thus liberalization of the migration provisions resulting from Poland's integration with the EU is unlikely to have any impact on that particular group. Unless there is an unexpected change in the German standpoint on this matter, the number of emigrants within this category will remain at its present level a few thousand a year.

¹⁷ There are many publications dealing with migration policies; cf. e.g. Castles and Miller, 1993; Miller, 1992; Stalker, 1994; Hoenekopp, 1997.

3.2.2. Family migrations

If we rightly assume that few persons will migrate from Poland to Western Europe acquiring the status of refugees or *Aussiedler*, the major channel of legal long-term migration of Poles to the EU during the transition period will be family migrations¹⁸. On one hand, the legal regulation of this channel will remain unchanged or become more favourable. Any restrictions on provision for family migration from new EU members seems very unlikely. On the other hand, dynamics of the social process of migration and the expected intensification of personal contacts between Poles and citizens of the Union will contribute to its growth.

The number of personal contacts between Poles and foreigners will in a natural way result from the growth in various economic, political, and scientific contacts, and also in foreign travel in general (temporary migrations and tourism included). This, in turn, will naturally translate into a growing probability of marriages and migrations for family reasons, made legally possible through that very immigration gate to the EU. If some of the present day's short-term labour migrations evolve into long-term migrations, the marriage will be the easiest way of legalizing one's stay. The big emigration tide of the late eighties may also be expected to generate streams of secondary flows of persons going abroad to join their families, which settled there in the previous decades, or to marry an earlier emigrant from Poland. The present mass short-term migrations to the West, as well as the "old" emigrants' contacts with their country of origin uphold the potential of secondary migration. Nevertheless, as has been mentioned in part 2.3 above, the scale of the present family migration from Poland shown is not really big in absolute terms. The nineties did not bring about a growth in family migrations that would be proportional to the huge increase of international mobility and economic exchange with the EU countries. Thus even if the figures family migration do show a dynamics of growth greater than at present, they are unlikely to go beyond the level of several to about a dozen thousand a year in the short- or medium-term perspective.

3.2.3. Labour migrations

Provisions regulating labour migrations to the EU countries are evidently restrictive. Were they abolished today, migrations from Poland would certainly go up. This is precisely what makes such abolition so very unlikely. The tensions in the Union's labour markets are serious and politically consequential enough to have led in recent years to attempts at curtailing foreigner labour programs (pertaining also to Poles) than to mitigation of the restrictions.

Polish workers find employment in the EU countries either under bilateral agreements signed early in the nineties, which are exceptions from the basically restrictive policy or thanks to low efficiency of the receiving countries efforts to fight illegal employment. Were the programs of temporary employment preserved in their present form and at a similar level, about 300 thousand Poles a year would be allowed to find a job in the EU. However, the future extent of such programs remains unclear. It depends on developments in labour markets within the Union; on efficiency of competing interest groups trying to reduce/preserve/extend import of foreign workers; and to some extent also on the progress of negotiations between Poland and the EU.

The largest group of migrants is that of seasonal workers. Their employment is subject to considerable fluctuations, and thus acts as the classic buffer. The future of the second largest group of Polish workers in the EU – employees of Polish firms working on specific projects in Germany¹⁹ – depends on the effects of pressure of the German construction workers' unions voicing their protests against the Polish competition aloud and with an increasing success. The third group of legal Polish workers, and one that has a chance to relatively grow is that, rather small today (about 1,500 persons), of commuters who work in Germany but live in Poland [Hoenekopp, 1997]. Here, the growth depends on a possible drop in the unemployment rate in eastern Germany, and on attention being paid to that group during the negotiations on the transition instruments.

¹⁸ So far, the EU countries have not introduced programs permitting immigration of persons with particularly desirable skills (special eligibility), pursued by overseas immigration countries.

¹⁹ The fact taken into account that seasonal workers may only work for up to 3 months, and contracted ones for much longer, the size of labor exports in both groups is comparable; see Hoenekopp, 1997.

As has been stated in part 2.3 above, the number of Poles who take illegal jobs abroad is bigger than that of migrants employed there legally. This means that at least some 300 thousand people a year take unregistered jobs. Obviously, regulations and policies pertaining to legal employment of foreigners do not apply to that group. On the other hand, the principles and practice of controlling illegal employment in different countries naturally influence the extent and nature of this phenomenon. For some time now, there has been a growing tendency in Western Europe to control illegal immigration with greater resolve, which is done by means of fighting illegal employment. A more effective struggle against illegal employment in Germany, Italy or Belgium may seriously reduce the scale of the unregistered temporary migrations, the greatest outflow stream from Poland now. The future of such migrations in the discussed perspective of 10 to 15 years will depend on the resultant of two opposing forces: the receiving countries actual resolution in fighting illegal employment, and the demand for this type of work. In industries and sectors where a considerable proportion of Polish illegal workers are employed, such as services (e.g. hotel, catering), and in individual households, the demand for migrants' flexible and cheap work may well go up. However, Poles are by no means the only groups of migrants capable of responding that demand (see point 3.6 below).

3.3. The economic effects of integration and reform in Poland

The effects of economic integration with EU countries may in the long run have a greater impact on Polish emigration than changes in the regulations that directly shape the migration. The effects will shape the major conditions of labour migration, which will act in a direction opposite to that of liberalization of labour flows. There are serious grounds to believe that the main economic aspects of integration – free flow of goods, capital, and technologies, together with financial support from the Union and probably also some legal flow of workers – will lead to changes reducing the potential of migration from Poland to Western Europe. Such changes are a purpose of extending the Union.

3.3.1. Convergence

The specific economic effects of Poland's admission to the European Union cannot be anticipated. They depend on many complex factors, as among others the adaptation program (both for the period preceding the admission and for the years to follow) which still has to be negotiated. However, the degree of Polish economy's integration with EU economy will no doubt become much greater. In light of conventional economic knowledge, this will mean a huge increase in mutual trade, and probably also just as huge increase in flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). According to the neoclassical theory of foreign trade, both these phenomena may contribute to a bigger or smaller leveling of differences in productivity, and reduction of real wage disparity²⁰. If we assume that most migrations from Poland to EU countries result first of all from wage disparities and different employment prospects, economic integration stimulating a relatively faster economic growth in Poland compared to migrants' countries of destination, and also a growth in living standards, should in the long run lead to a significant drop in migrations.

²⁰ Layard et al., 1992; Tapinos, 1994; Stalker, 1994; Straubhaar and Zimmermann, 1994.

This phenomenon accompanied previous enlargements, as e.g. Portugal, where the economic and social changes resulting from integration significantly reduced the originally mobile societies' inclination to seek employment abroad [Castles and Miller, 1994; SOPEMI, 1997; Fiejka, 1993]. The downward trend in Poland's migration potential in 1990s, described in point 2.2 above, may be seen as the effect of the "convergence leap" resulting from successful reforms of the nineties. If economic growth and institutional reforms continue, this process is bound to intensify.

3.3.2. Model versus reality

It has to be stressed, however, that migrations are too complex a phenomenon to be satisfactorily explained (and forecasted) with this elegant but simple model. Many times have facts diverged from expectations arising from the neoclassical theory. Even within this way of reasoning, actual convergence (equalization) depends not only on the effects of liberalization of trade and investment, but also on historically given conditions, such as the initial wage disparity and living standards, or the initial degree of economic integration, etc., which affect not only the pace of convergence but also the level at which it might possibly take place. In specific circumstances and in a limited time perspective, such convergence may not occur at all [Tapinos, 1994; Sassen, 1988]. Moreover, the neoclassical model of migration leaves out some of its social aspects, such as its inner dynamics, which - at least in the short run - may cause an increase in migrations despite macroeconomic changes that should generate a decrease. A usual derivation from the model is the so-called "migration hump". Initially despite progressing integration, growth in foreign trade is accompanied not by a drop or stabilization of migration but - quite the contrary - by its increase (hence the name, referring to the "hump" in graphs). According to Martin and Taylor, a growth in trade and labour migrations is complementary at the onset of the integration process, to become substitutive after a period of time. In any case, according to the authors, the "migration hump" is always small and temporary; besides, the drop in migration that follows makes up for the "hump" abundantly and quite promptly [Martin and Taylor, 1996].

It has to be stressed at the same time that neither a complete leveling nor even an approximation of earnings is necessary for labour migrations to decrease. For example, Portugal and Spain still have the *per capita* GDP 50% lower, and wages about three times lower than the countries to which they once exported labour on a scale much bigger than today. On the other hand, differences between Columbia and Venezuela as regards wages are smaller than between Portugal and France, and yet there is between them intense labour migration. Closer example is provided by present migrations from Poland to the Czech Republic, which persist despite a much smaller wage disparity compared to differences between countries of the European Union. Thus even if the model is simplified to the maximum, no specific level of the disparity can be indicated that would guarantee a decrease in migrations. Beside a gradual leveling of wages, what contributed to such drop within the European Community were historical circumstances such as successful reforms in migrants' countries of origin, presence and growth of labour from outside the Community, etc. [Tapinos, 1994].

Thus the economic models fail to provide an unequivocal answer to the question about the effects of Poland's accession to the Union on migration. Notwithstanding the above reservations, the model and the experience of enlargements so far make highly probable the supposition that in the medium and long-term perspective, the expected progress of economic integration and the resulting convergence will lead to a gradual reduction of migration from Poland to the West. The actual pace with which Poles' migration propensity may decrease we cannot calculate with any precision. At the beginning, the greater intensity of economic contacts with the Union may cause a stronger pressure towards migration (and thus the "hump"); this, however, should be neither a strong nor a long-lived phenomenon. Later on one may expect a considerable decrease in the inclination to seek employment in EU labour markets. This is possible to happen even before Polish workers are granted – in the assumed perspective of 10 to 15 years of transition – the free access to those markets.

Thus the transition period preceding Polish labour free access to EU countries aims in fact at shifting the moment of opening of the Western labour markets until the economic effects of integration manage to reduce Poland's migration potential. The Union's present members, Germany in particular, not only need the time to solve the problems their labour markets now suffer; they also want the above-mentioned effects of Poland's economic development to become apparent. Crucial from this viewpoint is the question whether in the assumed perspective of 10 to 15 years, the economic development of Poland will be fast enough, indeed faster than in the countries of destination and thus capable of reducing Polish migrations before the onset of free flow of workers. Right now, this question cannot be answered. During the transition period, migration trends should be monitored to find out whether their direction, pace and nature actually augur the supposed changes.

3.4. Changes of demographic conditions

In discussions of the future of emigration from Poland, there are voices stressing unusual tension in the Polish labour market in the nearest future, resulting from extremely high growth in the supply of manpower, difficult to be absorbed by internal demand. This factor would allegedly force people at productive age, especially the young ones, to migrate abroad. The migration propensity would additionally intensify because of a drop in labour supply in EU countries, conducive to a growing demand for foreign workers.

Indeed, the number of persons aged 15-59/64²¹ will go up in Poland in the years 1996-2000 by about 960 thousand compared to a mere 180 thousand in all countries of the European Union. In Europe treated as a whole, this growth will amount to 3,710 thousand; Poland's contribution will thus be as high as 26%. What is more, in the years 2001-2010, the resources of persons in productive age will remain at a practically unchanged level (with a decrease by 20 thousand only) in Europe as a whole; they will go down by 1,140 thousand in EU countries; and go up by 690 thousand in Poland. This is at least what follows from the recent UN prognosis [UN, 1994], largely consistent in its part pertaining to Poland with forecasts provided by the Polish Main Statistical Office GUS [GUS, 1998]. It might thus be supposed that manpower supply in Poland would grow to a level similar to the increase in the number of persons at the age of statutory working capability (though rather decreasing in view of a probable professional inactivity of a proportion of women). Due to its size and the relatively better situation in the EU labour market, a part of this group might therefore seek employment in the Union countries.

²¹ The "15-59/64" formula means the overall number of men aged 15-64 and women aged 15-59, which corresponds with the "legal age brackets" of work capability (productive) age generally adopted in Poland.

Graph

1

and

Graph

2

.

From data illustrated in Graph 1²² it follows that the above picture is but seemingly unequivocal. Namely, already in 2001-2010, the growth in population resources at the productive age in Poland will be much smaller compared to the three former Slav Soviet Republics, and after 2010 Poland will join the group of countries with a negative population growth in that age group. Further, if the population at productive age is divided into two groups: 15-44 and 45 or older, it appears (Graph 2) that the global growth of about 850 thousand (in 1996-2020) will result from two opposite trends: a drop (by about 570 thousand) in the size of the younger group, and an increase (by about 1,420 thousand) of the older one. Thus the population at productive age, generally considered highly mobile (aged up to 45) will be significantly reduced, and the increase will only be noted in the not too mobile part of manpower resources (aged 45 or older). Moreover, a drop (although rather slight - by 25 thousand) in the number of persons in the younger brackets of productive age (up to 45) will already appear during the present five years. During the first decade of the next century - when Poland is expected to join the Union - that drop will become quite considerable (by 630 thousand). If such developments in the demographic situation coincide with the probable effects of convergence, Poland's migration potential will be significantly reduced.

Thus the thesis as to the oncoming increase in the Polish manpower's migration potential, to take place soon for demographic reasons, is by no means obvious and perhaps even wrong. That thesis will indeed prove wrong if the frequently observed regularity is observed in Poland in the years to come: the relatively older are not inclined to seek employment outside the local labour market, and most of the migrants are the relatively younger persons. Nothing but an unexpected growth in the older workers' spatial mobility may lead to a growth in migration as anticipated by the above thesis²³.

3.5. Inner dynamics of migration

Foreign migrations are a social process that gradually affects local communities and their foreign "branches", that is concentrations of emigrants. The process has its specific inner dynamics, spreading the phenomenon to new persons and groups through so-called migration networks, that is bonds between migrants, their families, friends and neighbors in and out of the country, as well as persons who facilitate migration for profit. Through the networks migrants and potential migrants get the necessary information, jobs and lodging, as well as material and other assistance; themselves, they also advise and assist others who follow their example. Favourable economic conditions alone are not enough for development of mass migrations if no efficient migration networks have been established. The migration process that spreads over a given community follows definite stages: of growth, stability, and decline. The inner dynamics of that process involves a specific inertia, which may sustain migration for a time despite worsened external conditions [Massey et. al., 1987].

Poland has an old and large Diaspora whose existence has always facilitated migrations. The new mass migration, especially that of the eighties, led to emergence of a vast network of convenient contacts in nearly all EU countries. Although quite well rooted abroad by now, most such persons have not severed their ties with Poland, with their relatives and friends. They constitute a strong support for further migration from Poland today and in the nearest and more distant future.

²² Graphs 1 and 2 after: RKL, 1995.

²³ Just as susceptible of various interpretations are the conclusions that can be drawn from demographic forecasts concerning the EU. The thesis as to the need for imported manpower during the first decades of the next century is by no means substantiated; *cf.* Coleman, 1992.

From recent studies it follows that in regions characterized by intense migration movements, where the migration processes spread as early as the eighties, the penetration of migration networks and the development of migration process has gone so far as to justify the opinion that the stage of stability or even decline has already been reached. Unless new factors emerge to prompt people to migrate, greater intensity of migration from communities such as Perlejewo in Podlasie region or Lubniany in Opole province is rather improbable [Jaźwińska, Łukowski and Okólski, 1997]. Instead, there is a specific growth potential in areas not yet deeply penetrated by migration networks. As the issue has not been studied on the nation-wide scale, the potential areas of expansion and development of the networks cannot be identified. Conditions favourable for a growth in migration will emerge in regions where expansion of migration networks coincides with prompting effects of restructuring of some branches of industry or agriculture.

3.6. Selective nature of migration

Analysis of the macro-economic and demographic conditions of migration may prove too general in the face of concentration of migration phenomena in specific regions of the country of origin or of receiving countries, in variously defined segments of the labour market, in specific socio-professional categories, etc.

3.6.1. Regional peculiarities

The regional and sometimes even local concentration of the migration stream in the country of origin or in receiving countries has already been mentioned above. The economic situation, including that in the labour market of countries and regions where the inflow of Poles is above the average, may diverge in some periods from the overall EU trends. Thus migrations from Poland will depend above all on the conditions in those countries and regions, and not on mean parameters of the Union's general economic situation. In the probable transition period, with some restrictions on the inflow of Polish workers to the EU still preserved, also migration policies may well differ from one country to another to some extent. For example, a country may facilitate seasonal employment or control the illegal labour market with a greater or smaller efficiency. For these reasons, the following should be borne in mind:

1. A vast majority of Polish migrations to Western Europe are migrations to Germany. The German migration policy and the situation in the German labour market will have the greatest impact on the scale and nature of migrations from Poland. For example, a drop by a mere 5% in migration to Germany would be greater in absolute numbers than the whole of migration to Spain. The situation in Germany will have an even greater impact on migration from the parts of Poland that send almost all of their migrants to that country (e.g. Silesia).
2. Migrations to Germany have the greatest impact on the whole of migrations from Poland. Some areas where emigration is intense, however, developed strong ties (small migration systems) with some other EU countries (for example, Podlasie region has such ties with Belgium, and Małopolska - with Austria). The scale and nature of migrations from those regions will depend on the situation in their respective receiving country (or region).
3. On the other hand, the geographic selectivity of migration may result in a growth or decline of the inflow of Poles into specific countries caused by changes in the situation in potential migrants' regions of origin in Poland. The fact considered that migration networks determine to some extent the further direction of migrations, local growth in migration potential - resulting e.g. from tensions in the local labour market - is bound to seek outlet in the direction in which the network has been developing so far. For example, should factors that prompt migration from Podlasie region become intensified in the near future, new migrants would seek employment first of all in Belgium. Instead, should dynamic development start in that region, migrations from Poland to Belgium would go down, at least for the time needed for unsatisfied demand to attract migrants from other regions.

3.6.2. Other spheres of intense migration

Even if we assume that a period of high dynamics of economic growth and improvement of the people's living conditions is in store for Poland as a whole, the future of individual branches and sectors and of their respective socio-professional groups may be different. Concerned here in particular are branches such as mining or the steel industry where profound restructuring combined with mass relocation of manpower seems unavoidable. Integration with the EU will, on the one hand, speed up the restructuring processes, which may lead to accumulation of tensions in the labour markets. On the other hand, EU assistance in such restructuring will help to partly lessen such tensions. It is particularly difficult to take the effects of restructuring into account in migration forecasts; required would be, among other things, a more detailed demographic analysis of professional groups and areas facing the restructuring [Layard et al., 1992].

From the viewpoint of migration potential, the nature and pace of the expected restructuring of the agriculture seems of the paramount importance. The population employed in agriculture is the largest social group related to a sector in need of restructuring, and - as follows from studies of rural areas distant from the centers of today's economic development of Poland - temporary labour migrations to Western Europe have over the nineties become a popular strategy of responding to socio-economic changes in those areas [Jaźwińska and Okólski, 1996]. In the longer perspective, the demographic changes - including in particular progressive aging of the local population - are bound to bring about a drop in migration potential from these rural areas.

Analyzing the possible demand for Polish migrants' work in the EU, one should apply the following three criteria above all: qualifications, flexibility, and legality of migrants' employment.

In developed industrialized countries, there is a noticeable irregular distribution of demand for migrants with different qualifications. It corresponds with the reversed structure of supply of local workers. A relatively large number of qualified workers and a weak or even negative growth in suitable workplaces limit the demand for this type of foreigner work and prompt governments to pursue a restrictive migration policy towards foreigners with such qualifications. Among the highly qualified workers, instead, there is usually a shortage on the national or local scale - one that can hardly be made up for otherwise than through imports (in view e.g. of the rather long period of acquiring the qualifications). In the lowest wage groups, where low qualifications are needed, shortages result from local workers' avoidance of such jobs despite the demand; this is caused by the low wages and a low social status of the jobs, combined with existence of alternative sources of income such as unemployment and welfare benefits [Böhning, 1995; 1995a]. For obvious reasons, the low-qualified part of the labour market includes many more persons than the highly qualified one, and has much greater an impact on the size of migration.

Flexibility of labour is the ability to respond promptly to emerging demand, and the fact that a worker can be easily discarded once he is no longer needed. The possibility of dismissing the worker without difficulty reduces the employer's costs and risk in a fluctuating market situation. The demand for this type of labour is particularly high in the services sector. In some highly seasonal or unstable branches (as e.g. agriculture or the tourism), flexibility is the main trait of workers in demand.

A legal worker is not always the most desirable one. Apart from the obvious inconveniences and risk, employment with evasion of the law gives the employer cheaper manpower that is neither pegged down with regulations nor protected by the law and trade unions but much more disciplined instead, and one that can be discarded with practically no limitations. Provisions on employment may be particularly unsuitable for casual and seasonal jobs. Work in the twilight zone is the synonym of flexible work. With a high degree of regulation of the labour market in EU and the huge burden of taxes and obligatory insurance programs, development of that market's twilight zone is a specific form of its deregulation.

From studies of migrations from Poland in the nineties it follows that a vast majority of Poles who find jobs in West-European countries work in the above-mentioned segments of the labour market, usually as low-qualified, flexible (temporary) and illegally employed labour. Most Polish migrants work in agriculture and services, taking jobs that require no qualifications. Most of the legally employed are seasonal workers. At least a half of Polish workers abroad are employed illegally. The demand for thus defined migrant work can be expected to persist also in the future, at

least during the transition period of 10 to 15 years. In thus defined segments of the labour market, migrants from Poland compete and will compete with migrants from other countries.

From monitoring of Poles' temporary labour migrations in mid-nineties it can be concluded that both going abroad to work under legal contracts, and taking jobs abroad in the twilight zone is typical of a specific margin of the Polish labour market, which is now declining (if slowly) [Jaźwińska and Okólski, 1996; Jaźwińska, Łukowski and Okólski, 1997]. Employment abroad proves a more profitable form of earning one's living for persons who are largely incapable, in the new economic conditions and particularly in stagnant or slowly growing regions, of competing for offered jobs that require relatively high qualifications adequate to the "new" economic structure, but who at the same time struggle not to be classified as unemployed and are prepared to do jobs within an "inferior" segment of the market. Economic development and the effects of convergence should reduce this type of migration potential. However, this specific stream of migrations may also increase if migration networks launch an expansion and deeper penetration of areas where resources of thus characterized workers, who have not yet been involved in the migration movement, exist or will emerge in the future (see part 3.5 above).

3.7. The self-employed and businessmen

The focus of discussions on migration from Poland to EU countries is usually the possibility of free or limited labour flow. Labour migrations are no doubt the largest group of voluntary migrations; however, also the other groups should be borne in mind – smaller but important for certain reasons. Concerned here is the movement – related to labour migrations but different from the legal and to some extent also economic and social viewpoint – of persons who seek work abroad not through employment but through economic activity: entrepreneurs and the self-employed. This latter group is also given a variety of other names, such as "own account workers", and "individual" or "trans-frontier" service providers, etc. This group requires special attention in the context of Poles' migrations to Western Europe for at least three reasons.

First, provisions regulating the legal conditions of migration of this group are not those that apply to the flow of ordinary labour. The relevant regulations are not only more liberal but also, in the case of Poland and several other countries of Central Europe, provide the grounds even today for a considerable extension of this stream. The Europe Agreement on Poland's association with the Communities and their member countries defines the conditions of establishing firms and pursuing economic activity in its Article 44 [European Treaty]. So far, provisions regulating both the free flow of workers and the right of establishment have been practically dead. According, however, to specialists on the EU regulation of migration, the Treaty grants to Poles the above rights irrespective of the nature or lack of lower-ranking regulations in individual member countries of the Union [Guild, 1996]. The meaning of those regulations for the practice will probably only be established in judicial proceedings; yet the following can already be stated today: 1. Poland has better grounds for negotiations pertaining to migration of this particular group of persons as compared to ordinary workers; 2. until a free flow of manpower between Poland and the EU becomes a fact, the possibilities of legal migration of entrepreneurs and the self-employed will probably be greater compared to ordinary workers.

The second reason prompting special attention to be paid to this group of migrants is related to demand. Modern labour markets and their present evolution in Western Europe are characterized by a rapid growth in the number of the self-employed and small business, especially in the service sector. They offer flexible labour and, acting as sub-contractors, take over various risks and burdens (e.g. those related to social insurance) from big companies. It is more than likely that the demand for this type of labour, migrant labour included, will continue to grow. At the same time, political effects of resistance to the inflow of this type of migrants are smaller, which is due to the still weak institutionalization of the interests of their rivals (compared to the effective resistance to the inflow of workers organized by powerful trade unions).

Third, migration of persons from this group is most important for their country of origin. On the one hand, such migration is a form of exporting services, and thus of activity that is welcome and supported in many countries; on the other hand, it is a specific (temporary or permanent)

outflow of the capital of human enterprise, which is particularly important in the conditions of progressing systemic transformation.

3.8. Migrations to new member countries of the European Union

An issue that has so far been ignored is that of migrations to countries that will only become EU members in the future but already note some flow from Poland today. Concerned here above all is the Czech Republic and Hungary. Migrations between the three countries developed as early as the days of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. After a breakdown resulting from the crisis of transformation in the Czech and Hungarian labour markets early in the nineties, a growth in Poles' migrations to the Czech Republic in particular is now observed. For nearly a century, Czech lands have been importing labour. Polish workers were employed there even before World War I, during the decades between the two wars, and – to a growing extent – in the period of People's Poland. In recent years, over 12 thousand Poles have been employed there legally, and the number of Poles who reside in Czechia is growing rapidly (it exceeded 23 thousand persons in 1995). The respective figures for Hungary, however much lower (Poles were granted 1,380 work permits in 1995), nevertheless give Poland the fourth position among the countries of origin of foreign workers (after Romania, Ukraine and former Yugoslavia)²⁴. Mentioned among the main factors of migration from Poland to the two discussed countries and to the Czech Republic in particular should be historically shaped migration ties, different demographic trends, as well as higher wages and lower unemployment rates compared to Poland.

The regulations of migration between Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary can be expected to become more liberal at a quicker, or at least not a slower pace compared to relevant principles of migration between the new and old EU member countries. At the same time, the countries concerned will limit the inflow of migrants from other countries, those of Central and Eastern Europe included (in particular Ukraine – the main labour exporter in CEE). In view of the resulting growing privilege of Poles compared to other migrants, conditions favourable for increased migration will emerge. On the other hand, the price leveling mechanisms will take place also in new member countries of the Union. The actual extent to which the above effects of economic integration will reduce the inclination to labour migration will depend on differences in the pace of economic development in the three countries. The strength of the migration ties, the inner dynamics of migration, and the regional inequalities of development considered, some growth in migrations to countries south of the Polish border can be expected.

3.9. Other migrations

Beside labour migrations – the majority of today's migrations from Poland – also migrants motivated by scientific, artistic and other such reasons should be mentioned here. Despite their much smaller size and the lack of simple models describing this type of migrations, such groups cannot possibly be left out of account here. The process of Poland's historical reorientation to the West during the nineties is not only in a dynamic growth in the economic exchange with EU countries, but also in development of political, cultural, scientific and other contacts. Involved here are shorter or longer scholar- and fellowships, and also employment in international institutions. Comprehensive data on this subject are lacking; yet e.g. the GUS data on Polish students abroad show a reorientation consisting in a rapid and huge drop in the number of such students in former USSR early in the nineties, followed by a gradual increase in EU countries [GUS, 1998]. With progressing political, economic, military, scientific and other cooperation with West-European countries, the number of such temporary migrants will no doubt keep going up. In turn, with intensification of various interpersonal contacts resulting from economic, scientific or political cooperation as well as tourism and other related contacts, also the probability of migration for personal reasons.

²⁴ After SOPEMI national reports.

4. Migrations from the European Union to Poland

To end with, migration streams in the opposite direction should be summarized briefly. The overall scale of movement of persons from EU to Poland is quite considerable; however, only small proportion of visits actually bear the traits of migrations, and a vast majority of visitors come to Poland for a very short time: to do shopping, to visit their family and friends, or as tourists. The extent of the present migrations from Western Europe to Poland is incomparably smaller than that of migrations in the opposite direction. It is also smaller than the extent of migrations to Poland from countries of the former Soviet Union. The number of persons from the EU countries who register as permanent residents in Poland never exceeds 4,000 a year; a considerable proportion among them are returning Polish emigrants. The permanent resident's permits are granted to several hundred EU citizens (about 200 Germans, about 50 Swedes, and about 40 British a year). Work permits are granted to several hundred citizens of Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands a year, the total never going beyond 2,500 persons or under one-fourth of the legally employed foreigners [GUS, 1998]. The inflow of EU citizens shows an upward trend; the process of Poland's integration with the Union and the accompanying intensification of various contacts will no doubt strengthen this trend, but the extent of such flow in absolute numbers is likely to remain at a low level.

There is but one stream of inflow from the EU that has a bigger growth potential: the return migrations. At present, returning migrants constitute about a half of the registered immigrants to Poland coming to settle as permanent residents. Added to this should be the "dark number" of Polish citizens returning, many of them after quite a long stay abroad, without being shown in the registers. Tides of return migrations were noted in countries where before their accession to the European Communities the emigration traditions were as strong as in Poland – Italy, Spain and Portugal. Of course, the return migrations resulted not from the fact of the country's accession to the Communities but from economic processes reducing the attraction of life and work away from one's country.

As has been mentioned in part 3.3 above, such economic processes can also be expected in Poland. The large group of people who left Poland at the end of the eighties may well become the source of return migrations. However, the conditions for return migrations from the EU to Poland differ from those to Italy or Spain in several important respects. First, as opposed to Italians and the Spanish, most Polish migrants have acquired a foreign citizenship (this concerns the emigrants to Germany, most of whom have been granted the *Aussiedler* status). This resulted in their better chances for integration in the receiving country, as well as specific obstacles to re-settlement in the country of origin (in cases where a person resigned his Polish citizenship). Second, at the moment of accession to the Union, Poland will still be much less wealthy than the countries where Polish emigrants settled. Many years will have to pass before this difference in wealth and living standards becomes similar to that between e.g. Italy and France in the years of their return migration tide. By that time, Polish emigrants will become even better integrated in their new countries and the probability of their return will decrease.

Research into return migrations from Germany to the Upper Silesia region shows the specific traits of that particular stream [Heffner and Sołdra-Gwiżdż, 1997]. While the emigrants maintain contacts with their country of origin and visit it frequently, the actual return migrations are but a marginal phenomenon. The examined cases of return were usually motivated by failed integration in Germany and by family ties with persons still living in Silesia. It is difficult to say for that matter whether the return migrants involved really intend to settle in Poland: some of them consider the possibility of migrating again (to which there are no formal obstacles in the case of persons with double citizenship). The observation seems important that the children of migrants – those who did not stay on in Germany included – tend to see their future in Germany rather than in Poland. Bigger is the number of persons who not exactly return to Poland but rather visit the country to make sure that they can still return or to avail themselves of specific profits resulting from the fact of having two homes or the double citizenship (property matters, social benefits, holidays).

5. Recapitulation

The process of Poland's European integration and the parallel internal socio-economic transformations will influence on Polish migrations to the EU in a variety of ways, sometimes in the opposite directions. The expected schedule of integration divides the time perspective of this discussion into two periods. The basic conclusions as to the development of migration in the longer perspective (of 10 to 15 years, after the actual free flow of persons is allowed) can be summarized as follows:

1. What seems crucial for the shape of the future emigration is the process of Poland's further economic development as well as that of leveling of prices as a result of economic integration. The two processes will gradually reduce the migration potential of Poland.
2. Demographic forecasts provide no grounds to expect a growth in the migration potential caused by generation changes in the labour market.
3. With moderately optimistic assumptions as to dynamics of growth, the effects of such processes in the sphere of migrations will probably become manifest before the frontiers will be actually opened. The pace at which the potential will decline cannot be defined in advance; however, a monitoring of that process will be possible.
4. With the above assumptions, what can be expected after the introduction of a free flow of persons is not a rapid growth in migrations but rather a gradual decrease.

In the short and medium perspective, before Poland's accession to the Union and during the transition period, continuation of today's migration trends can be expected with high probability. In particular:

1. Labour migration to Western Europe, Germany in particular, will remain the prevalent form of migration. A gradual decline in the potential of such movements can be expected depending on the economic situation in Poland.
2. The policy of receiving countries, that is their programs of legal temporary employment of Polish workers and efficiency of controlling the twilight zone of that employment, will be an important factor to determine the extent of labour migration.
3. The nineties' trends in the social structure of this migration stream will continue. This means a bigger proportion of lower educated and older persons.
4. The main sources of labour migrations from Poland will be areas of inferior economic development, especially those peripheral as well as the agricultural ones, where migration networks operate at the same time. The expected restructuring of some branches of the industry and agriculture may increase the migration potential.
5. A new trend of legal labour migrations, which can be expected (and should be taken into account during negotiations with the Union), will be migration of entrepreneurs and the self-employed.
6. The main channel of legal, long-term and settlement immigration from Poland to the EU will consist of family migrations. The stream will include reunions of the families of former emigrants (a downward trend), as well as migrations resulting from marriages with EU citizens (here, an upward trend can be expected).
7. Migration of EU citizens to Poland will go up; however, its scale will remain much smaller as compared to movements in the opposite direction. The major stream of immigration from the West will be return migration.

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