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The (not quite yet?) Brexit issue

Brexit is fast approaching. Or maybe not. One way or the other, it is very much present in the minds of migrants and migration scholars in the EU, including CMR scholars. In this issue, we present several Brexit-related research projects which are currently taking place at CMR. They aim to answer such basic questions as: how was the Brexit referendum result related with large-scale migration from Central Europe?; who is returning and who is staying because of Brexit?

The @IMISCOE Spring Conference on “Transforming Mobility and Immobility: Brexit and Beyond”, organized by the Migration Research Group @SheffieldMRG at the University of Sheffield and CMR, which will take place on 28-29 March, will be a fantastic occasion to discuss these and other Brexit-related projects.



Dover Banksy by ijclark



15 years of post-enlargement intra-EU mobility: a tale of economic opportunities and political threats

Paweł Kaczmarczyk

Free movement of workers is commonly presented as one of key issues in the debate on EU enlargements and its aftermaths. Apparently, free movement of labour is one the four basic principles of the European Community set out in the Treaty of Rome but still the pre-2004 discussion dealt more with possible risks and benefits than institutional principles. Proponents of the free movement emphasized the importance of mobility of labour as a means towards more efficient allocation of resources and as a convergence mechanism, but also have seen it as a way to promote European values in the Eastern part of the continent. Adversaries focused more on income differentials between the European West and East, and the still incomplete process of socio-economic transition in the accession countries. As a consequence, the negotiation process was difficult and resulted in a selective application of Transitional Arrangements that made the accession (in the area of free movement) a process staged over a number of phases and created a space for possible diversion effects.

Today, in March 2019, almost 15 years since the 2004 enlargement round we have to our disposal a very broad base of empirical research to assess the post-accession migration as a 'laboratory of open borders' (Benton, Petrovic 2013). Undoubtedly, the effects of the introduction of a free migratory regime turned out to be spectacular.

According to the EU-LFS, the number of EU12 nationals residing in EU15 countries increased from around 1 million in 2004 to 3 million in 2007 and more than 6 million in 2014 (to stabilize later on). In terms of numbers, mobility of the 'new Europeans' mattered the most for the United Kingdom and Ireland (in the case of EU8 nationals, among others due to the fact that these two countries opened their labour markets already in May 2004) and for Italy and Spain, if we consider migrants from Bulgaria and Romania. The post-accession migrants proved to be relatively young, well-educated and clearly work oriented. These characteristics, combined with favourable conditions on host labour markets, determined the labour market outcomes of the newcomers. And they are – in general terms – beneficial as mobile persons from EU8 countries tend to have higher labour market participation rates, higher employment rates and lower unemployment rates than recorded in the case of natives. Available complex economic models (particularly various versions of Computable General Equilibrium Models that allow to control for large sets of variables and include multiplier effects) point to relatively positive aggregate effects for those countries which opened their labour markets in 2004 and negligible outcomes for the rest of the EU (Brücker 2009; Holland et al. 2011). On the same note, empirical analyses challenge a common belief that intra-European migrants

are driven by the magnetism of generous welfare systems in the EU15 countries and tend to overuse them (OECD 2013). In fact, particularly in the British case, the post-accession migrants proved to have (very) positive impact on budgets of host countries (Dustmann, Frattini, Halls 2010). Generally if we consider aggregate level statistical data one could conclude that 1) post-accession migration has had a positive economic impact on receiving countries and, additionally, 2) has played some role in alleviating negative consequences of the global financial and economic crisis of late 2000s (Jauer et al. 2019).

These outcomes seems puzzling considering the anti-immigrant debate which accompanied the 2016 EU referendum in the UK, and is present in many other EU countries. In my paper I try to show that this is an illusive paradox, though. Despite aggregated positive economic outcomes, migration always brings some adverse effects, including also social and political consequences. The British case seems particularly instructive in that matter, as the UK economy could easily be portrayed as a winner of the post-enlargement 'migration experiment'. Still, the massive inflow of migrants resulted in a number of undesirable distributional effects that could easily be employed by anti-European political movements and according to many observers may have played some role in the 2016 EU Referendum (Becker, Fetzer, Novy 2017).

The post-enlargement migration experience shows clearly that if we focus on aggregate level / average effects we lose from sight extremes of the distribution and these cases

(voters, members of the society) can be decisive in political terms. In economic, social and political terms, migration is 'what you make it' (Clemens et al. 2018). Thus one of the responsibilities of policymakers should be to identify both opportunities and risks related to mobility and to address them in a sufficiently efficient way (including distributional effects).

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
Envisaging post-Brexit immobilities: Polish migrants’ care intentions concerning their elderly parents

Agnieszka Radziwinowiczówna, Anna Rosińska, Weronika Kloc-Nowak

Brexit is used as an additional excuse for migrants not to provide personal care to aging parents in the future. ‘Whatever will be, will be’ reasoning also increased between 2016 and 2018

Leaving the European Union by the United Kingdom will involve the cease of the freedom of movement and of the privileged status for EU citizens in the UK as part of the exit process. It will likely affect ‘Brexit families’ (Kofman, 2017) and their transnational care arrangements (Radziwinowiczówna, Rosińska, Kloc-Nowak 2018). Poles form the biggest migrant diaspora in Great Britain, often brought up in the discussions by the ‘Leave’ voters in the EU membership referendum.

In 2016, in the period immediately before the referendum, we identified several types of intentions versus the envisaged care for these migrants’ parents who remained in Poland (Kordasiewicz, Radziwinowiczówna, & Kloc-Nowak, 2018). In 2018 we followed-up with a second wave of our qualitative panel on research participants’ care intentions.



In the paper we analyze how the looming Brexit affects Polish migrants’ care intentions concerning their parents ageing in Poland and their perception of the changes that Brexit will bring about. The paper sees care intentions as discursive strategies that need to be included in the analysis in order to understand the lived experience of care. Brexit appears as one of the accounts (Scott & Lyman, 1968) not to provide personal elderly care in the future, together with, more widespread than in 2016, reasoning called ‘whatever will be, will be’, indicating higher uncertainty that Brexit brings about for Polish migrants.


Brexit as a factor encouraging Poles to remain in the UK

Barbara Jancewicz, Weronika Kloc-Nowak, Dominika Pszczołkowska

Brexit is not the main factor which influences Poles’ decisions whether to remain in the UK. Economic issues are far more important. However, among those who were influenced by the UK’s planned departure from the EU, it was more in the direction of staying permanently or extending their stay.

This surprising finding comes from a survey of Poles in the UK (N=445) conducted by CMR between June and September 2018. It may seem contradictory with Office of National Statistics data, which show that increasing numbers of Poles are leaving the UK, and that the balance of migrations from Poland to the UK became negative in 2017 for the first time since Poland’s EU accession (ONS 2018). However, it may also show that those Poles who have not left in the two years following the Brexit referendum in June 2016 are more determined to stay. In the survey, significantly more Poles declared that Brexit influenced them in the direction of staying permanently or at least extending their stay (a total of 36.2%) than in the direction of not staying permanently or shortening their stay (total of 8.5%). This was true irrespective of age, professional group or length of stay in the UK. Coupled with large percentages of Poles already holding or declaring the intention to apply for British citizenship (6.5 % of respondent in our survey held British citizenship, 2.6 % had already

applied for citizenship, 29.8% intended to do so; ONS data show that 33,300 Polish people have been granted citizenship since 2005, with the numbers increasing sharply since 2014) or a residence permit, the results leads us to believe that Brexit may in fact be encouraging some Poles to settle more permanently in the UK.



However, the key issue may prove to be how Brexit influences the British economy, since the largest groups of Poles point to economic issues as those which encourage them to remain in the UK and discourage them from returning.

Geographical and occupational trajectories of multiple migrants from Poland

Olga Czeranowska, Dominika Winogrodzka

International mobility is unavoidably connected with occupational mobility – when individuals move to another country, their positions on the labour market necessarily change. This may mean upward or downward mobility in terms of income/occupational position and/or changing sector/specialization. International mobility can be used as a strategy of career development (Beaverstock 2002, 2005) or dealing with a difficult situation on the labour market in the country of origin. However, human capital is not fully transferable, which is one of the costs of migration. Moreover, the more educated migrants are, the more they can lose in terms of occupational position (Chiswick et.al 2005).

Due to the political and economic circumstances, Poland has a long history of migrations and established cultural patterns of mobility. After Poland's accession to the European Union in 2004 new possibilities of mobility were (gradually) opened and new profiles of migrants emerged. One of these new tendencies are multiple migrations, that is trajectories consisting of more than two countries of destination (Salamońska 2017). Great Britain was one of the first EU member states to open its labour market for Polish

migrants which, connected with other factors, made this country the main destination of Polish post-2004 emigration (Okólski, Salt 2014), especially for younger and more educated migrants (Grabowska-Lusińska, Okólski 2009).

In our presentation, we would like to analyze young Polish multiple migrants' geographical and occupational trajectories. We will be using data gathered in two research projects: Education-to-domestic and- foreign labour market transitions of youth: The role of local community, peer group and new media and In search of a theory of multiple migration. A quantitative and qualitative study of Polish migrants after 1989. We will look at subjective and objective dimensions of careers, taking into consideration education and human capital, as well as duration and number of migrations. We would like also to analyze motivations behind young people's international mobility and level of their satisfaction with results of migrations.

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