



Sous la direction de
Clément BENELBAZ, Hugo FLAVIER, Olga GILLE-BELOVA, Moya JONES



LES MIGRATIONS INTRA-EUROPEENNES A L'AUBE DU XXI^{SIECLE}



Editions A. PEDONE

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À L'AUBE
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**REPRODUCING SOCIO-POLITICAL CLEAVAGES.
THE CASE OF ELECTORAL MOBILISATION
OF THE POLISH DIASPORA***

MAGDALENA LESIŃSKA

1. INTRODUCTION

The parliamentary and presidential elections that have taken place in Poland over the last few years have featured a previously unknown mobilisation among the Poles living abroad. However, despite the introduction of measures facilitating the voting process, only 1% of all the votes in the elections were cast abroad. Their actual impact on the results is therefore negligible; however, expatriates' votes are significant both symbolically and in political rhetoric. It is this significance that has led to the Polish diaspora becoming the object of candidates' and political parties' unprecedented attention.

The aim of the present article is to analyse the dynamics in the number of votes cast by expatriate Poles in national elections over the last two decades, particularly the elections that have taken place after the Polish accession to the EU and the resulting mass emigration, the so-called post-accession emigration. The author endeavours to determine the causes and conditions of the observed electoral mobilisation among Polish citizens living abroad in recent years, and the actions undertaken by politicians in order to gain support among emigrants.

The main hypothesis of this article is that the issue of emigration has been consciously politicised: political parties and presidential candidates have emphasised the existing divisions in the Polish diaspora in order to mobilise both citizens abroad and those living in the country. The politicisation was particularly noticeable during the wave of post-accession migration: the intensity of public and political debates over emigration increased, their content changed, the degree of politicisation of the diaspora and voting abroad rose. In a broader sense, it also influenced the relations between the state and the diaspora. The political system in Poland has reacted to the wave of mass emigration which followed the Polish accession to the EU in 2004, and the reaction has been reflected in electoral campaigns as well as in the number of votes cast by Poles

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living abroad. Important issues remain about why political elites make significant efforts to mobilize the diaspora, since the contribution of votes from abroad is numerically almost insignificant, and how political elites use electoral campaigns and media in this process.

According to the macro-analytic theories of voter participation, socio-political divides and the polarisation of the political system make the latter more dynamic and increase voter turnout. Strengthening the existing socio-political divides in the nation is a logical political strategy to gain support and influence voters, whether they live within the country or abroad. In the electoral campaigns of 2007 and 2010, politicians consciously emphasised the distinction between the 'old' and the 'new' Polish diaspora: the former represented by the 'conservative and nationalistic' American Poles, and the latter by the 'young and modern' post-accession emigrants. The main argument of this paper is that the political elites, through referring to existing polarisations within the diaspora and politicizing the issue of emigration, aim to monopolise and activate voters in order to increase their support at home and abroad.

The article attempts to contribute to the existing literature related to diaspora-homeland relations and migrants' transnational political participation by analysing the diaspora's electoral participation in state elections. The analytical framework of the study is based on the political participation and mobilization and socio-political cleavages approach.

The text is divided into four parts. In the first one, the author briefly describes the role of the diaspora in the native state's political arena, discusses the mutual relations between socio-political camps and voter mobilisation and defines the role of politicians in maintaining the existing divisions in order to gain support and activate their electorate. The second part contains a description of the Polish diaspora, particularly of the successive waves of emigration from Poland in the post-World War II period, and of the new and distinct post-accession wave. In the third part the author presents an analysis of the electoral mobilisation of the Polish diaspora, i.e. the participation of Poles living abroad in national (presidential and parliamentary) elections over the last twenty years (1990-2011). Major trends, voting results from abroad and their distributions are also discussed. The final part is devoted to an analysis of the electoral campaigns and the role of the media in reinforcing the existing dichotomies in order to mobilize all voters at election time. The issue of emigration became an important one for Polish society and as such was prominent in public and media discourse. In time political elites also joined the discussion over post-accession migration and its effects. The content of electoral and media campaigns reflects how the issue of emigration and the diaspora became politicized by political elites.

2. POLITICAL CLEAVAGES, ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND THE DIASPORA. SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The term "diaspora" is used in the present paper to refer to all citizens living abroad. It constitutes an important political entity and plays a significant role in the political process of the country of origin¹. Bauböck lists three main reasons why governments and politicians from all camps strive to strengthen their ties with the diaspora: they do it in order to exploit the social and economic capital of those who decide to come back, because of remittances sent by the emigrants to their families and, finally, to further the interests of the home country in the receiving countries. We would add one more reason to the list: politicians use the diaspora during electoral campaigns and the elections to mobilise their political bases at home and abroad.

The more numerous and influential the diaspora, the more interested the governments and politicians are in strengthening the ties between the emigrants and their home country. Most states have a very active policy towards their diasporas and help strengthen their ties with the home country, for example through support for their socio-cultural organisations and programmes (mainly through consulates and embassies) or by funding schools and native language courses. One of the most important things a state can do to keep the emigrants interested in the situation of their home country is to give them suffrage in national elections.

There are many pros and cons of granting passive and active voting rights in national elections to citizens living abroad². One of the most important of these arguments is the basic tenet of democracy: extending suffrage to citizens living abroad is the fullest realisation of the principle of universality of elections; it is also the basic democratic right of any citizen that cannot be taken away from him or her even if he or she temporarily or permanently lives abroad. Opponents of the idea point out that people living abroad are not directly subject to the legal and political system of the home country and usually do not pay its taxes, and thus should not have the right to decide who should form the government. Another argument against giving voting rights to citizens living abroad is that, since they are non-residents, they cannot be fully aware of its political situation and of the candidates, and therefore their choices are often random. However, in the age of internet and mass media, this argument seems weak at best.

¹ BAUBÖCK Rainer, «Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism», *International Migration Review*, nr 37/3, 2003, pp.700-723; SHEFFER Gabriel, *Diaspora Politics. At Home Abroad*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; ØSTERGAARD-NIELSEN Eva, «International migration and sending countries: key issues and themes», In: ØSTERGAARD-NIELSEN Eva (ed.) *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, pp.3-30.

² BAUBÖCK Rainer, «Stakeholder citizenship and transnational political participation: a normative evaluation of external voting», *Fordham Law Review*, 75, 2007, pp. 2393-2447; RUBIO-MARIN Ruth, «Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation-State: Normative Challenges of Expatriate Voting and Nationality retention of Emigrants», *New York University Law Review*, 81, 2006, pp. 117-147.

The political elite's opinion on granting suffrage to citizens living abroad may depend on the impact their votes might have on the results of national elections. If it is merely symbolic – as is the case in Poland – this right is not controversial. However, if emigrants participate in huge numbers and their vote could have a significant impact on the final result, and especially if their population is made up of influential members of the opposition, the question of voting rights for non-resident citizens may become the subject of passionate political struggle.

Politicians are aware that the diaspora can be an influential political entity. Its position varies according to country of residence, depending on its size and distribution and on the degree of its self-organisation (the existence of influential political, cultural and economic elites). A diaspora with some potential political influence often becomes an independent player on the political scene in the transnational arena. It can also become the object of attention of politicians from various camps on the internal political scene. These attempts to encourage the diaspora to participate in national elections are common: any group that has voting rights, especially if it is numerous, influential and with a clear political orientation, is of interest to candidates and political parties during electoral campaigns. Voting is a way for the diaspora to participate in its homeland's domestic politics; there are many other ways in which a diaspora is engaged and influences political relations with the country of origin. The ties between homeland and diaspora are usually very complex and multiple³.

There are many methods politicians and their parties use to encourage the electorate to vote: one of them is emphasising the existing social divides (or creating new ones) that are known to mobilise voters⁴. Social divides concerning beliefs, ideas, values or identities incite people to manifest their political opinions and therefore translate them into political choices and support for a given political camp. We can therefore reference G. Almond and S. Verba⁵ and note that the existence of political divides is a fundamental characteristic of democracy.

One of the most interesting models of political divides was formulated by S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan⁶. An instant classic and a point of reference for most of today's analyses of political conflicts, their approach has been frequently

³ SHEFFER Gabriel, *Diaspora Politics. At Home Abroad*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2003; SMITH Robert C., «Diasporic Memberships in Historical Perspective: Comparative Insights from the Mexican, Italian and Polish Cases», *International Migration Review*, 37-3, 2003, pp. 724-759.

⁴ ENYEDI Zsolt, «The role of agency in cleavage formation», *European Journal of Political Research* 44/5, 2005, pp. 697-720; NETO Octavio Amorim & COX Gary W., «Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties», *American Journal of Political Science*, 41/1, 1997, pp. 149-174; SARTORI Giovanni, «From the Sociology of Politics to Political Sociology», In LIPSET Seymour M. (ed.), *Social Science and Politics*, London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp.65-100.

⁵ ALMOND Gabriel & VERBA Sydney, *The Civic Culture*, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1965, pp.337-338.

⁶ LIPSET Seymour M. & ROKKAN Stein, «Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments», In LIPSET SEYMOUR M. & ROKKAN STEIN (eds.) *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives*, New York: Free Press, 1967, pp. 1-64.

modified, most notably by S. Bartolini and P. Mair⁷, who consider socio-political cleavages as links between the social structure and the institutional and political system, in which the existing social divides are reflected in the political sphere and, vice versa, the divisions in the political elite are transposed and preserved in society. According to the authors, any cleavage existing in a political community is tripartite: empirical (concerning socio-demographic characteristics), normative (concerning identity), and organisational (when the cleavage becomes institutionalised and organisations representing the camps emerge)⁸. The socio-political cleavage is therefore presented as a system which polarises a political community that is divided into factions supporting a given policy and the parties that are responsible for it and factions supporting the opposition and its political projects.

The socio-political cleavage impacts political behaviour, which may be transient or permanent. Political parties are aware of the divides existing in society and use them in their platforms to target specific groups of voters to gain their support and therefore to win power. If a political party can react to social change swiftly and address the problems that are important for public opinion on its election platform, it can count on gaining new voters. In Poland, during the mass post-accession outflow to the EU that began in 2004, the question of emigration became very topical and important in public and political discourse. It was noted and leveraged during the electoral campaigns of many parties and presidential candidates who openly emphasised the existing divides. The problem is discussed in more detail later in the article.

In most European countries, citizens living abroad have the right to vote in national elections⁹. What is more, governments do their best to simplify the procedure of voting abroad by encouraging various forms of participation in national elections in order to strengthen emigrants' engagement in national affairs. Of the 27 European countries that allow their citizens living abroad to vote, just eight permit only the traditional procedure of voting, in which one must cast a ballot in person. The other 19 countries have implemented other ways of voting – by post, via internet or by proxy. The simpler methods are designed to encourage citizens to vote and therefore increase voter turnout. Simplification of voting is particularly important in the case of citizens living abroad for they are usually dispersed throughout the receiving country and far from polling stations which thereby discourages their participation.

In Poland, any citizen who is of age has a right to vote in parliamentary and presidential elections and in referendums, and can vote from abroad, whether he or she lives there permanently or is there only temporarily, provided that his or her name is on the list of voters abroad. To get on the list, one has to register in advance (three days before election day at the latest) at an appropriate consulate.

⁷ BARTOLINI Stefano & MAIR Peter, Identity, Competition and Electoral Availability. *The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 215.

⁹ ELLIS, A. et al., *Voting from abroad. The International IDEA Handbook*. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, The Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico, 2007.

In the past, a voter had to appear there in person. Today the consul register of voters is based on an oral, written, telephone, wire, fax or e-mail application.

The 2011 election was the first one where it was possible to vote by post. To do so, a citizen had to register to vote at the closest consulate in the receiving country. The consulate would then send him or her a ballot by post. The voter had to fill it in and send it back to the consulate, where it was opened in the presence of a committee on election day and added to all the other votes cast at the consulate. The 2011 election showed this form of voting was not very popular among Polish citizens living abroad; only 16,440 people voted by post.

In the parliamentary elections, electoral constituencies abroad are part of the electoral constituency of Warsaw I. It means that people who vote abroad cast their votes for the candidates from this constituency and therefore have little impact on and interest in the general result, for their ballots are aggregated to those cast in Warsaw. Their votes have therefore a purely symbolic meaning, rather than any real impact, and are only important for the media. However, in presidential elections, where votes are cast for specific candidates, those cast abroad have a real value. In the 1990 and 1995 presidential elections, citizens living abroad could only participate in the first round. This law was later changed and, as of the year 2000, citizens abroad could vote in both rounds of all elections.

3. THE POLISH DIASPORA – A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

Poland is and has always been predominantly a country of emigration and its history has been marked by successive waves of emigrants.¹⁰ In order to understand the political orientation and the exact character of the divisions in the Polish diaspora, we have to examine the history and the circumstances of its emergence, especially in the post-World War II period.

Emigration from Poland has had a mass and permanent character since the 19th century; by 1914, 3.5 to 4.2 million people had left Polish territory, and the number of emigrants in the interwar period is estimated at 1.6 to 2 million¹¹. The end of World War II and the isolation of the Eastern Bloc caused successive waves of emigration (including mass wartime and early post-war displaced people). From the mid 1940s, the Polish borders were closed and leaving the country became more and more difficult¹². In the years 1959-1989, 762,000 emigrants were

¹⁰ There are many estimates of the number of Poles abroad. The Central Statistics Office data suggest that there are ca. 2 million Polish emigrants (Poles living temporarily abroad), varying from 2.2 million in 2008 to 1.9 million in 2011. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs estimates that there are 10-12 million Polish citizens or people of Polish origin living abroad; including generations whose relation to Poland is often purely symbolic.

¹¹ GRABOWSKA-LUSIŃSKA Izabela & OKÓLSKI Marek, *Emigracja ostatnia?* [Ultimate emigration?], Warszawa: Scholar, 2010, pp. 10-11; WALASZEK Adam, «Polska diaspora» [Polish diaspora], in WALASZEK Adam (ed.) *Polska diaspora* [Polish diaspora], Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2001, p. 9.

¹² FASSMANN Heinz & MÜNZ Rainer, «European East-West Migration», *International Migration Review*, nr 28/3, 1994, pp. 520-538; STOLA Dariusz, «Kraj bez wyjścia? Migracje Polaków w okresie

officially registered, but it is estimated that an additional 0.5 million may have left Poland permanently without a permit (the so-called invisible migrants)¹³. The outflow was particularly heavy in the 1980s, when entire families fled the country.

The most popular receiving countries from the post-World War II period until 1989 were West Germany, the US and Canada. In this era, the causes for emigration were political and economic and the emigrants formed 'a diaspora of workmen and a diaspora of victims'¹⁴, the former consisting of people who emigrated and stayed in the West for economic reasons¹⁵, and the latter were those forced to leave or whose escape was the ultimate form of protest against the regime in Poland (the 'independence emigration'), as well as those who were forced to leave by the Polish authorities (in the case of Poles of Jewish origin in 1968 or of Solidarity activists in the 1980s, who continued their opposition activities abroad). Many of them had trouble integrating a foreign reality due to the language barrier, so they were concentrated in Polish districts and around Polish parishes which were centres for the Polish diaspora, particularly in South and North America. Some who emigrated from Poland after the war (such as ethnic Germans and Jews) preferred to join their ethnic communities rather than the Polish diaspora.

As a result of the successive waves of political refugees and Poles who found themselves abroad at the end of World War II (particularly in the UK and in France) who refused to return to communist Poland, the emigrant population became a very active, politically-conscious group which emphasised its role as a supporter of the fight for Polish sovereignty and as an inheritor of the tradition of the fight for independence. Successive waves of opposition activists who left Poland in the subsequent decades (especially in the 1980s when Solidarity movement activists were persecuted) soon joined the group¹⁶. In the post-war period, the emigrants established numerous cultural, artistic, religious (centred around the numerous Polish parishes that exist worldwide) and political (mainly in the US and Canada, and in London, around the Polish government in exile)¹⁷ institutions (organizations, associations, committees). All of them emphasised their engagement in the fight for the independence of Poland, for example,

PRL» [Country with no exit? International Migration from Poland, 1949-1989]. Warszawa: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2010.

¹³ OKÓLSKI Marek, «Migracje zagraniczne w Polsce w latach 1980-1989. Zarys problematyki badawczej» [International migration in Poland 1980-1989. The outline of research problem], *Studia Demograficzne* [Demographic Studies], 117/3, 1994, pp. 3-59.

¹⁴ WALASZEK Adam, «Polska diaspora» [Polish diaspora], in Walaszek Adam (ed.) *Polska diaspora* [Polish diaspora], Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2001, pp. 10-16.

¹⁵ ŚLANY Krystyna, *Między przymusem a wyborem. Kontynentalne i zamorskie emigracje z krajów Europy środkowo-wschodniej 1939-1989* [Between Pressure and Choice. Continental and Overseas Emigration from the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (1939-1989)], Kraków: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1995.

¹⁶ ERDMANS Mary Patrice, *Opposite Poles: Immigrants and Ethnic in Polish Chicago 1976-1990*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998.


¹⁷ The Polish government in exile existed from 1939 to 1990 as a legal successor of the government in Poland. It concluded its activity after Lech Wałęsa was elected president in 1990, when it handed over to him the presidential insignia kept abroad ever since 1939.

by helping successive waves of refugees to find their way in the receiving country or by supporting the opposition in the homeland. The émigrés and exiles, particularly some of its leaders, all but mythologized their own role¹⁸.

The year 1989, a milestone in the history of Poland and its diaspora, marked the beginning of freer migrations, which were restricted not by closed borders or refusal of the authorities to issue passports, but mainly by visa regimes in receiving countries. According to official data, around 216,000 citizens left Poland permanently or semi-permanently in the years 1990-1999. In the 1990s, short-term emigration for economic purposes (seasonal, circular), particularly to Germany, was the dominant form of flows.

However, a really significant phenomenon in the post-war history of Polish emigration was the so-called post-accession wave, which is unparalleled not only because of its magnitude, dynamics and directions of the outflow, but also because of its character, which was very unlike the previous post-war waves. With the accession, Poles became citizens of the EU and were granted the right of free movement and of employment in other member states. It was a mass outflow of unexpected dynamics, unforeseen by both Polish authorities and society, and the receiving countries. It is estimated that at the apex of the emigration wave, in 2004-2006, 1.1 million citizens left Poland¹⁹. Between 2004 and 2008, 550,000 Polish workers moved to the UK alone and registered with the Workers Registration Scheme. They were immediately or shortly joined by their families, who increased the numbers even further. The post-accession emigration chose different destinations to the previous waves. Until then, the main receiving countries had been Germany, the US, Canada, and Italy. However, since 2004, the UK and Ireland, which were the first to open their labour markets to citizens of the new member states have been the main destinations of the 'new Polish diaspora' (see Figure 1). This group is young (the average age of a post-accession migrant was 31.4 years old), predominantly male (64.7%) and better educated than their predecessors. It is also, unlike the previous waves, dominated by inhabitants of cities and big towns²⁰.

Figure 1.
Outflows from Poland to main destination countries in 2000-2007 (in thousands)



Source : Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2009:84.

Because the waves of emigration differed significantly, it is important to note the strong internal divisions within the Polish diaspora; some authors go as far as distinguishing several Polish diasporas²¹, which differ not only by cause of

¹⁸ RADZIK Tadeusz, « Dła siebie czy dla kraju? Społeczne uwarunkowania aktywności politycznej emigracji polskiej », [For the country or for myself? Social considerations of political activity of Polish emigration], In *Studia Migracyjne – Przegląd Polonijny* [Migration Studies – Polonia Review], 36/2, 2010, pp. 23-38.

¹⁹ GRABOWSKA-LUSIŃSKA Izabela & OKÓLSKI Marek, *Emigracja ostatnia?* [Ultimate emigration?], Warszawa: Scholar, 2010, p. 74.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 96-103.

²¹ GARAPICH Michał, « Migracje, społeczeństwo obywatelskie i władza. Uwarunkowania stowarzyszeniowości etnicznej i rozwoju społeczeństwa obywatelskiego wśród polskich emigrantów w Wielkiej Brytanii » [Migration, civil society and power. Considerations of ethnic associationalism and development of civil society among Polish emigrants in the UK], In DUSZCZYK Maciej & LESIŃSKA Magdalena (eds.) *Współczesne migracje: dylematy Europy i Polski* [Contemporary migration: dilemmas of Europe and Poland], Warszawa: Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2009, pp. 39-69; POPRZEZIŃSKA Martyna, « Poles apart: the two faces of Polish society », *The Guardian*, 25 August 2010; GARAPICH Michał, DRINKWATER Stephen, EADE, John, « Poles Apart? EU Enlargement and the Labour Market Outcomes of Immigrants in the UK », *International Migration*, 47/1, 2009, pp. 161-190.

emigration (political and economic), main destination, and emigrant social profile, but also by their role in the receiving countries (see Table 1). The post-war diaspora, in its own eyes, had the mission of preserving true 'Polishness' in the times of Soviet occupation and lack of independence, whereas the current wave has a purely economic character. What is more, the differences also concern the nature of the subsequent waves. Before 1989, the decision to emigrate was frequently made in dramatic circumstances (escapes) and usually meant that the emigrant could not return; the post-accession emigration is fluid, temporary, circular and does not require a prior commitment regarding the length of stay. Contemporary emigrants maintain close personal ties with the home country and many of them returned to Poland during the recent European economic crisis or plan to return in the indefinite future.

What remains an important characteristic of Polish diaspora is its remarkable political engagement in homeland affairs in the historical perspective. It was especially noticeable when Poland lost its independence as a state and political elites residing abroad initiated and supported efforts to regain its sovereignty²². The leaders of the Polish diaspora created many vital centres of political life which brought together activists from a variety of political parties to carry on the never-ending disputes over the future of the Polish state. Nowadays the tradition of political engagement in domestic politics is still continued by some Polish diaspora organizations, especially those from the Americas; they uphold strong relations (both institutional and personal) with political elites in Poland, with Catholic Church organizations and with conservative parties.

The differentiation of the Polish diaspora is exemplified by the orientation and policy of Polish emigrant organisations²³. Those established before 1989 were very politically engaged in the home country and considered themselves bastions of independent Poland abroad; those created by the new waves of emigrants focus on economic and social problems, on everyday life in the receiving countries. Their main role is to support new emigrants, inform them about the legal system, employment opportunities, social benefits, or cultural events; they are a meeting place for professional groups and students, and their political engagement is marginal. As a result, the Polish emigrant organisations (like the whole diaspora), although numerous, are deeply divided and their interactions and relations are rather limited²⁴. Significantly, the 'old' diaspora

²² PIENKOS Donald E., *For Your Freedom Through Ours: Polish American Efforts on Poland's behalf, 1863-1991*, New-York: Boulder, 1991; RADZIK Tadeusz, *Polonia amerykańska wobec Polski 1918-1939* [The Polish diaspora in the United States towards Poland, 1918-1939], Lublin: Wydawnictwo Polonia, 1990.

²³ BLEJWAS Stanisław, «Nowa i stara Polonia: napięcia w społeczności etnicznej» [The New and the Old Polish diaspora: tensions in the ethnic community]. In KUBIAK Hieronim, KUSIELEWICZ Eugene, GROMADA Thaddeus (eds.), *Polonia amerykańska. Przyszłość i współczesność* [Polish diaspora in America. The Past and Present], Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1988, pp. 705-726.

²⁴ CHODUBSKI Andrzej, «O źródłach konfliktów współczesnej emigracji polskiej» [On the origins of conflicts of contemporary Polish emigration]. In: Piątek, R. (ed.), *Konflikty społeczne w procesie transformacji systemowej* [Social conflicts in the process of system transformation], Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 1996.

integration were centred on historical sites and buildings, which act as places for cultural life and regular meetings, whereas 'new' emigrants self-organize using cyberspace and social networking services²⁵. The internet has become the most important communication device used by emigrants all over the world not only to contact homeland and families left behind but also as a source of information about diaspora life and it is a mobilizing tool during important events²⁶.

Table 1.
Differentiation of the Polish diaspora – general characteristics

	Emigration before 1989	Post-accession emigration
Motives of departure	political (and economic)	only economic
Type of migration	mostly permanent (settlement)	indefinite, temporary, circular
Destination countries	Germany, the US, Canada	the UK, Ireland, Germany, Italy
Relations with Poland	strong emotional ties Poland as a symbolic homeland occasional visits	trans-nationalism, living in both countries ('here and there') regular visits
Social profile	most migrants were middle-aged or older, with secondary school or vocational education focused in Polish districts, parishes, organisations	most migrants are young, with secondary or higher education dispersed
Ideological profile	nationalistic, based on religion and culture, with a strong tradition of support for the independence movement	modern- and daily life-oriented, strongly individualistic

It is worth noting the strong ties between the Polish diaspora and the homeland. Emigration is not only part of the history of the Polish society, but above all an experience rooted in national, local, family and individual history; it is part of the everyday reality of most Poles. Emigrants have always remained in close contact with the homeland, their family and friends in the home country. They exchange information, visit them and support them financially. In the past as well as today, the day-to-day functioning of many Polish households depends on the stable employment of their members abroad.

²⁵ SEREDYŃSKA-ABOU EID Renata, «Polskie społeczności wirtualne w Wielkiej Brytanii po 2004 roku» [Polish virtual communities in the UK after 2004]. In Kaczmarczyk P., Lesińska M. (eds.), *Krajobrazy migracyjne Polski* [Migration Landscapes of Poland], Warszawa: Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2012, pp. 166-178.

²⁶ BRINKERHOFF Jennifer, *Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; PARHAM Angel Adam, «Internet, Place and Public Sphere in Diaspora Communities», *Diaspora: Journal of Transnational Studies*, 14/2, 2005, pp.349-380.

The divisions inside the Polish diaspora are reflected in its political orientations and therefore in its voting preferences. With the post-accession wave of emigration, a visible mobilisation of Poles living abroad could be observed in national elections.

4. ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION OF POLES LIVING ABROAD IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN 1990-2011

In the years 1990–2011, there were seven parliamentary and five presidential elections in Poland. Table 2 summarises statistics on the electoral participation of Poles living abroad. A general trend is that more people vote in presidential elections than in parliamentary ones, which is also noticeable in the Polish diaspora case. The common explanation is that voters prefer to vote for a particular person than a political party. The number of votes in the four presidential elections between 1990 and 2005 fluctuated slightly (the lowest number was 35,611 in 2005, the highest – 67,683 in 1995). In the case of parliamentary elections, the numbers were even smaller (the number of votes waned to 26,749 in 2001). There is however one exception in the general trend: during the first parliamentary elections in 1991, more than 113,000 Poles voted abroad. This phenomenon could be explained simply by the fact that it was the first democratic and general parliamentary elections in Poland after the World War II.

Since 2005, there has been a notable increase in the number of those entitled to vote (i.e. registered at polling stations outside Poland) and voting abroad. In the parliamentary election of 2007 and the presidential election three years later, the number of votes cast was significantly higher than in previous elections, in Poland as well as abroad.

Table 1.

Votes cast abroad in parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland 1990-2011.

Elections	Number of persons eligible to vote	Number of voters	Number of polling stations abroad	Turnout (%) ^b
1990 Presidential	143,586	113,251	177	78.9
1991 Parliamentary	57,648	40,834	156	70.8
1993 Parliamentary	57,870	41,918	117	72.4
1995 Presidential ^a	79,896	67,683	127	84.7
1997 Parliamentary	53,848	44,561	144	82.7
2000 Presidential ^a	69,625	57,649	167	82.7
2001 Parliamentary	41,817	26,749	165	64.08

2005 Parliamentary	49,840	35,611	161	71.59
2005 Presidential ^a	80,071	48,179	162	60.19
2007 Parliamentary	190,637	148,946	205	78.13
2010 Presidential	277,016	203,477	263	73.50
2011 Parliamentary	139,415	119,678	268	85.84

Source: State Election Commission.

a) The results of the presidential elections are presented for the first round (the election of 1990 and 1995) and for the second round (the elections of 2000, 2005 and 2010).

b) Turnout refers to the ratio of the number of persons eligible to vote (registered to vote) to the number of votes cast abroad during any one election.

In 2007, the number of people who voted abroad was six times higher than in 2005. In the 2010 presidential election, the increase over 2005 was four-fold. Most votes were cast in the UK, Ireland, the US and Germany. Around 75% of all votes from abroad were cast in these countries (see Table 2).

Table 2.

Number of votes cast abroad in the 2005-2011 elections in selected countries

	2005 Parliamentary	2005 Presidential ^a	2007 Parliamentary	2010 Presidential ^a	2011 Parliamentary
UK	2,431	3,318	36,296	43,979	31,107
Ireland	883	1,577	13,952	14,449	7,298
US	5,578	9,337	28,073	37,005	21,491
Germany	4,199	5,731	14,591	21,449	11,933
All votes from abroad	35,611	48,179	148,946	203,477	119,678

Source: State Election Commission.

a) The results of the presidential elections are presented for the second round.

The most dynamic increase in participation abroad was noted between the presidential elections of 2005 and 2010. In the second round of the 2010 election, over four times more votes were cast than in the previous one (48,179 in 2005 vs. 203,477 in 2010). In 2010, compared to 2005, 13 times as many Poles voted in the UK, nine times as many in Ireland, almost five times as many in the US, and four times as many in Germany. A similarly high increase was also noted in other receiving countries of the post-accession emigration: in Norway the increase was 11-fold (396 in 2005 vs. 4,564 in 2010), in Spain – six-fold (995 in 2005 vs. 5,793 in 2010), and two-fold in Italy (2,424 in 2005 vs. 4,882 in 2010).

Despite the dynamic increase in votes cast abroad during a national election, it is important to note that, given the overall number of Poles officially living abroad, their electoral participation is not very high. When we compare the estimates of the Central Statistics Office (GUS) regarding the overall number of Poles living abroad (emigrants or people staying abroad temporarily for more than two months) with the number of votes cast abroad in national elections, we can see that in 2005, only 3.3% of emigrants actually voted, in 2007 – 6.5%, and in the presidential election of 2010 – 10.8%. In 2010, one in ten Poles living in the UK and in Ireland voted, whereas in Germany the number was only one in twenty.

Such a leap in participation in the years 2005–2010 cannot be explained away as a direct consequence of the post-accession wave, i.e. more Poles living abroad, and of its fluid character, because the leap also occurred in countries where the number of Poles did not increase or even decreased (as is the case in the US and Canada). It can therefore be hypothesised that it was a polarisation of the Polish diaspora, as encouraged by politicians, that mobilised the ‘new’ post-accession diaspora and caught the interest of the ‘older’ waves of emigration, mainly in the US and other American countries, causing them to vote as well.

In the 2011 parliamentary elections, the number of votes cast dropped to 119,000. This represents a decrease of 30,000 (or 20%) compared to the 2007 parliamentary election and by 84,000 (or 42%) compared to the 2010 presidential election. Certainly, the decrease was caused by a wave of return migration and subsequent decline in the number of Poles residing abroad, but also by the fact that in the 2011 election, politicians did not focus on emigration and the situation of Poles living abroad in electoral campaigns as they had in the past.

When analysing the dynamics of electoral participation, it is usually worthwhile to look at voter turnout. In the case of the Polish diaspora, however, it is not a reliable indicator. It is important to note that voter turnout is the ratio of those who registered to vote abroad (and not all those residing abroad at that moment) to those who really voted abroad. Therefore, voter turnout as a stand-alone statistic does not prove much, except the fact that those who went to the effort to register themselves before elections generally cast a ballot (74% on average in the elections in the years 1990–2010; see Table 2).

One important factor that influenced the number of voters abroad was institutional. In recent years many changes have been implemented in the organisation of elections to encourage would-be voters and to facilitate voting for citizens living abroad. The number of electoral constituencies abroad has been increased, voter registration has been simplified, and the option to vote by post has been implemented. In the 2005 election and later, a record number of polling stations was established abroad. In the recent election of 2011, there were 268 of them, especially in the countries where the number of Poles has been traditionally high and in those where it had increased in the post-accession period (see Table 4). Between the 2005 and 2010 presidential elections, the number of polling stations in the UK increased from three to 41 (and to 43 in 2011), in Ireland from one to 11 (and 16 in 2011), in Germany from five to 12

(11 in 2011), and in the US from 15 to 28 (27 in 2011). New stations were also established in countries where the number of voters had never been high but which became destination countries of the post-accession wave of emigration. Compared to 2005, there was an increase in the number of polling stations in 2010: from one to three in Italy, from one to four in Norway, and from three to 11 in Spain (the numbers did not change in 2011).

Table 3.

Number of polling stations abroad in the 2001–2011 elections

	2000 Presidential	2005 Parliamentary	2005 Presidential	2007 Parliamentary	2010 Presidential	2011 Parliamentary
UK	2	3	3	20	41	43
Ireland	1	1	1	4	11	16
USA	21	14	15	21	28	27
Germany	6	5	5	6	12	11
All polling stations abroad	167	161	162	206	263	268

Source: State Election Commission.

The increased number of polling stations abroad has certainly made voting easier for Poles living abroad, which brought about more external votes. However, the 2007 election showed that many stations abroad were not prepared for the increased turnout. In the most popular polling station in Poland (Warsaw), 2,054 ballots were cast in 2007. In the same election, the station Chicago 4 issued over twice as many ballots (5,781), as did the station London 3 (5,397). Others (London 1 and 2, Dublin 1 and 2, Cologne in Germany) issued over 4,000 ballots each. The dynamism of the increase is particularly visible in the results of the parliamentary and presidential elections in the UK and Ireland since 2005. In 2005, a little over 3,000 people voted for president. In the following years, the number soared to 36,000 in 2007 and over 43,000 in 2010. A similarly significant increase was observed in Ireland, where 883 people voted in 2005 and 14,000 people in 2007; in the US, with 5.5 thousand voters in 2005 vs. 28,000 in 2007; and in Germany, where the number of voters increased three-fold (from 4,000 to over 14,000 voters) (see Table 3).

Votes cast abroad constitute around 1% of all votes cast in any Polish national election. Their impact on the overall result is therefore negligible, but symbolically extremely important. It is due to their propagandist value that, in order to encourage the emigrants to vote, politicians have started to appeal to them as a target audience in electoral campaigns by emphasising the existing divides in the heart of the diaspora.

5. POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THE POLISH DIASPORA IN THE LIGHT OF ELECTION RESULTS: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND THEIR EFFECTS

As mentioned above, the contemporary Polish diaspora is very divided and differentiated. The schisms are rooted in history and reflect the nature of successive waves of emigration as well as divisions existing in the homeland. These cleavages are also highlighted and exploited by politicians and political parties to mobilise their electorates at home and abroad, which is apparent in their electoral and media campaigns.

Permanent structural and axiological divides of Polish society are the subject of heated debate among political scientists²⁷. Researchers studying socio-political cleavages in Poland agree that Poles' electoral behaviours are motivated not by economic, class or material questions, but by axiological and religious ones, as well as those related to national identity, their outlook on the past and national history, etc.²⁸. The main splits existing in Polish society concern values (European values vs. national values), future-orientedness vs. past-orientedness, attitudes towards religion and the role of the Catholic Church (relative secularity vs. ostentatious Catholicism), opinions on the economy (liberalised vs. centralised), and on the centre vs. peripheries divide. These divisions intersect with social stratification: age, place of residence, education etc.

In the last decade, the dominant divide of the Polish political scene has been shaped by the main two parties: the centrist-liberal Civic Platform party (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), and the conservative-right wing Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS); their profiles reflect the above-mentioned cleavages. In the 2005 and the 2010 presidential elections, the leaders of the two parties competed in the second round. In both cases the right-wing candidate representing PiS (Lech Kaczyński in 2005 and Jarosław Kaczyński in 2010) gained 70% of votes in the US and 71 & 72% in Canada. Meanwhile, liberal-centrist candidates from PO (Donald Tusk in 2005 and Bronisław Komorowski in 2010) gained 71 & 72% of votes in the UK and 82 & 83% in Ireland, respectively.

²⁷ GRABOWSKA Mirosława & SZAWIEL Tadeusz, *Budowanie demokracji. Podziały społeczne, partie polityczne i społeczeństwo obywatelskie w postkomunistycznej Polsce* [Building democracy. Social cleavages, political parties and civil society in post communist Poland], Warszawa : Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2003; ZARYCKI Tomasz., «W poszukiwaniu peryferii. Teoria podziałów politycznych Lipseta - Rokkana w kontekście polskim» [Searching for peripheries. The Lipset – Rokkan theory of political cleavages in the context of Poland], In Dajnowicz, M. (ed.), *Oblicze polityczne regionów Polski* [Political character of the regions in Poland], Białystok: Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Finansów i Zarządzania w Białymstoku, 2007, pp.13-34.

²⁸ EVANS Geoffrey & WHITEFIELD Stephen, «Explaining the Formation of Electoral Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies», In KLINGEMANN Hans Dieter, MOCHMANN Ekkehard, NEWTON Kenneth (eds.) *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe: The First Wave*, Berlin: Edition Sigma, 2000, pp. 36-68; NOWAK Ewa, «Podziały strukturalne i aksjologiczne polskiego elektoratu. Wybory parlamentarne w 2007 roku» [Structural and normative cleavages of the Polish electorate. Parliamentary elections of 2007], *Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne* [Athenaeum. Polish Political Studies], 19, 2008, pp. 95-110.

A similar distribution has emerged in the parliamentary elections. Centrist and left-wing parties are most popular in the receiving countries of the post-accession emigration, whereas the Polish diaspora of the Americas vote traditionally for right-wing parties. This tendency was confirmed by the results of the 2007 parliamentary election: the centrist-liberal PO gained 74.5% of support in the UK and 77.3% in Ireland (as well as 62.7% in Germany and 54.87% in France), whereas the right-wing PiS got 66.14% of votes in the US and 67.12 in Canada. The distribution did not change much in 2011: the PO kept its high result in the UK (57%), in Ireland (55%), in Germany (57%), and in France (51%), whereas PiS gained the support of 67% of Poles living in the US and Canada.

The visible cleavage may be due to the emigrants' region of origin of and therefore the history of their clusters. Polish emigrants in America come predominantly from eastern and southern Poland, from traditionally conservative and nationalist regions (the Sub-Carpathian region in the south-east of the country has been the traditional source of emigrants to the Americas). The post-accession wave consists of young people living in the era of open borders and fluid mobility, unburdened by history, appreciative of Poland's accession to the EU and supporting liberal economic reforms and socio-political changes in their home country. Ideological divides, relating to values, identities and history are geographically and demographically entrenched in Polish society and are echoed in cleavages present in the diaspora, which have in turn been purposefully exploited by politicians from the main parties and by presidential candidates in their campaigns, in order to mobilise their electorates in Poland and abroad.

The political elites' efforts to politicize emigration and the diaspora became visible after the 2005 elections. For the first time, political parties included emigration as an important issue in their electoral platforms and appealed directly to emigrants and their families. The importance of the emigration issue for society and for political elites was reflected in the media. Post-accession migration and the realities of Poles abroad and their family members remaining at home became a subject frequently present in the media; this interest evolved into widespread public and political discourse over the twin issues of emigration and diaspora.

During the electoral campaigns of 2005-2010, Poles living abroad became a separate target group, and emigration – considered as the situation faced by Polish citizens abroad and by their families who were left behind, as well as the impact of mass outflows on Poland's society and economy – became one of the key concerns in the campaigns of political parties and presidential candidates. The topic of emigration was already present in the 2005 presidential campaign and the local election of 2006. However, it was in the 2007 parliamentary election that the press wrote about 'the Battle of Britain', a reference to the participation of Polish pilots in the defence of London in 1940. During the electoral campaigns, the negative effects of mass emigration on Polish families

and households were discussed heatedly²⁹. Both left- and right-wing politicians expressed their worry for the situation of the emigrants, made references to the notion of national community, and treated emigration as a necessary evil and a threat to society, the state and the emigrants themselves³⁰. The main message of the campaigns was addressed not only to emigrants themselves, but also to the families they had left behind. It was particularly obvious in the 2007 election, when right- and left-wing parties alike emphasised that it was the economy and the abandonment of reforms that forced young Poles to emigrate. Both sides suggested that the post-accession emigration was a way for citizens to show their distaste for politicians' decisions, manifest the young generation's non-acceptance of the political changes in Poland, of the high unemployment and lack of reforms and perspectives. Before the 2007 election, the Civic Platform party (then in opposition to the conservative government) claimed that the changes introduced by the right-wing conservative government had forced young Poles to leave³¹.

The 2010 campaign took place at the time of a return wave, when voters worried how to reintegrate the return migrants who decided to weather the crisis in the home country in the domestic labour market. From the very beginning of the crisis, the media very colourfully presented the spectre of a sudden mass return of Poles first from Iceland, then also from the UK and South European countries. Candidates and political parties tried to outdo each other by presenting support projects for the returning emigrants. The government established in 2008 the Interdepartmental Working Group on Return Migration, which formulated a programme on return migration³². It was followed by a broad governmental campaign named 'Have you got a PPlan to return?', which included a special guide-book for returnees and an official website. The internet was used here as a practical tool for effective communication between government and diaspora.

In the run-up to elections, leaders of the political parties and presidential candidates visited the biggest centres of the diaspora with great regularity. Representatives of the centrist Civic Platform party visited the UK, where they met with young ex-pats, students and managers, and the leaders of the right side of the political spectrum wooed the Polish diaspora in America. The political elite, who politicised the very process of emigration and included it in electoral campaigns and political programmes, targeted particular segments of the Polish

²⁹ MILLARD Frances, *Democratic Elections in Poland, 1991-2007*. London and New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 150-151.

³⁰ GARAPICH Michał, «Wyjechałem ot, tak... I nie jestem emigrantem. Polski dominujący dyskurs migracyjny i jego kontestacje na przykładzie Wielkiej Brytanii» [I have just left... and I am not an emigrant. Polish dominant migration discourse and its contestation based on the example of the UK], *Studia Migracyjne – Przegląd Polonijny* [Migration Studies – Polonia Review], 35/4, 2009, pp. 41-65.

³¹ SZCZEPAŃSKI Maciej, «Analiza polityki państwa wobec migracji powrotnych. Przypadek Polski» [The analysis of state policy towards return migration of the citizens], In LESIŃSKA, Magdalena (ed.), *Polityka państwa wobec migracji powrotnych własnych obywateli. Teoria i praktyka*. [The state policy on return migration of its citizens], *CMR Working Papers*, 44/102, 2010, p. 23.

³² SZCZEPAŃSKI Maciej, «Polityka rządu polskiego wobec najnowszych migracji powrotnych» [The Polish government's policy towards the latest return migrations], *The Poland-Polonia Review* 1, 2011, pp. 85-97.

diaspora, referencing and therefore deepening the existing cleavages. Thus the diaspora has become an object of the political game and party competition.

Ever since 2004 post-accession emigration has become one of the main topics in the media³³. However, the discourse concerning emigration is very diverse. The media focus on the negative impacts of mass emigration, such as loss of a young and talented generation (the 'lost generation' motif), the acceptance of low-skilled jobs by educated people ('brain waste') and the abandonment of children ('euro-orphans'). Everybody is willing to expound on the topic: politicians, scientists, experts, celebrities and the emigrants themselves. The topics that were particularly discussed in the early post-accession period included: reasons for emigrating, the nature of emigration, its consequences and the likelihood of return. The media portrayals of post-accession migration, as polarised as elsewhere, may be described as cosmopolitan vs. patriotic. The former claims that Poles are European citizens who are taking advantage of their right to free movement, whereas the latter emphasises that real Poles (the patriots) do not leave their homeland at a time of difficulty in its journey to dynamic growth.

The course and content of electoral campaigns and media discourse demonstrate clearly that political elites aim to preserve existing political cleavages within the Polish diaspora to gain the support of the voters within Poland and abroad at elections. Additionally, the strong media coverage of the topic of post-accession migration also contributed significantly to the focus on Poles living abroad in electoral campaigns, to expatriates' voting rates (however difficult it is to measure) and also indirectly to the overall election results.

6. CONCLUSION

An analysis of the level of participation of Poles living abroad in national elections reveals interesting dynamics in recent years. The main cause of the increased voter participation of the Polish diaspora since 2004 was the mass outflow of Poles after Poland joined the EU. The post-accession emigration gave rise to a dynamic increase in the number of Poles living abroad, and to the fact that the topic of emigration and emigrants became important to Polish society and political elites, which was reflected in political and media discourse. The 'new' post-accession wave enforced internal divisions within the Polish diaspora and mobilized its 'old' part. This phenomenon is clearly visible in the case of Poles in the US, where, despite a decrease in the Polish emigrant population, the

³³ LESIŃSKA Magdalena, «Will we be the second Ireland? The Polish labour migration to UK and Ireland after the 1st of May 2004 – a review of public discourse in Poland». Unpublished paper, presented at the conference *Three Years On: EU Accession and East European Migration to the UK and Ireland*, De Montfort University, Leicester, 20-21 April 2007; RICHTER Olga, «Medialny obraz migracji Polaków do krajów Unii Europejskiej po 1 maja 2004 roku na podstawie analizy treści tygodników opinii» [Migration of Poles to EU countries after 1st of May 2004 in the media-analysis of weekly press], *CMR Working Papers*, 53, 2012, p.111.

number of voters reached previously unseen levels. This is proof that people who had been inactive in earlier elections have started to take an interest and vote.

The dynamics of electoral participation is largely due to the political elite who treat emigrants as a pawn in the electoral game; it helps them compete for the emigrants' support and the votes of the families they have left in the home country. By emphasising the existing cleavages inside the diaspora, political parties and presidential candidates strengthen the simplified distinction between the right-wing, conservative 'old' diaspora and the centrist, liberal, post-accession 'new' one in order to mobilise their respective constituencies during election campaigns. The effectiveness of such a strategy has been proven by the results of the elections and the visible divide in expatriates' voting trends.

Another important factor that encourages the emigrants to vote is the reorganisation of how Poles may vote abroad. The diaspora's willingness to vote in national elections was already apparent in 2005, and the long queues at polling stations all over Europe were shown in all the Polish media, which in turn drew politicians' attention. In a short time, the number of electoral constituencies and polling stations abroad was significantly increased, particularly in the receiving countries of the newest wave of emigration. A simplified registration system and voting methods were also introduced.

The real impact of the external votes on the overall result of the elections is insignificant. This is due to the electoral system, in which votes cast abroad in parliamentary elections are attributed to a single, populous constituency in the capital and due to the small number of external votes relative to votes cast domestically. Despite this, political elites addressed parts of their electoral programs and campaigns directly to emigrants and consciously politicized the issues of emigration and diaspora to reinforce existing socio-political divides and to mobilize voters not only abroad but also in the homeland.

LES MIGRATIONS EN EUROPE : QUELLES CAUSES POUR QUELLES CONSÉQUENCES ÉCONOMIQUES ?

OUSSAMA EZZEDDINE

*« Les migrations seront plus que jamais
au cœur des grands débats de société
du XXI^e siècle car les questions
qu'elles suscitent interpellent l'avenir
de l'Europe et du monde entier »¹.*

Depuis une cinquantaine d'années, la notion d'immigration a émergé en tant que composante intégrante des économies modernes. Le thème de l'immigration s'inscrit dans une logique pluridisciplinaire puisqu'il aborde diverses questions économiques et sociétales historiquement et politiquement marquées. Depuis longtemps, plusieurs domaines de recherche prennent en compte la question migratoire au sens large : l'anthropologie, les sciences politiques, la démographie, le droit, l'ethnologie, l'histoire, la linguistique, la sociologie et bien évidemment l'économie... La question de l'immigration renvoie donc à des problématiques socio-économiques diverses et variées qui intègrent des dimensions d'analyses plurielles.

On relie souvent, en économie, l'immigration aux performances du marché du travail ou de l'économie nationale. Perçue comme un moyen de favoriser l'expansion économique lors des périodes de croissance économique, la dynamique migratoire contemporaine pourrait avoir des incidences négatives sur le marché du travail des pays récepteurs, dans les périodes de récession.

C'est la mobilité du travail qui nous intéresse dans le cadre de cet article. La migration de travail comporte quatre flux différents :

- Les migrants qui cherchent un travail
- Les étrangers qui, changeant de statut, souhaitent entrer dans le monde du travail (demandeurs d'asiles acceptés, étudiants étrangers)

¹ GOUREVITCH Jean-Paul, *Les migrations en Europe : les réalités du présent, les défis du futur*, Acropole, 2007, p.19.